A PÓLAY ELEMÉR ALAPÍTVÁNY KÖNYVTÁRA 86

Communicative Space – Political Space

11th Central and Eastern European Communication and Media Conference, 2018

Pólay Elemér Alapítvány

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and Media Conference, 2018

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86

Készült a Szegedi Tudományegyetem
Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara
Politológiai Tanszékén.

Tanszékvezető:
Molnár Judit
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Communicative Space – Political Space

11th Central and Eastern European Communication and Media Conference, 2018

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EDITORS' PREFACE

Spatial turn has been one of the influential cultural 'turns' in the last few decades each of which has a focus on interpretation, problematizes epistemological questions and has a strong emphasis on methodology. Through the social scientific analyses of *space*, it has become apparent that contrary to its former concept focusing solely on its obvious physicality, space is produced in social practices: it provides identity for the individual and communicates symbolic meanings. These understandings have led to a marked differentiation of *space* and *place* in the social sciences. Spatial turn not only had its impacts on social sciences and cultural studies, but it also played a crucial role in the career of cultural geography. Globalization and the related processes of networked culture and digitalization have revealed that the spatially circumscribed phenomenon of *culture* and space controlling entities of *society* and *nation* have to be reconsidered and reinterpreted. Similarly to these reconsiderations, the traditional interpretations of *publicity*, *politics* and *community-creation* all deriving from the abstract concepts of space have to be reevaluated also. The relationship between *space* as a geographic and *place* as a cultural entity can be problematized as the relationship of *sign* and *meaning*. Contemporary tendencies show the dominance of *imaginary* spaces (i.e. places) that lack geographical reference (that is they are not organized in the fashion of geographical models). The concepts of socially relevant spaces (culture, society, nation) have been fundamentally eroded by the economic logic of late capitalism, while the current (soon to be recent) revolution in communication technologies has brought forward brand new spatial experiences that poses a challenge to the previous interconnectedness of *culture* and *locality* (that has already been questioned by migration). New spaces created by the new technologies are often described with traditional spatial terms while they lack every aspect of physical spatiality.

However, it is important to note that this is not entirely a late-modern phenomenon. The reflection on non-direct spatial experience has already been present from the 19th century in the spatial experiences of diverse technological media and in the medially defined spatial experience of mass media (and mass culture). The concept of medially constructed and socially defined space can create a focal point for the interpretation of many issues regarding social communication: e.g. paradigm shifts in the public sphere (right until the new publics of social media), the relationship between politics and media (the mediatization of politics) or the new forms of power and control (surveillance) in mediatized spaces.

Mediatization appearing in spatial experience conveys a new cultural logic that potentially changes almost every traditional form of communication and representation. Social media platforms are one of the most researched areas in contemporary social sciences. However, only a small amount of the research analyzes the connection between physical and online space, and the communicative and political diversities in these spaces. Even traditional limits of physical spaces have become blurred – or at least reduced in significance – due

to the immense traffic of people, goods and information. These practices – whether online or offline invoke new experiences of spatiality, identity and belonging.

Scholars often consider the use of Social Networking Sites (SNS) by institutional actors an automatism: the actors follow their audience to the new places/spaces of action. At the same time they adapt their style, form and nature of communication to the allowances of these new spaces. For instance, the concept of mediatization is not an automatism from this perspective: it is rather a functional principle of media, more preferably the social media. The process that was interpreted before as the self-representation of institutions can rather be conceptualized as the self-mediatization of institutions.

Pressured to mediatize themselves, political and media actors of all kinds are all increasingly driven to involve themselves in the complex processes of self-mediatization. Social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter homogenize the possibilities in communication, but does this mean that they homogenize politics, communication and public space as well?

This book of conference proceedings gives a preview of the most discussed topics during the 11th Central and Eastern European Conference held in Szeged, Hungary. The event was co-organised by the Department of Communication and Media Studies, and the Department of Political Science of the University of Szeged. Presenters came from almost all the states of Europe, and also from Brazil, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, India, and Mexico. They gave almost 140 presentations in 34 panels talking about the latest results of their research.

This volume includes the edited version of 32 presentations by 37 authors.

Szeged, 2019–2020

LOGO AS A VISUAL SYMBOL OF COUNTRY'S IDENTITY

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Abstract: Developing a country brand is of vital importance for places as branding can contribute to the success achieved in the development of the region itself. There seems to be a recognizable gap in the literature regarding the application of visual signs in place marketing. The research identifies logos of the EU countries. The purpose of this study is to analyse the visual identities of countries through the content analysis of logos. Content analysis research method was used to obtain visual identity of the countries. The results of the study illustrate how governmental institutions portray countries in internet and social media.

Keywords: country/nation branding, visual identity, EU countries, tourism marketing, social media

Introduction

Picture, image, screen are the concepts characterizing contemporary global culture. A man of the 21st century lives in an environment in which a graphic message, drawing, photo, film or 3D animation disclose, in communication processes, contents significant for both the sender and the recipient. Images have dominated modern communication and replaced to a large degree traditional verbal communication. An individual creates images in his/her own mind, which are the result of a two-way process between messages sent by various sources in the environment and by himself/herself. The visual message has a significant meaning for every person, organization, product, and place. Cities, regions and countries use numerous tools to communicate with citizens and visitors in a variety of ways, including images that are the bearer of information. That is why nowadays such questions as – how is the content of a particular picture built, what is the relationship between the picture and the object it illustrates, how does the picture communicate the values important for the sender? – might be raised.

A logo is one of the most popular pictures in public space, which presents and symbolizes a particular organisation, including a place. It is a graphical sign of promotional and informational significance. The authors of the presented article decided to examine this

popular communication technique that is simple, but at the same time commonly practiced, also by the EU countries.

The first objective of the presented research was to collect data to build – as comprehensive as possible – an empirical database of logos used in promotional communication for touristic purposes by the EU countries. The second objective was to add to the theory of place branding the basis of empirical research. Relatively rich theoretical literature on marketing, promotion and visual identity of places takes primarily advantage of case studies and theoretical models built on the basis of these cases (Chan & Marafa, 2013; Hanna & Rowley, 2008). Before the research started, the authors had recognised few empirical studies that would allow one to identify the existing principles and the rules of the visual communication of place identity (Lee, Rodrigez & Sar, 2012; Zeybek & Unlu, 2016; Newell & Canessa, 2018). Kots et al. (2018, p. 113) suggests that the role of visual elements has not been systematically studied with respect to place branding. The third objective of the presented research is practical. Gathering all available logos of the EU countries allows the reader (e.g. designers of the visual identification of a place) to recognize existing signatures and thus, help institutions responsible for place branding to prepare more applicable logos and other visual images. The logo is the most visible and frequent reminder of what the brand stands for (Wheeler, 2009, p. 35).

Having in mind these three objectives the authors try to find answers for the following research questions:

1. Are logos present *genius loci* of the countries or are they rather metaphors of the imaginary space?
2. In what way does a logo communicate the identity of a particular country?

Identity and place identity

Although a logo as a visual symbol has a long history in public space, there are still people who confuse identity with visual identification (Baker, Balmer & van Riel, 1997). The term *identity* is variously defined depending on a given scientific discipline and theoretical approach, it is semantically vague and full of contradictions of definitions (Soenen & Moingeon, 2002). It plays a critical role, because it provides meaning, stability, and distinctiveness (Soenen & Moingeon, 2002, p. 1). Psychologists, especially social psychologist and sociologists, have studied the concept of social identity beginning from the 40. of the 20th century. The subject in recent years has gained impetus in the field of organizational behaviour (Clark, Chandler & Barry, 1994), marketing (Dowling, 2001; Kapferer, 2008), management (Fombrun & van Riel, 2004), public relations (L'Etang, 2010) and human resource management (Gioia et al., 2000).

The topic was developed by Henry Tajfel, who discussed the issue of social identity, unambiguously linking the term identity with the position of an individual in a society. Under this concept, the British psychologist understands an element of the individual's self-image, resulting from his/her knowledge of belonging to a social group (or groups), including the emotional significance attributed to this membership (Tajfel, 1978). The individual's identity is the awareness of oneself in a particular society; it is the result of human life in society (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). There is no identity in isolation from the social context. Social identity is basically the sense of unity constructed between individuals (Ashforth & Mael, 1989) and it occurs when an individual

is identified with a particular group. Individuals belonging to a group define themselves in relation to this group and distinguish themselves from the others (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

People build bonds with a particular place and "this attachment may serve as integral component of self-identity" (Storey, 2012, p. 11). People and places are mutually constructed and constituted (Harvey, 2001). Identity of a place has been explored by different disciplines (Convery et al., 2012). It participates in the larger concept of self (Proshansky, Fabian & Kaminoff, 1983). Such understanding of identity is a key element in branding (Kapferer, 2008, p. 117), which defines the brand identity as a concept of a brand designed and presented by an organization (Geuens et al. 2009). The identity of each brand is its quintessence and originality. Identity draws upon the brand's roots and heritage – everything that gives it its unique authority and legitimacy within a realm of precise values and benefits (Kapferer, 2008, p. 178). A distinctive brand identity enables the consumers to fulfil their self-definition needs for being unique (Berger & Heath, 2007; Ruvio, 2008; Tian et al., 2001).

Although social identity theory was originally developed to explain intergroup relations, it has heavily influenced research on organizational identity and identification in the last 15 years (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Haslam, 2001; van Dick, 2004). Corporate identity refers to the way that the organization presents itself to its stakeholders and answers the question "Who are you? (Dowling, 2001). Sense of place (Pretty et al., 2003), place attachments (More & Graefe, 1994), place identity (Lalli, 1992; Proshansky et al., 1983; Hawke, 2010), *genius loci* (Norberg-Schultz, 1980) are terms which define characters, the 'spirit' and specifics of a place. The discussion over essence of the place influences also on the debate how such feature can be disclosed and how it can be shown in promotional strategies of places.

Logo as a visual sign of *genius loci*

Logo is a particular and distinctive visual symbol that has clear goals: description and distinction (Mollerup, 2013). This picture is organic, because it is created in long processes of knowledge accumulation, collecting experiences, formal education and media impact (Kots et al. 2018, p. 113). Another issue having crucial meaning for this symbol is the process of decision-making itself and its stages (Plassman, Ramsoy & Milasavljevic, 2012), which have impact on the logo content. Some researchers strongly emphasised the impact of stakeholders on such a picture (Hunkinson, 2004).

The purchase of durable goods like a place (city, region, country) as a product is a long-term commitment. People are social beings; this is why they make evaluation and assessments of certain choices they make, with implication to their social belonging. Such a process explains why social identity is also built around the logos and the brands that people follow (Kapferere, 2008). Consequently, the country's brand is in competition with other countries: it must be perceived as distinctive, reliable and attractive for recipients – tourists, visitors, investors and inhabitants (Kotler, Haider & Rein, 1993; Zenker, 2009; Zenker & Beckmann, 2013). The country's brand must, therefore, have a positioning based on the identity promoted abroad: perceived values, perceived history, perceived competence and accomplishments that prove it, make the brand. (Kapferer, 2008, p. 125).

Every country has its own specificity, its idea, its essential authenticity, *genius loci*, or a certain 'spirit', 'sense' which determines its attractiveness and substance. The issue of this essence of the place is the subject of considerations of urban sociologists, urban planners

and architects. *Genius loci* is a term introduced to the language of sociologists and urban planners to convey a certain character of the place which consists of nature transformed by human activities into a cultural landscape determining how things exist and how they are perceived (Norberg-Schulz, 1980; Jałowiecki, 2009). *Genius loci* as well as the term 'identity', is variously defined depending on a given scientific discipline and theoretical approach, it is vague semantically and full of definitional contradictions. Place identity is *genius loci* whose presence is revealed in architecture, landscape, myths, superstitions and people themselves. That is why the question arises: is visual identity that is a figurative presentation of the uniqueness of a given place, also reflected in its *genius loci*. *Genius loci* is a natural element of a given place, resulting from its history, tradition, location, inhabiting the community and its culture, which is called by Norberg-Schulz – the character of the place. The literature on the subject shows that the *genius loci* is relatively durable, due to its rooting in the permanent components of space, such as landscape, climate, architecture, urban planning. The concept of *genius loci* is matched by the term 'fixed elements' or an anchor in the territorial marketing researches. The literature of the place marketing presents the shared view that logo and visual identification system should be based on a whole range of tests and analyses, while the logo itself should be related to what the particular unit is (organization, company, place) and subjected to the branding process. That is why it is assumed that logo, as a visual picture that is expected to present the essence of the place, should expose the spirit of it, its *genius loci*.

To present the sense of a place, graphic designers as well as marketing specialists try to search for the best sign, which might represent the place (or organisation) in a clear, understandable and easily noticeable way. Michael Evamy claims that there is fluidity between the visual symbol (motif) and the typographical name of the name (Evamy, 2007). Farther he distinguishes the 'logotype', indicating that it can appear in three versions: the wordmark, the monogram and the single letter mark. The German authors Matthias Beyrow and Constance Vogt refer to the territorial (urban) signs using the term 'Logo alias Stadtzeichen', meaning the city's sign (Beyrow & Vogt, 2015). Per Mollerup, in turn, explains that visual identity is built from the following basic elements, including: a verbal sign of the brand (name mark), i.e. the name of the organization written in a specific way, symbol or picture mark, selected colours, company typography, and so-called the fifth element, that is the additional decorative element. According to Mollerup, the term trademark includes the wordmark and the graphic symbol. In the same sense the word 'logo' is used. As Healey defines: "Symbol plus name remains the most common form of the logo". In contrast, the 'wordmark' refers to the verbal brand characters (Adamus-Matuszyńska & Dzik, 2017). Summing up, logo identifies the business in a very modest form using well-known symbols, icons or other marks that both identify and distinguish a particular object (in case of presented research – a country as a place). Transforming such a definition into place branding one should not expect the logo of a country would convert its *genius loci*.

Research methods

A visual content analysis was used to code the data, since logo is a graphic representation and it is a reasonable way of finding out something about the meaning of such symbol, as well as it allows for general statements to be made about aspects of the representation which tourists, investors, residents alike can understand (Oliveira & Panyik, 2015). Therefore,

the authors of this study have examined the pictures (logos) applying the content analysis research method, understood as a research process serving the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the message content (Lisowska-Magdziarz, 2004, p. 13; Rose, 2001, p. 55). Content analysis of the graphic symbols used in promotion consists of four stages (Rose, 2001, pp. 56-66):

- finding images – countries' logos were found on official webpages, social media and in other promotional publications;
- devising categories for coding – coding means attaching a set of descriptive labels (or categories) to the images (Rose, 2001, p. 58);
- coding the images – applying distinguished categories into countries' logos;
- analysing the results – formulating conclusions and discussion of the questions.

Exploring the literature – both graphic design and place branding – which addresses the logo issue, one may find numerous studies and typologies of visual symbols used in marketing. To develop categories for coding the authors used taxonomies elaborated by graphic designer – Mollerup, as well as marketing specialists – Beyrow and Vogt. These two typologies were chosen, because firstly, they represent two fields with the greatest impact on the content of logos. Secondly, Mollerup elaborated on the taxonomy which is relevant in today's design theory and practice. He also used to be an international expert preparing proposals for national design policies for Estonia (2003), Latvia (2004), and Lithuania (2008). Beyrow and Vogt collected and analysed logos of the German cities and published first in the world a book about city's logos. They used in it a specially prepared typology that let them disclose specifics of these visual symbols. All presented city signs (*Ger. Stadtsignet*) have a main objective to symbolise appropriately the city (Beyrow & Vogt, 2015, p. 34). That is why the relevance of the sign is signalled. Thus, logos in the cited book called „city signs" (*Ger. Stadtzeichen*), lead to the question: what constitutes the content of a city logo (*Ger. Gehalt*)? In further analyses German authors divide the content of a logo into three main categories:

Substance (*Ger. Substanz*), when a logo exposes what a city administrates and offers to the public (for example, the logo which shows existing buildings, bridges, monuments, etc.),

Presence (*Ger. Präsenz*), when a logo presents the fact of the city's existence (by, for example, the logotypes).

Reference (*Ger. Referenz*), when a logo discloses the values of the symbols (for example, the logos referring to heraldry or cultural heritage of a city).

Taking into account two classifications and the experience in researching the Polish city logos, the authors decided to analyse the EU countries logos considering four different categories. The first class used for content analysis was 'substance' in Beyrow and Vogt's understanding. The EU countries' logos were investigated whether they contain substance such as cultural and natural elements. The second category was taken from the Mollerup's classification. The term 'motif' is defined in Mollerup's concept (Mollerup, 2013. p. 129) and understood as the illustration of the storyline subject (theme). Mollerup presents many examples of graphic (visual) motifs, and then clarifies them in the proposed taxonomy. One of the presented motifs can be described as 'human' (p. 180), which is understood as a real or fictional person. Additionally, the category of time was considered, to pay attention to the values of the proposed logos. This analysis was made referring to the previous research of authors on the logotypes of Polish cities. It turned out that visual symbols, contained in logos very frequently, clearly refer to the past, the present or the future. Finally, the core

values expounded and explained in the documents (brand books) were studied to find links between pictures and their clarification prepared by the creators of logos or authors of the idea revealed in the logo content. In some promotional strategies the main values are explained and in such a way that the *genius loci* is visually exposed. The brand's deepest values must be reflected in the external signs of recognition, and these must be apparent at first glance (Kapferer, 2008, p. 173).

Logo presentation

Table 1 contains the characteristics of the EU countries' logos content divided according to the Mollerup's criteria into three categories. It also includes references to the time and brand values. The last column contains additional information about the logo.

Table 1. *Logo content presentation*

	Substance		**Human**		**Time (past, present, future, not defined)**	**Brand values**	**Additional remarks**
Country (nation)/ region	**Culture**	**Nature**	**Known person (Real or legendary)**	**People in general, society, community**			
Austria	-	-	Slogan clearly states that Austria as a country invites people to arrive and revive.	-	-	Creativity Attentiveness Enjoyment of life Sense of belonging	The Austrian flag is the most important element of the logo, the addressed idea is stressed in the slogan. The values are explained in the document called: "The brand. Holiday in Austria".
Belgium – Brussels	-	A flower – iris which is a symbol of the region	-	-	-	Diversity Omnipresent Creativity	The values are projected in different colours depending on the specific departments, media or areas: events, culture, business and congresses, art of living, etc.
Belgium – Flanders	Flemish lion that comes from the coat of arms.	-	-	-	Referred to the past, because a coat of arms is a symbol of the past	Imagination	This logo is universal, not only for tourists.
Belgium – Wallonia	-	Nature – hills and valleys	-	-	-	Identifies the destination and Belgium as a country.	The logo communicates through colours: culture, nature and locality. The country is identified by the colour red. In promotional materials, human beings must be presented to show the people as the core value in Wallonia.
Bulgaria	-	A rose which is a traditional symbol of Bulgaria.	-	-	-	-	Traditional Damask rose oil is a symbol of Bulgaria and well known to Europeans. These roses are available only in Bulgaria.

	Substance		Human		Time (past, present, future, not defined)	Brand values	Additional remarks
Country (nation)/ region	**Culture**	**Nature**	**Known person (Real or legendary)**	**People in general, society, community**			
Croatia	Sailboat	Sea, sun Palm fronds	-	-	Meaning of the past referring to the Croatia's heraldic symbolism	Happiness and relaxation	The multitude of languages used in the name of Croatia has an important meaning to avoid political difficulties. The content of the logo is very rich. It takes advantages of different languages.
Cyprus	-	Sea, heart, sun	Legendary figure – Aphrodite.	-	Mythological past	Heritage Tradition	Referring to Aphrodite because Cyprus is perceived as the birthplace of Aphrodite.
Czech Republic	-	-	-	-	History Stories	Values are included in the slogan which is an integral element of the country's logo.	Czech national colours which are connected with the idea of panslavonic identity. Logo unified destination brand-name.
Denmark	-	The heart as a symbol of Danish way of life.	-	-	-	Diversity Eye-to-eye (direct contact) Creativity Danish hospitality	The colours of the Danish flag. The primary colours are powerful, eye-catching and symbolise strength, dynamism and 'Danishness'.
Estonia	Digital society as a contemporary symbol of Estonia	-	-	Society	Future	Independent minds Clean environment Digital society 3 crucial vales: Nordic, surprising, smart.	Instead of having a particular logo, Estonia uses specially prepared fonts called "aino".
Finland	-	-	-	-	Not defined	Unconventional Fresh, Individual Alternative	
France	-	-	Woman as a symbol of France	-	Timeless	Liberty Authenticity Sensuality	The design is a fluid feminine figure that is modern, sensual, timeless and forward-looking.

	Substance		Human		Time (past, present, future, not defined)	Brand values	Additional remarks
Country (nation)/ region	**Culture**	**Nature**	**Known person (Real or legendary)**	**People in general, society, community**			
Germany	-	-	Logo shows emotions and radiate friendliness	-	Not defined	Diversity, Vibrancy, Friendliness, Perfection and – not least – unity and uniformity.	Colours related to the German flag. The picture is a single eye-catching. There are three different slogans which are immanent part of the logo. This is a signature.
Greece	-	-	-	-	The past which is fashionable all the time.	Democracy Philosophy Music Theatre Architecture Olympism	The logo symbolises: national colours, both ancient and different cultures, tradition, ways of life, sunny beaches, mountains and wilderness, together with islands. Logo objective is to build the brand name.
Hungary	-	-	-	-	Present and future	Modernity Friendliness Activity	Informal element of logo - greetings. Logo promotes the brand name. There is a different logo addressed to the Hungarian tourist market.
Ireland	-	Shamrock as a traditional symbol of Ireland	-	-	Not defined	-	According to the meaning of shamrock it brings luck. Nothing is explained. This is just a corporate sign to identify the country.
Italy	-	-	-	-	Not defined	Sustainability, digital innovation, quality accommodation/ services and adaptation to the new trends of the demand.	Logo objective is to build brand name only the name of the country is in the logo. Reviving Italy – the goal of the tourism strategy.

	Substance		Human		Time (past, present, future, not defined)	Brand values	Additional remarks
Country (nation)/ region	**Culture**	**Nature**	**Known person (Real or legendary)**	**People in general, society, community**			
Latvia	Technology	-	-	-	Future	Core values: Versatility Modern Innovative Forward-thinking	The slogan expresses values: "Best enjoyed slowly"
Lithuania	Postage stamp	-	-	Real people	Present	Realness	The slogan (Real is Beautiful) is an integral part of the logo.
Luxembourg	The sign X consists of 4 bi-directional arrows distinguishes Luxemburg from other countries.	-	-	-	Present	Openness, dynamic, reliable, development	National colours, The logotype is made up of lettering Luxemburg and the symbol X, which replaces the letter X.
Malta	Maltese Cross inside 4 arrows.	-	-	-	Logo refers to the past (Maltese Cross).	-	Very new logo published in February 2018. No explanation of what the logo means. Colours used in logo may mean: Gold – a sun Green – nature Blue – a symbol of sky Red is connected with Maltese cross and national colours of Malta.
the Netherlands	-	Sunny tulip -	Rembrandt who inspired the sketch lettering.	The open minded people.	Not defined	Welcoming Colourful Inventive Enterprising	The colour – orange -links the logo to the country's royal heritage. In logo the name Holland is used instead of the Netherlands. It is because the name Holland is often used when all of the Netherlands is referred to.

	Substance		Human		Time (past, present, future, not defined)	Brand values	Additional remarks
Country (nation)/ region	**Culture**	**Nature**	**Known person (Real or legendary)**	**People in general, society, community**			
Poland	-	Mountains, water, tree	-	-	Past	Heritage Diversity	The symbol is very generic. The logo is expected to accompany the collage of national icons.
Portugal	Haven	-	A mythical figure. A warrior – a Portuguese hero	People who are explorers, seafarers – warm people	Past	Old times	A symbol that represents Portugal as an Atlantic country. Colours come from the Portuguese flag.
Romania	Folklore Rural life	-	-	-	Past	Nature Authenticity Tradition Unique culture	Gold – a sun Green – nature Blue – a symbol of the sky
Slovakia	Typography which represents the best of Slovakia	-	-	-	Past	Core values: Diversity Ingenuity Vitality Authenticity	The logo is a slogan which consists of the name of Slovakia. The fonts are created by Peter Bilak – a famous typographer.
Slovenia	-	Undefined organic	-	-	Future	Family Attachment on local goods Health Responsibility	Green is a symbol of preserved natural environment that joins Slovenian cultural and natural heritage in a balanced whole.

	Substance		Human		Time (past, present, future, not defined)	Brand values	Additional remarks
Country (nation)/ region	**Culture**	**Nature**	**Known person (Real or legendary)**	**People in general, society, community**			
Spain	The logo consists of a red sun with a broad black edge and an additional broad yellow edge, bellow the word “España” in naif hand-written black capitals	-	-	-	Timeless	-	The oldest logo created by Joan Miro in 1983, few months before his death. Spain was the first country having a promotional logo.
Sweden	Consists of the flag and the word ‘Sverige’ (Sweden) – what is known in typography as a ‘bouma’. The word ‘Sverige’, means Sweden, refers to the shape of a cluster of letters, whole word.	-	-	-	-	Communication Dialogue Relationship	‘Sverige’ is, in this case, a clear and unique message as it is used in combination with the flag, together with communicators ‘Swe’ or ‘Sweden’.

Conclusions and discussion

Logo design is a creative work which allows a country to be perceived through a symbol in a specific, intended way. When analysing the content of the logos of the European Union countries, one may emphasis that they 'speak' very little about the states they symbolize. They are imaginary, not realistic. Most logos refer to traditional symbols such as national colours, flags or coats of arms.

The authors of logos had had to assume that recipients have quite wide and deep cultural and historical knowledge about a given country. In some cases, a sender (creator of the logo) anticipates that an observer will know the Greek mythology or other legends, myths or traditional symbols. These are the cases of Greece, Cyprus, France and Holland.

It is very difficult to understand what a particular logo means by reading only its visual content. One, who wants unmistakeably understand a particular sign, needs to read the brand book, where the sense of symbols is habitually explained. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that not every country releases a brand book. Even, when such a document is available, it is assumed that a tourist or anyone else, who is interested in visiting a particular country, has access to the website and he/she wants to find some more pieces of information about the meaning of the logo.

Symbols used in the logos of the European countries are more imaginative than genuine; therefore, they rather do not present *genius loci* of a country. They are very classical, which means they are simple, constant, immediately recognizable, reproducible at different sizes, distinct and easily readable (Stones, 2009, p. 4). Such conclusion is understandable, because each of the countries is a complicated unit consisting of rich cultural, social, geographical and political diversity. This means when one detail is presented, another one might be lost.

Summing up, the content of discussed logos might be divided into the following groups:

- Signs referring to the coats of arms: Flanders and Croatia refer to the flags; Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxemburg, Portugal and Sweden display national colours.
- Signs referring to unofficial symbols of countries. It means they are not included in the heraldic, but are widely known or popular: Bulgaria (a rose), France (Maryanne), Malta, Holland (colours and tulip), Ireland (shamrock) use unofficial symbols of countries,
- Logos of Austria, Flanders, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia have slogans which are included as an integral part of the country's logo, for example, a logo is the slogan itself or a slogan is a logo.
- In three cases well-known names – famous people are involved in the logo creation:
  - Painter Joan Miro is a creator of Spanish logo;
  - Typographer Peter Bilak is a creator of Slovakian font;
  - In the logo of Holland the name of the country is written in the way Rembrandt signed his pictures.

In conclusion, logo content analysis of the countries is a quite new analysis. Going intensely into symbols inserted in the logos of the EU countries, it is impossible to recognise the genius loci of the country. Nevertheless, to the authors' knowledge, it may be crucial for the tourism industry to acknowledge what is beyond the logo content. The presented research can be regarded as a kind of novelty in critical research in place branding, especially

in deeper understanding what a certain logo presents. From the logo content presentation, it is very difficult to recognize what a given sign means, what it should show, or how it should be understood. In the cases of EU countries, which are old and well-known in the world, one may assume that logos do not need to disclose specifics of them. Graphically perfect logo is only one of the many elements that promote a particular destination. It is important but without a promotional strategy and clever marketing activities, even the nicest logo does not bring tourists and visitors to the country.

Limitation of the study

The presented research has at least two limitations. Firstly, the cases which were very specific – the EU countries – do not allow to make comparisons with other parts of the world. Secondly, the authors concentrated only of four characteristics of the logos (referring to the graphic design classifications), while it might not be enough to recognise their meaning and significance. Additional cases from other countries, for example from the American continents, would increase the validity of such research. What is more, the authors have not tried to study how tourists recognize the logos. Such an analysis could provide a broader understanding of the logos' content.

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CEE PATTERN OF INTERNET OF THINGS ACROSS THE COMMUNICATION CONTEXT

Lívia Benkő

Abstract: For the use of the Internet of Things, the everyday usage conditions the market has created are not sufficient. From the beginning, the data-driven technologies, the data protection, security, trust challenges, and consumer awareness cannot keep pace with technological developments and the open market. This is why it is of utmost importance to have as many forum dialogues as possible about the data-driven technology related phenomena. This publication examines what mentions the Visegrad Four (V4) countries made between November 28, 2017 and May 28, 2017, on Hungarian, Czech, Slovakian, and Polish online channels. This research paper gives answers to whether the fake news has infiltrated the technology themes of the world, which countries think most neutrally about IoT devices, and the impact to the online communities life from GDPR'S entry in May.

Keywords: Internet of Things, digital culture, data literacy, new media, framing theory, information society

Introduction

33 years after the release of Donna Haraway's book titled "Cyborg Manifesto," the blurring of public-private boundaries are becoming reality, the exchange of mind and artificial intelligence, plus the appreciation of the role of information control. From smart homes to smart cars, it's all permeated in the data, the data-driven expression, an entire system's vulnerability is determined by its development. As Haraway argues (1985, 2016, p. 32), "any system breakdown is a function of stress. The fundamentals of this technology can be condensed into the metaphor C3I, command-control-communication-intelligence, the military's symbol for its operations theory." According to PwC (2017), 2016 was the first time ever in history that more cars than phones were newly connected to US mobile networks. The dependence of the technological ecosystem and the data is a given, however society cannot match the development step for step, so that is why my research emphasizes how we communicate, how we think, and how we give news in the IoT connection. In addition to creating an appropriate market environment, consumers engagement and the users willingness to buy data-driven tools are just as important. This is possible if people consciously use the technology and the dialogue of advantages and disadvantages takes place in public forums. The news – whether it is traditional press, blog posts or posts in social media – shape our thinking. Accordingly, we can create different viewpoints when

processing information as to what we accept, what framing is behind the articles, or accept what frameworks are given.

The frameworks and the contexts determine how we think about the new technology: The lexical alternatives provide separate frameworks for the news. According to Puschmann and Burgess (2014, p. 1695) the digital technology media discourses regularly use metaphors, just like when the world wide web was launched it used certain images associated with the internet. If the data revolution is compared to a flood which is difficult to control, as suggested by the editor/medium, there is no human influence as to what happens to your personal information. However, with this type of approach it does not help to increase the awareness of data, because it strengthens the message of not supporting individual control. The knowledge of individual control is one of the most important educational directions so that data-based technology can be used securely. Helen Nissenbaum, the creator of contextual privacy, mentions several researchers (2009, p.71), for whom privacy is defined as the role of control, including Charles Fried (1968), Anita Allan (1999) and Michael Froomkin (2000). People can control what personal information is shared with the surrounding environment, and how to permit the information to flow.

My choice fell on to the countries of the Visegrad Four (V4): although they may have different economic indicators, but because of the historical past, they may give an interesting insight to what kinds of parallels or different patterns are found among the V4 in the new technology media.

IoT approaches

Technology is continuously breaking a new path for itself and innovations appear in different sectors. According to Statista (2016) the overall IoT market is projected to be worth more than one billion U.S. dollars annually from 2017 onward.

In a joint study by PwC and the European Commission (2017), the IoT definition is close to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and to the IRRC approaches, and accordingly that is what I would use.

The Internet of Things is a dynamic global network infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities based on standard and inter-operable communication protocols, where physical and virtual “things” have identities, physical attributes and virtual personalities and use intelligent interfaces and are seamlessly integrated into the information network.

For the IoT tools connection, the biggest issues have been unchanged since the beginning. A 2010 research has already defined the values of privacy, security and trust as the greatest challenges of smart systems (Atzori et al., 2010).

The subject of my analysis has also fallen onto the IoT tools, because I believe that the most recent technologies of IoT are present in the everyday lives of consumers in their households. The quantified self can be wrapped up in a huge number of different types of IoT devices, such as smart pillows that can monitor your sleep, or with a smart watch that can measure every type of sports performance, and it is possible to monitor your nutritional habits and health condition. I believe that besides the areas mentioned above, such as the privacy, trust, and security – a separate challenge to the IoT world will be in the field of psychology. The individuals wrestle in many different ways with the amount of information which they receive from their own behaviors and habits. The “quantified self” can support a healthy life, but it can even create a dependency-education, and presence in the media

of data literacy issues should play a prominent role. During this recent time, Hungary has experienced bigger changes in the IoT marketplace. According to Doransky (2018), two years ago there was no dedicated network in Hungary, only M2M's optimized for telephones with SIM cards using energy consuming solutions existed. However, by 2018 the trend has changed so that four telecommunications companies have IoT networks securely available.

Understanding of the changing digital world

But why is it important how we write, talk, and communicate with the changing digital world's innovations? The virtual reality, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things interact in different ways in society. According to CNN's report (2016, November 21), in Japan, the so-called romance gaming industry by 2014 was already $130 million, which could be associated with the social phenomenon in the country: 44.2% of single females between the ages of 18 and 34 are still virgins, favoring getting intimacy from a virtual partner who is either a talking robot with artificial intelligence, or an online video game player. Digitalization and algorithms can increase the societal gaps (Ságvári, 2017), but they can also form bridges and help with the realignment of social issues. The Govlab Report (Verhulst & Young, 2017) calls for a paradigm of data stewardship, according to the authors who argue "move away from the concept of data as something to be owned and towards stewardship of data as a public good." IoT does not only communicate with sensors, machines, devices to implement, but it can also help to monitor endangered species. Forbes (2018) refers to Cisco's collaboration, in which the company has teamed up with researchers, that they installed RFID sensors onto bees using IoT technology, they received continuous data the their movements. This makes it easier to understand how natural disasters, or even air pollution and water consumption affects pollination.

If the press doesn't communicate with the appropriate emphasis, about what kinds of advantages and disadvantages exist from not being familiar with the technology, the press can easily come to mislead the users. Therefore, there is a greater need than ever to be strengthening data literacy. According to a study made by Eurobarometer (2015, p. 6), which was commissioned by The European Commission, the research found "a large majority of people (71%) still say that providing personal information is an increasing part of modern life and accept that there is no alternative other than to provide it if they want to obtain products of services." The research data is shocking in that only 15% of respondents think that they have control over their personal data.

I believe that the changing digital world must be familiarized with and not avoided/overused, and that the partnership between the press and the blogger community is indispensable.

Frameworks and context

According to Fairclough (2003), different discourses are different perspectives on the world. Different kinds of discourses can be shaped by many factors. A Hungarian published research paper in 2017 investigated that through 09.27.2014. and 06.11.2016 in the 42,845 migration articles appeared, what images were accompanying the text. For example, the image metaphors, on the road, river, epidemics, criminalization, with pictures of a refugee

mother have occurred. What focus, which emphasizing did the reports use. All this has placed a framing around the articles that have an impact on the content.

The context can also shape the report, because depending on the context we are more or less tolerant of certain technological tools, and we do not feel the privacy weaknesses, we embrace technology surveillance, however in other situations we even organize street demonstrations against the invasion of privacy (Nissenbaum, 2009). The boundaries of private sphere differ, if there is a word about an airport control and security as a value, it is placed above our private sphere.

There are various theories about framing, according to Goffman (1974, 1986), "frames are principles of organization" that allow people to locate, perceive, identify, and label. Ricoeur (1984) emphasizes the importance of cultural sense-making, "Through cultural sense-making people come to be able to place new technologies in social life." According to Pentzold and Fisher (2017), in "modern societies the public understanding of technology is largely driven by a media-based discourse, which is a key arena for circulating collectively shared meanings". From this approach, starting from the various news framing of the media to the lexical choices (for example metaphors in an article), journalists have huge responsibility forming the public opinion on the new technology.

Comparison & Analysis of V4

This analysis was conducted with respect to the following similarities in the V4 countries:

- the historical background and its relation to surveillance and data sharing
  According to David Lyon (2002), "surveillance studies," the areas between, belonging to and including law, geography and history, all of which can impact the way in which a particular citizen's relationship is observed. For data-based technologies that use personal information, it is inevitable to take this area into consideration.
- similar media landscape
  According to a 2017 Átlátszó Report, state control in all of the V4 countries can be observed in the press, and press freedom is declining. A strong government presence can lead to less educational content appearing in the press, and to coloring and showing events in a negative or positive fashion. In a given country, all this can affect how state institutions, authorities, organizations are communicating about data intelligence, whether the government press bulletin releases information about data theft or even in observation of the market dangers.

Accordingly, different perspectives of the V4 countries' press situation may be compared, but one of the important tendencies in media consumption is the penetration of online channels compared to print. This is an important outlook of what the level of penetration of the internet and smartphones is in individual countries. Statistical data in the first quarter of 2017 reported that 49% of people between the ages of 35-44 read news on online channels, including the social media interface. In this same age group, only 6% get their news listening to the radio or get informed through print. 37% get their information from television. Advertising spending and news consumption data also shows us that news on online sources will shape our perceptions about the world news which appears.

Google Consumer Barometer reported that in Slovakia in 2017, 85% of the population had access to the Internet, this number is 81% in the Czech Republic, 82% in Poland and is 81% in Hungary. The penetration of smartphone usage shows a measurably more inequitable picture. In Hungary and the Czech Republic, 65% of the total population have a smartphone, in Slovakia and Poland this number is 70%.

From an economic point of view, Poland is the leader of the V4 countries, and Hungary is at the bottom of the line. The Article of the Central European Financial Observer (2016) points out that although the V4 countries are among the poorest in the European Union, they have achieved faster growth over the last 25 years than their Western counterparts in Europe. In that respect this can be interesting data that at what pace innovations are adopted in Western European and V4 countries.

Methodology of analysis

The analyses were carried out using the SentiOne software, the study period was between November 28, 2017 and May 28, 2018 for the V4 countries, that include Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. SentiOne's system examined IoT-related issues, and analyzed those social media entries that appeared in public forums – the writings on private social media sites were not counted even if their respective profile was public.

The role of the publisher/medium

Different aspects of the V4 countries' press situation may be compared, but as an important trend in media consumption is the penetration of online channels against prints, that's why it is important to look ahead, how and at what level is the internet and smartphone penetration for individual countries.

Figure 1. *Top domains in Hungary*



Figure 2. *Top domains in Poland*



Figure 3. *Top domains in Czech Republic*



Figure 4. *Top domains in Slovakia*



Publishers, along with the media, always cater to a specific business sphere they belong to, which occasionally may cover political interests. Different perspective comparisons are accordingly possible for the V4 countries' press situation, but as an important trend in media consumption is the penetration of online channels compared to the prints, that is why it is important to look ahead, as to what is the level of internet and smartphone penetration in individual countries. The publisher's sphere of interest can therefore provide a powerful framework for what kind of value system, political view, and news are brought forth to consumers. The channel distribution tables are also visible, while in Hungary the

press releases lead to IoT, meanwhile in the other three countries the discourse takes place on Facebook.

The role of the publisher or medium is also important, because often an IT-themed site writes with a different approach about technology – and compared to a female lifestyle medium represents a technology-related societal phenomena in a different way. Creating opinion formation and education at present should not be extended to IT professional sites, the graphs show those types of media are missing which reach people in a truly broad range, whether in a tabloid media or in classic female lifestyle medium.

The SentiOne system is currently capable of filtering fake news when we provide a list of fake-pages for a given country. There is no fake news in the current results, but this may change in the future. According to Visegradinfo, the International Republican Institute assessment (2018) mentions that citizens of V4 countries have little confidence toward mainstream media, and they have greater confidence in "alternative" channels In news consumption, 27% of Poles, 36% of Czechs and 45% of Slovaks rely more on the opinions of their family and friends than on the press. According to the article, there are nearly 100 fake news pages operating in Hungary, in the Czech Republic they number between 40-50, in Slovakia the most popular fake news pages are all about healing remedies and "migrant threats." Based on the graphs, it can be concluded that fake news sites have not yet targeted technology-related topics thus far.

The role of tonality

Figure 5. *Sentiment in Hungary*



Figure 6. *Sentiment in Poland*



Figure 7. *Sentiment in Slovakia*



Figure 8. *Sentiment in Czech Republic*



According to Kosicki and Pan, five devices signify the presence of frames: metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The title of the article and visual illustration can also have a strong influence on what kind of article is created: it can negatively or positively approach social behaviors. The majority of the countries in the V4 show neutral news regarding the IoT theme, which can be attributed to the fact that most of the articles report more about new innovation themes and the appearance of new products. They put fewer articles in context, even in terms of data protection challenges or the role of IoT in relation to public good (2) connection. In Hungary, the proportion of nonsensical remarks is extremely high.

Channel distribution

Figure 9. *Online channels in Hungary*



Figure 10. *Online channels in Poland*



Figure 11. *Online channels in Slovakia*



Figure 12. *Online channels in Czech Republic*



There is nothing interesting from the standpoint of the different channel distributions that can vary from one country to the next, as to which social media forums are stronger. For example, in Hungary Twitter did not find a strong following base. Looking at the above data, it is most striking that among the V4 countries, in Hungary the number of references to IoTs on portals jumps up (78.2%). This number implies that in Hungary the classical media still has discourses, and it is not the writings that appear on social media about the new technology that shapes public opinion.

Mentions in time

Figure 13. *IoT mentions in Poland*



Figure 14. *IoT mentions in Czech Republic*



Figure 15. *IoT mentions in Hungary*



Figure 16. *IoT mentions in Slovakia*



Articles can also be framed by their timing, because certain kinds of articles which may influence the public opinion are emphasized during peak periods of time. For example, in the public relations profession, "issue management" is an important tool to focus on for professionals, so that one theme is highlighted from a certain aspect they deal with communication in the longer term, and even formulate opinions based on timing. For example, during the Easter season, several media deal with official controls, with qualitative differences. This could be a good time for either the Hungarian Meat Industry Association or a meat company to schedule a campaign around Easter, focusing on the high professional requirements and that with how high of professional standards they work with.

In this research, I considered it important to look at the time allocation because I wanted to have examined the impact of the introduction of a unified European Union regulation on IoT news when it comes to the GDPR (1) connection, which came into effect on May 25th. The graphs show that the entry put into force on May 25 had no influence on the appearance of articles.

Summary

In the V4 countries the tone of related remarks about the Internet of Things are mostly neutral. Apart from Hungary, dialogue takes place mainly on Facebook in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In Hungary, nevertheless, the classic portals are still hosting forums for the Internet of Things. Although the presence of fake news in the V4 countries

is becoming more and more of a problem, the issue of data-based technology is not yet affected by the fake news phenomenon, they are rather more focused on the migration and healthcare areas. The GDPR, which came into effect on 25th of May, made no mention of the impact on the IoT Internet during the jurisdiction period.

Endnotes

1. The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 2016/679 / EU
2. The term Data For Good refers to those kinds of initiatives designed for which purpose is not for profit business growth, but however, to solve problems in the areas of environmental protection, healthcare, and social inequality issues.

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JOURNALISM EDUCATION IN GERMANY, HUNGARY, PORTUGAL AND ROMANIA: A CALL FOR CHANGE?

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Abstract: The digitalization has significantly changed the dynamics of journalism and the job of journalists. Journalism education should stay abreast of these changes. Against this background, a study has analysed how academic journalism education in Hungary, Romania, Germany and Portugal teaches new skills needed for todays' journalists. The key focus is on data journalism, collaborative journalism, new business models and ethical challenges for journalists in the digital age. The research demonstrates that the institutions under observation have adopted their curricula to the new needs of the media industry with various degrees.

Keywords: Journalism education; journalistic skills; data journalism; collaborative journalism; innovative business models; ethical challenges

Background

The journalism profession has, in the last few decades, changed radically because digitalization required journalists to gain new knowledge and skills. Journalism will continue to be exposed to innovation, there will be no resting phases, and they will have to readjust constantly. Thus, the education of journalists will have to continually make progress and adapt to the new developments in the media industry. In recent years, journalism educators have been particularly challenged by the growing importance of technical competences, including data journalism, as well as new media business concepts. Splendore et al. (2016, p. 147) consider that "current developments in data journalism prompt an increasing need among journalists – and their teachers – for new knowledge and skills". Gillmor (2016, p. 816) states that it "is vital for journalists to know how to communicate with programmers". He also stresses the importance of teaching students to understand media business concepts, as "today's students will be among the people who develop tomorrow's journalism business models" (Gillmor, 2016, p. 816).

Against this background, this study was set up to gain insight into the status quo of innovation in journalism and academic journalism education in four European countries with a focus on data journalism, collaborative journalism, innovative business models and ethical challenges of the digital public sphere. For each of the four participating countries,

our research design included (1) an analysis of the curricula of six selected journalism programmes at public and private universities and universities of applied sciences, (2) in-depth interviews with representatives from the six chosen programmes, and (3) in-depth interviews with five to six journalists who are experienced in at least one of the four aforementioned fields. Hence, in total, interviews with 25 journalism educators and 21 leading journalists from Romania, Hungary, Germany and Portugal were conducted between February and May 2018.

How Data Journalism is Conveyed in Journalism Education

In Hungary, data journalism as an independent course is only available at Budapest Metropolitan University and Eötvös Loránd University, and the same data journalist teaches students in both institutions. These courses concentrate on journalistic skills rather than IT skills. At the University of Debrecen, the staff has tried to build the use of data visualisation software into the 'Presentation technologies' course. However, the revolutionary professional challenges, such as algorithmic journalism, are not part of the curriculum. At Pázmány Péter Catholic University students have the possibility to learn about infographics which has been integrated into the course 'Multimedia content creation'. At the University of Szeged although there is a demand for a data journalism course, there is no staff available to teach it.

In Romania, the University of Bucharest and the Babeș-Bolyai University have the most extensive course offers concerning data journalism. The institutions offer basic and advanced training in the field of data gathering. At the University of Bucharest, there are data journalism courses both at Bachelor's and Master's level. The Journalism and Communication Sciences Department at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University also offers a data journalism course. Journalism professor Alexandru Lăzescu from this university said that "it is an asset for journalists if they also have training in data journalism, as thus they have more working tools" (Alexandru Lăzescu, 2018, personal communication). The Lucian Blaga University and the West University of Timișoara do not aim to propose a specialisation in data journalism, they offer only fundamentals as their lecturers think a basic introduction is enough. To date, Spiru Haret University does not run a course in data journalism.

All six German journalism programmes under study offer courses on data journalism. However, the range of intensity and the amount of acquired knowledge and practice is very varied. While the B.A. in science journalism at the TU Dortmund University offers data journalism as a second subject, and therefore dedicates about one-half of the study time to dealing with data, the other faculties offer modules or workshops or integrate aspects of data journalism into other courses.

While the departments at Hamburg, Dortmund and Cologne are eager to expand their data journalism course selection in the future, journalism professors Klaus Meier from the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt and Tanjev Schultz from the University of Mainz (2018, personal communication) cautioned that only a limited number of data journalists will be able to make a living from this specialization. Journalism professor Holger Wormer from TU Dortmund University, on the other hand, argued that the size of the job market for data journalism graduates depends on how broadly data journalism is defined. If data journalism is just seen as revealing data leaks, such as the Panama Papers, or as creating data graphics, it will stay a niche area. If, however, the analysis of data and

user behaviour are also seen as data journalism, the job market automatically becomes much bigger (Holger Wormer, 2018, personal communication).

In Portugal, data journalism as a specific course is only offered in the postgraduate programme at ISCTE-IUL. The course aims to provide basic knowledge ranging from choosing the right sources, treating and analysing data to visualising data, and storytelling with data. Other universities have some courses on visualisation, i.e. the University Autónoma of Lisbon, but they have a broader focus, including print infographics etc. At some universities, although data journalism is not a course in itself, there are workshops or journalistic projects where students develop projects in this area.

How Collaborative Journalism is Conveyed in Journalism Education

Collaborations between journalists and news organisations are gaining importance, especially for those concerned with investigative and accountability journalism. Collaboration allows them to join resources and expertise to investigate issues of public relevance for example in the fields of politics, business, trade, and crime – both at a pan-national and a cross-border level (Alfter, 2016, 2018; Sambrook, 2018). Still, no analysed institution in Hungary, Romania, Germany or Portugal teaches collaborative journalism as a specific course. However, the most widespread form to integrate some aspects of it is to make students work in teams. Klaus Meier from the Catholic University Eichstätt-Ingolstadt (2018, personal communication) underlined, and most of his colleagues agreed, that "journalists are no longer individual workers – lonely riders –, they need to be able to work in teams. […] And once you are able to work in teams, you will be able to work in international teams afterwards".

At Nova University of Lisbon journalism students have been part of a collaboration project where they produce, in cooperation with journalism students from other Portuguese universities, investigative reports for a website and a radio show (Repórteres em Construção).

In Germany, Portugal and Romania some departments also use the format of lectures to discuss forms of collaboration in journalism – through case studies students learn how collaborative journalistic projects have emerged, how they were organised and what difficulties might arise.

How the Knowledge of New Business Models is Conveyed in Journalism Education

All the Hungarian communication and media departments analysed run lectures on media economics, however new business models are not in their focus. Nevertheless, there are a few courses where some aspects are taught.

The Budapest Metropolitan University offers a course on how journalists can build a personal brand. Journalism professor András Murai (2018, personal communication) believes this is very important as nowadays the chance of becoming a full-time journalist has diminished and therefore students have to learn how to move in several directions as freelance journalists.

At Eötvös Loránd University there is a general PR communication course with different lecturers from the different fields of the media industry, where personal branding is also

covered. As the analysis shows, at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, and also at the universities at Debrecen, Pécs and Szeged, marketing knowledge is mainly taught in PR courses.

All the journalism faculties analysed in Romania have integrated elements of media economics. The University of Bucharest prepares its journalism students to think about financial constraints, challenges and possibilities. The Alexandru Ioan Cuza University offers a basic economic course named 'Theoretical Introduction to Economics' in the first semester, while other universities offer students the opportunity to learn about and discuss new business models in the framework of other courses dealing with media economics.

In Germany, five of the six programmes being studied include questions about financing journalism in the future in their curricula and offer students the opportunity to learn about new business models. Most involve media professionals as guest lecturers. Only Hamburg does not offer courses on this topic; the head of department, Michael Brüggemann (2018, personal communication), justifies this approach by saying: "We believe that the difference between newsrooms and publishing companies is reasonable as it provides for journalistic professionalism: journalists should not have to worry about how to finance journalism. Developing business models should be in the hands of media managers."

The programmes at Cologne, Dortmund and Stuttgart offer special courses on business models, but only the programme at Stuttgart has a strong focus on innovations.

Of the Portuguese programmes analysed only two offer specific courses on business models, at ISCTE-IUL 'Entrepreneurial Journalism and Media Economics and Business' and at the University Autónoma of Lisbon 'Media, Economics and Business'. At the other programmes the issue is included in more generic courses.

How Ethical Challenges Are Conveyed in Journalism Education

In every Hungarian institution analysed, there have been general media law and media ethics courses integrated into the curricula for a long time, and most of them have been converted to the new challenges related to digitization.

Media professor Zsolt Szijártó from the University of Pécs (2018, personal communication) noted that with the penetration of social media a large number of questions arise that one has never thought of before. 'The ethical and legal questions of the regulation of communication' are taught together in one course, and there is an independent course for 'Media regulation'. Similarly, at the University of Debrecen and at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, media law and media ethics are taught together. Media professor Ákos Kovács from the Pázmány Péter Catholic University (2018, personal communication) considers that for a catholic university it is essential to take responsibility for someone's actions, and this is also the case in the media field.

At the University of Szeged and at Eötvös Loránd University students can attend not only courses on media law and media ethics but also specific courses for journalists. Students at Szeged who have chosen the specialisation in print have to do the course 'Legal background of journalism, legal and ethics question in practice'. At Eötvös Loránd University the changes in Internet content related to judgement practice are an emphasised topic during the course 'Communication case studies: the freedom of expression in the light of judicial practice'.

In Romania, all programmes discuss journalistic ethics and new challenges that have arrived with digitalization during courses that teach media ethics in general.

The journalism programme at Lucian Blaga University offers a course in ethics and media criticism, but as lecturer Gabriel Hasmațuchi (2018, personal communication) stated, they face a major problem because, apparently, in the local media things are different: "Students told us that when they were hired, people in the media advised them to forget all the rubbish that they learned in school, to forget ethics. They have to do what needs to be done. So, they are torn apart between what they learned to do in school and what the boss asks them to do, regardless of ethical concerns."

In Germany, most of the time, questions about ethical challenges are embedded in other parts of the curricula. As the journalism educators reported, discussions around journalistic ethics frequently arise during news production in workshops and teaching newsrooms.

Apart from Stuttgart, all other departments discuss journalistic ethics and challenges that have arisen with digitalization during courses that focus on media ethics in general or on single aspects.

In Portugal, all of the programmes analysed run courses in this area, some are more focused on law, others on ethics, and others on deontology. Both lecturers and journalists acknowledged the importance of ethics in today's journalism. "I think the ethical challenges of today's journalists are different from those ten years ago; due to digital journalism, social networks and the quantity of information it has become an even more important topic", said journalist Raquel Albuquerque from Expresso (2018, personal communication).

Conclusion

All interviewees agreed that the on-going digitalisation of communication has been posing challenges to journalism on many levels, ranging from the need to create new streams of income to coping with the frenetic pace of an often overwhelming stream of information. Journalists and journalism educators agree that skills like curiosity, critical thinking, good writing or checking information are evergreen, but that in addition today's journalists must master new, technology-related skills like editing multimedia content or making secure use of digital communication channels.

One common theme presented by journalism educators was that there is no need to follow every trend; that journalism education should not try to include and embrace every new development in the industry, but to teach core competences and only those trends that are significant. The role of journalism educators should rather be that of critics who observe developments in the media and implement new skills and tools in their teaching only if relevant.

Almost all the journalism education institutions acknowledge the importance of teaching ethics in the digital age and of conveying knowledge about new business models. However, while most of the institutions teach general media economics and discuss current developments with their students, a minority focuses on the need to learn how to develop business plans and strategies for journalistic projects. The same is the case for the field of journalism ethics, which is taught in the majority of the institutions in the sample, often in the form of lectures on media laws and media ethics. Courses that focus on single problematic aspects of the digital public sphere, such as handling hate speech and the viral spread of fake news are exceptions.

None of the educational institutions we analysed provide courses on collaborative journalism, but most put emphasis on teaching their students how to work in teams. Some discuss best-practice examples of collaborative journalism during lectures.

The journalism educators we interviewed, often pointed out that it is quite difficult for universities to offer specific courses on the different topics as their institutions are often constrained by a lack of resources. This is especially true for the field of data journalism, which is taught as a special course by most German and Romanian institutions we analysed, but only by a few in Hungary and Portugal. Clearly, financial constraints make it hard to teach courses, for which modern technical equipment needs to be bought and practicing data journalists need to be hired as lecturers. Hiring external expertise is necessary because most journalism educators do not have practical experience in data journalism and therefore cannot teach it adequately. Besides the financial constraints, one reason why Hungary lags behind in all four of our fields is that there are no independent journalism programmes at higher education institutions. Journalism education is integrated into media and communication programmes which must include other content as well. The need to acknowledge journalism as an independent discipline (see also: Weyer et al., 2015) is great, and only then would it be possible to teach journalism adequately and to provide future journalists with the professional skills their careers require.

Another reason for the differences in implementing innovation in journalism education could be the status quo of the media in the respective countries, which again becomes especially clear when looking at data journalism. While, for example, promising developments in the media as well as in journalism education can be observed in Germany, newsrooms and universities in Romania and Hungary are not only struggling with a lack of time and resources, but also with economic and political constraints. However, there are bright spots as many new collaborative journalism networks have evolved in the two countries during the past few years, which have set up new business models to finance their often investigative and data-driven journalistic projects.

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The full research report with the list of the interview partners is available via the project's website: http://newsreel.pte.hu/.

FACEBOOK ACTIVITY OF INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATIVE CANDIDATES DURING THE 2018 HUNGARIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS

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Dóra Boldizsár
Kornél Németh
László Petrovszki

Abstract: In this paper our group of four made a research concerning the campaign activity on social media of individual candidates of the most prominent political parties in Hungary during the 2018 Hungarian General Elections. The chosen method was thematic analysis, because for the latest period there were certain topics determining Hungarian political communication. The three researched main topics were the European Union and the United Nations, migration and George Soros. This paper proves that thematic analysis can point out that the representatives of different political ideologies connect different meaning and contents to the same main topics.

Keywords: social media, political communication, Hungary, thematic analysis, general elections

Introduction

The frist part of this paper shows the methodology of thematic analysis of the Facebook activity of the single-member constituency candidates during the 2018 Hungarian General Elections. The effects of media on politics are continuously growing, politics has gone through a remarkable mediatization and that phenomenon determines the ways of modern political communication (Moog & Sluyter, 2001). In connection with mediatization, the spread and growing popularity of social media bring new features of political communication, as political actors use social media for their goals, especially in campaigns.

In the campaign of the 2018 Hungarian General Elections, the candidates concentrated their online activity on Facebook, because this social media site is the most used in Hungary (Global Stats). Based on this fact, our group of four began a research about observing the Facebook activity of the candidates during the campaign.

The chosen method was thematic analysis for researching the Facebook posts made by the single-member constituency candidates of the 106 Hungarian single-member constituencies. The analysis used three main topics: the European Union with United Nations, the refugee crisis and posts concerning George Soros. The posts were examined

according to their political affiliation. The governing parties' Facebook posts related to the topics, which are followed by the right-wing opposition's, and end with the left-wing opposition's communication. The study's main goal was to compare these three sides in order to find the most conspicuous similarities and differences among their communication on Facebook.

The Research Method

Thematic Analysis

Thematic analysis is a foundational method in psychology for qualitative analysis, but there is no commonground around its usage and details.. Despite this, thematic analysis is frequently used not jusxt in psychology, but in other disciplines as well. The main usage of this method is for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within data (Roulston, 2001) Thematic analysis can be used as a flexible research tool for processing a large amount of data and creating a deep, accurate account of the information (Boyatzis, 1998).

The most significant speciality of this qualitative way of analysis is transcribing the collected data by generating codes, themes and maps for the topics and investigating these elements – in our case by their usage on Facebook by electoral candidates.

The researcher sets up themes for the analysis, a theme targets some essential feature of the data concerning to the research question and shows patterns along the data set. The utility of a theme depends on the importance it captures in connection with the main question of the research. Thematic analysis is a qualitative method, which means that the measurement of the numerical frequency is not the goal of the research. Instead the focus is to study the circumstances of how the topic is mentioned and the attitudes of the people using the searched topic in relation with the issue.

In this social media watch project, theoretical thematic analysis was used, which is determined by the researcher's theoretical or analytic interest in the area. This type of thematic analysis is more explicitly analyst-driven. The main interest was the way candidates use Facebook during the campaign. The theoretical form of thematic analysis does not produce an overall description of the data, but a more detailed analysis of some aspects of the collected data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The beginning of the procedure is the point when the researcher starts looking for patterns of meaning and relations of the research question within the data. The closure of the work is presenting the content and meaning of the created patterns.

The Three Themes

This paper exhibits the thematic analysis of three topics that determines political communication in Hungary for the latest period. Of course, there were other significant topics in Hungarian public speaking, but our focus was on three main themes that were relevant in the communication amongst the most prominent political parties. All three topics are pushed by the government, in this way the ruling party can control the communication during the campaign, even in social media and the parties of the opposition are obligated to react to these topics on their own way, if they can.

The first subject of this research was political communication on Facebook concerning the European Union and the United Nations. The topics of EU and UN are always campaign topics in every member state and they are main topics in Hungary recently, because the governing parties denied the adaptation of the refugee quota created by the European Union in the middle of the refugee crisis. They criticize the EU and the UN for encroaching on a sovereign state's security policy.

The second main topic in this project was the refugee crisis. The migration crisis is a significant issue in Hungarian politics since 2015. The ruling parties use migration as their main topic in political communication. In the campaign of the 2018 Hungarian General Elections this phenomenon continues strongly, the refugee crisis is still a divisive question and a big debate between all the political participants.

The third researched topic contains the Facebook posts mentioning George Soros. George Soros, the notable investor and philanthropist is a constant campaign topic since the refugee crisis started in 2015. In 2017 the Hungarian government started a billboard campaign against illegal migration with the picture of George Soros. He is criticized by the governing parties for being pro-migration and funding civil societies.

Questions and Purpose

The results were expected to show how and in what way Fidesz-KDNP can utilize the three topics, EU and UN, the refugee crisis and posts concerning George Soros, as one of their main issues. Concerning the opposition, we studied how the Fidesz-KDNP alliance can force them to communicate about these topics. Another important question is the difference between attitudes of opposition parties toward the three topics (or to find out if there is any difference at all).

The main task was to explore the differences between the communication of the governing and opposition parties on Facebook.

The purpose of this thematic analysis – as it is the purpose of the method itself – was to find repeating patterns and themes relating to our research questions.

Collecting Data

For the first step, with the help of the second year Political Science bachelor students of the University of Szeged, information were collected of the candidates of the 106 Hungarian single-member constituencies, 585 candidates in all, which were distributed amongst 36 second year students. They watched the official candidates' posts, not the activity of parties, and The subjects of the research were the texts, descriptions of pictures and videos and the shared articles' those parts, which were readable without clicking on links pointing to other sites, but nothing more.

The activity of the candidates on Facebook concerning the three topics were followed from the 6th of March to the 8th of April.

The Analysis

During the analysis, the three topics were studied regarding three types of candidates: from the ruling parties (Fidesz-KDNP), from the right-wing opposition (Jobbik) and from the left-wing opposition (MSZP-P, DK, LMP, Együtt, and Momentum). There were two

independent candidates (Zoltán Kész and Tamás Mellár). Based on their political standpoint, they were added to the left-wing opposition.

The first step of the process involved repeated reading of the data, and searching for meanings, repeating patterns. As a second step, codes were generated which refer to the most basic segment, or element of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon. A great amount of codes were used for example, for each candidates' opinion on the refugee quota created by the European Union or the barrier at the southern border of Hungary or the connection between the ruling parties and George Soros. The third step in the project involved sorting the different codes into potential themes, and collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes. In this research itself, codes are referred as topics and themes are referred as subtopics. In the fourth step, based on the subtopics, mind maps were generated, which show the connections between the topics and the subtopics, with the topic in the middle, and subtopics around.

After reviewing and defining the codes and themes several times, clear definitions and names were generated for each theme and a final analysis of selected extracts were produced, relating back of the analysis to the research question and literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.

Thematic analysis does not mean a linear process with steps strictly following each other, but a recurrent cycle of phases and going through the data all over again. While using this method, the researcher goes back and forth in the entire dataset, the coded extracts of the analysed data and the analysis of the produced data.

A Thematic Analysis of Facebook Posts Concerning the European Union and the United Nations

Governing Parties

According to the research, the communication of the candidates belonging to the governing parties can be divided to four determining subtopics, which are the following:

1. fight with the European Union and the United Nations,
2. heroic government,
3. values,
4. funds from the European Union.

The most extensive subtopic is the "fight with the European Union and the United Nations". It is based on the demonization of these international organizations for several reasons. Here are some examples, which represent these parties' communication: the European Union/ United Nations wants to force Hungary to accept the refugee-quota, which prescribes to settle 10.000 refugees per year; they want to tear down the barrier between the Hungarian and the Serbian border to let in thousands of refugees; they also intervene in the Hungarian elections, because they want to unseat the current government.

In these examples it is common that the government stands for independence of Hungary and wants to stop the European Union and the United Nations in meddling with the Hungarian businesses. The governing parties use often these kind of expressions: "*Hungary decides, not the United Nations*."

The subtopic of "heroic government" consists of posts about the government's good actions. According to their opinion, they set an example to the other member states of the European Union at how to protect a nation. These quotes show this situation: "*We stand up for Hungary!*", "*Hungary is the first for us!*"

They also highlight the importance of the Hungarian and European values, mainly our languages, cultures, the Christianity and the sovereignty, which they signify with statements such as: "*We want Hungarian Hungary and European Europe. This is only possible, if we protect the Christian Hungary in the Christian Europe*."

The last topic, which is the "funds from the European Union" is not so dominant. They share posts about the European Union's investments and constructions, but mainly emphasize the Hungarian financial sources. The governing parties are proud of the rising rate of family allowance.

Right-wing Opposition

After the governing parties, the research continues with the thematic analysis of the right-wing opposition, Jobbik party. Its communication contains four main subtopics, similar to the governing parties, which are the following:

1. unveiling the government's untruths,
2. pay-union,
3. funds from the European Union,
4. property.

The subtopic of "unveiling the government's untruths" contains the most posts. The Jobbik party tries relentlessly to unveil the government's lies, which appear in their propaganda. According to the Jobbik party's communication, the Fidesz-KDNP actually supports the refugees with funds from the European Union's budget. They also claimed that Fidesz-KDNP stood by the refugee-quota in Brussels earlier, and already let in 50.000 refugees. They also emphasised that the governing parties' fight against the European Union and the United Nations is just a show, because in reality they had already accepted the European Union's migration policy, and that the governing parties' whole communication is hate speech.

The "pay-union" is also an expression which appears often in Jobbik's communication. According to their arguments, it would be important because of the differences between the salaries in Western and Eastern Europe. They also hope, that this action would keep the younger generations at home. The following Facebook post describes their viewpoint appropriately: "*We are behind with the payments compared with Western Europe, but we have closed up with the prices. The pay-union would solve this unfair situation, because we would like to live in a solidary European Union, where everyone could succeed in his/her homeland.*"

Their posts about the "funds from the European Union" are mostly connected to the frauds of Fidesz-KDNP. They unveil that the financial resources from the European Union mainly end up in the hands of the prime minister's relatives and friends. According to their statements it is organized budget fraud, which can be implemented through the European Union's tenders. In some cases even OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) has investigated them, which is also highlighted in the Jobbik party's communication, as a good example for the government's corrupt businesses.

The last subtopic is "property" which is not that significant as the previous ones. Concerning this subject, the Jobbik party criticizes Fidesz-KDNP and even the European Union mostly because there are more and more foreign customers for the Hungarian lands. This Facebook post is a clear example: "*We are determined to keep the Hungarian lands in Hungarian hands. We will not be slaves on our parents', grandparents' lands!*"

Left-wing Opposition

The left-wing opposition's communication about the European Union and the United Nations also contains four subtopic. These are the following:

1. funds from the European Union,
2. unveiling the government's untruths,
3. the government's propaganda,
4. promises.

The subtopic of the "funds from the European Union" contains the most posts. They highlight the financial frauds made by companies close to the governing parties to draw attention to the organized corruption. It is showcased by posts just like the following: "*We did not fight against corruption when the EU investigated against the son-in-law of Viktor Orbán and when his best friend who is a gas-fitter earning millions even while sleeping. It is a crime, a historical crime which we cannot let happen any further!*" Just as the Jobbik party, the left-wing also expresses the importance of OLAF, which has reported, that Hungary inveigled the most sources from the European Union. Consequently, they require the repayment of these cheated amounts and to stop the further payments. Instead of corruption, they would give the incoming money to citizens, which is in the center of their communication.

They also try to unveil the government's untruths, just like the Jobbik party. For example, they blame the government for letting in 50.000 refugees and highlight the refugee-quota, that was supported earlier by the Fidesz-KDNP. Moreover, the left-wing parties drew attention to the state's Investment Immigration Program, which has already given an opportunity for 18.000 refugees to settle down in Hungary. In the opinion of the left-wing the government endangers Hungary and whole Europe with these arrangements. As an example to this subtopic: "*Did you know that 90% less refugees have arrived this year than 2 years ago? And did you know that we can be thankful for the agreement between Turkey and the EU, and not for Viktor Orban?*"

The left-wing opposition strongly stands against the government's propaganda, which is vindictive and warlike for no real reasons. For example, they point out that the government accepts financial sources from the European Union, while attacking it constantly. According to the left-wing parties' viewpoint, these are just the government's tactics for diverting the people's attention from the truly important questions regarding Hungary.

Finally, only the left-wing parties came up with promises concerning the European Union. These promises are mostly connected to the European standards of living, especially in the fields of education, healthcare and salaries. They express the importance of cooperation with the European Union and the necessity of some common European policies, such as the national defense and the foreign policy. They also believe in a United States of Europe. The following Facebook post is a good example: "*Hungary's place is in Europe, in a renewable*

and social European Union, which means a raise for every Hungarian citizen." Despite this positive vision, the left-wing parties also refuse the refugee-quota.

Thematic Analysis of Facebook Posts Concerning migration and the refugee crisis

Governing Parties

The main subtopics of the governing parties connected to migration were the following:

1. George Soros and his role in the migration crisis,
2. irreversibility,
3. anti-barrier opposition,
4. the chance of becoming an immigrant country,
5. the solutions of Viktor Orbán,
6. the differences between the religion of migrants and Hungarians.

In the campaign of Fidesz-KDNP, migration was connected with George Soros in every possible way. One of the frequently recurring posts were "*We are going to fight against the plans with Hungary of George Soros and his empire*." The term "empire of George Soros" is commonly used in the campaigns and propaganda of Fidesz KDNP. George Soros and "his candidates", who – according to Fidesz were all candidates of the opposition – were used as an enemy image in the campaign, with slogans like "*All the Sorosists will vote, we'll have to be there too!*" and "*We have to stop George Soros and his candidates!*"

"*If we make this mistake, we can not fix it. If Hungary becomes an immigrant country there is no going back!*" In this post, the "mistake" is letting the migrants in, which – according to the campaign of Fidesz-KDNP – Will be the consequence of any opposition party winning the elections. This correspondence became so common in the Hungarian public opinion, that it was enough to say "*If Hungary becomes an immigrant country, we will lose everything we accomplished in the last few years!*" and it was not said explicitly, but heavily suggested that it was about the opposition.

One of the biggest campaign weapons of Fidesz-KDNP was that they made people believe, that all of the opposition parties wanted to let the refugees in with posts like "*Hungary made a role model for Europe: we protected our Christian values. We will lose this, if the opposition comes into leadership. They will demolish the fence and let all the migrants in.*" and "*Everywhere in April, there will be one candidate of the national government. The other candidates would destroy the border barrier and make Hungary an immigrant country*."

"*The stake is enormous: Hungary will either be a country for Hungarians, or it will become an immigrant country.*" This post is another good example for Fidesz-KDNP's opinion about the opposition. They did not even had to say anything about the other parties, and the voters knew, that it was about the opposition. Naturally, they were often more obvious than that, with posts like "*The candidates of George Soros would make Hungary an immigrant county. The candidates of Viktor Orbán will keep Hungary for the Hungarians*."

As stated above, the individual candidates of the governing parties did not post about their achievements and plans. Instead they overemphasized that the only man who could save the country is Viktor Orbán, with posts like "*As long as the prime minister is called*

Viktor Orbán, the fence will stand still!", "*The candidates of Viktor Orbán will save Hungary for Hungarians.*" and "*When we have to protect the country, the only ones we can count on, are the candidates of Viktor Orbán.*"

One of the governing parties, KDNP is mostly based on Christian values. The differences between the religion of refugees and Hungarians were emphasised with posts like "*The conflict of the Islamic and Christian culture is heading from the Middle East towards Europe.*"; "*Unfortunately, the Islamic terror reached Europe today.*" and "*The future of Europe is endangered by the Islamic attempt to conquer our continent, just as terrorism that menaces us through the migration is an everyday topic for all of us.*"

Right-wing Oppostition

The candidates of the right-wing opposition party in Hungary tried to acquit themselves that they did not wanted to pull down the border barrier, along with uncovering the problems with the governing parties. The studied subtopics were the following:

1. the government's Investment Immigration Program,
2. the governing parties' refusal to debate,
3. the governing parties' incitement to hatred,
4. the border barrier as the idea of Jobbik.

During the refugee crisis, the Hungarian government sold bonds, that enabled foreign people to settle in the country for money. Jobbik criticized that in posts like "*Dealing with the migration was always the task of the reigning government. Because of that, Fidesz gave chances for 2300 patronized migrants and for 50000 foreign citizens through the investment immigration program.*" Their slogan in the campaign was "*After the regime change we will not let neither rich, nor poor migrants into the country!*"

Jobbik criticized the government because they did not want to react to their questions. "*...as long as they can talk about migrants they do not have to deal with and talk about healthcare and education, low salaries, corruption scandals and youth emigration*." In some posts, this was handled as natural behavior of Fidesz-candidates. "*There were two candidates who had not been able to look into the eyes of other candidates: Sándor Hadházy from Fidesz and Miklós Király from DK. About the candidate of the current government, I could not even imagine that he would come…*"

Jobbik's candidates often stated that the government and the governing parties were trying to fire up the voters with fake news about refugees and opposition parties. "*...The gutter-press of Habony keeps publishing fake news against the opposition because they want to fire up their mass of voters*." They criticized that it was funded by money that could have been used for better purposes. "*The government scared people with all of its power and with spending 22 thousand billion forints*"

"*The fence is important, and it would have been necessary 11 months before it was built, just as the re-establishment of the Border Patrol.*" This is a post that sums up Jobbik's thoughts about the border barrier. Other examples are "*We DO NOT WANT TO pull the fence down, we asked for it in the first place!*" and "*Jobbik suggested to build the barrier so anyone who says that we will destroy it, simply lies.*"

Left-wing Opposition

The posts of the left-wing opposition were a bit more diverse because we collected the data about the candidates of four parties and two independent candidates. Despite this, it was not any harder to find the main subtopics regarding these parties. These were the following:

1. the emigration of Hungarian workers to Western-Europe,
2. Fidesz-propaganda,
3. lack of debate,
4. the huge amount of corruption,
5. the fake news about the border barrier,
6. the Vienna Propaganda Video made by János Lázár.

They stated that instead of refugees, the government should care about people who left Hungary. They posted about that issue a lot. Examples are "*Every politician of Fidesz asks from us who we want to let into the country: we want to resettle the youth who recently left the country and who are essential to be able to build a successful Hungary.*" and "*Hungary is not pressured by migration because people do not aim to come here, people are trying to emigrate instead.*"

The left-wing opposition criticized the governing parties claiming that they destroyed the independent press and used their influence to disguise their propaganda as news. This opinion appeared in posts like "*Nowadays 90% of the media in Hungary is depending on the government. It is funded by public money. The independent press does not have a chance against that*." and "*...it happened in a minute that the nation proclaimed the IMF, the multinational companies, the banks, the Norway Grants, Brussels, the CEU, George Soros, the migrants and now the whole UN as enemies because they want someone to defend the country from.*"

The left-wing also criticized the government claiming that they did not want to react to their questions. They expressed this in posts like "*... our elected representatives are fleeing from the questions from non-friendly media like from the black death. It is like they must smuggle the politicians in and out, from and into events to avoid meeting with journalists.*" and "*Why isn't there any debate between parties? Why is it possible to answer a question with: Merry Christmas?*"

During the campaign, the problems with corruption were also connected to the refugee crisis with posts like "*I am just saying that I do not want to hear anything about migration. The social peace and exposure of corrupt politicians is what I am interested in.*" and "*We did not fight against corruption when the EU investigated against the son-in-law of Viktor Orbán and when his best friend who is a gas-fitter earning millions even while sleeping. It is a crime, a historical crime which we cannot let happen any further!*"

The left-wing opposition's biggest problem was that the government propaganda accused them that they will demolish the border barrier. The candidates tried to defend themselves with posts like "*According to Fidesz the opposition wants to demolish the barrier. When I meet voters, their first question is about this. IT IS A MISBELIEF!*" and "*We will not pull down the fence, do not be afraid. The barrier stays, Orbán goes!*"

As part of the Fidesz-campaign, a candidate, János Lázár posted a video about Vienna. However, after a few hours it was removed by Lázár because of the massive negative feedback. In the video he showed that Vienna looks catastrophic and there are migrants everywhere. At the end, Lázár stated that people cannot live normally in Vienna anymore

and if the opposition wins, Budapest will be just like that. The left-wing opposition used this opportunity to reveal the lies of the Fidesz-campaign. Their posts about the video were mostly like this example: "*Vienna is the second most livable city in the world. In contrast, Budapest is only the 36th. Instead of misleading people, we should focus on the real problems!*" However, some candidates went even further, posting "*Do not forget the words of Lázár! If the opposition wins in April, Budapest is going to be just like Vienna. Listen to him for once. If a politician is stealing in Vienna, he or she goes to jail.*"

A Thematic Analysis of Facebook Posts Concerning George Soros

Governing Parties

According to this research the posts of Fidesz-KDNP candidates could only be categorized into one subtopic: immigrant country. Nearly all of the posts concerning George Soros dealt with the question of immigration and immigrants. It needs to be specified that Soros did not always appear as a person, but as the "Soros Empire" or as "the candidates of Soros".

The subtopic of "immigrant country" means that the person – George Soros –, his organizations or his candidates, according to the posts, are the politicians of the opposition that want to make Hungary an immigrant country and to change it. The posts were structured by the logic that if the opposition wins, the previous statements, like immigrants flooding the country, will come true. Some examples for this type of posts are the following: "*The candidates of George Soros would make Hungary an immigrant country*.", "*We are going to fight against what George Soros wants to do with Hungary*".

The second quote highlights another tendency: the simplification of the message. By the time of the campaign Fidesz-KDNP does not need to explain what or how George Soros plans to change Hungary. George Soros, as a topic, appears as a "force of nature" or as a villain who wants to ruin Hungary and force his will upon it. It is important to note that most of the posts were shared from the main Fidesz-KDNP Facebook pages, like the page of Fidesz, Orbán Viktor or the government.

There was a small percentage of "individual" and "unique" posts still concerning the topic of immigrant country that had their own narrative about how Soros plans to make Hungary an immigrant country. For example: "*According to Viktor Orbán, the henchmen of George Soros are going to sit in the government, just like it had happened in other countries – the voice recording of Soros-leaks proves this too. If the henchmen of Soros gain government level of influence, then they will take the Hungarian energy and bank sectors.*"

The narrative does not differ from the official Fidesz sources, but the framing is unique, indicating that the writers of these posts created them on their own.

Right-wing Opposition

Observing the posts of the right-wing opposition – which was Jobbik at the period of the election campaign – five subtopics could be identified:

1. propaganda,
2. "it is more important than Soros",
3. Soros = Fidesz,

4. Jobbik ≠ Soros,
5. Fidesz-KDNP cannot stop migration.

Jobbik has roots in far-right nationalism, therefore for them, criticising Soros and his agenda would not be far-fetched. However, explicitly critical voices against him did not appear in the Facebook posts. The propaganda subtopic means hatemongering and the use of government power to influence the voters. The second subtopic covers various policies and, in a lot of cases, connects with other subtopics. Jobbik equals Soros means that Fidesz has or had ties to Soros and his foundations. Jobbik does not equal Soros means Jobbik does not have any relationship with Soros. The last topic "Fidesz-KDNP cannot stop migration" is more about migration than George Soros, but the businessman still appears in this context making it clear that migration and Soros became interweaved in Hungarian political discussion. These five subtopics overlap frequently in the posts, therefore one post can be put into multiple categories.

The most overlaps happened with the "propaganda" and "it is more important than Soros" subtopics, but there is a similar tendency with Soros = Fidesz and Jobbik ≠ Soros. "*It is outrageous that the government after eight years in office can only say »George Soros« and does not talk about healthcare, emigration of Hungarians, the state of the roads, the status of wages, education…*"

The first part of the quote fits into the propaganda subtopic, but in the second part, the poster tries to suggest something that is more important, than the question of George Soros. This structure is used in a lot of cases, but it is reversible, shown in the next quote. "*I believe the sane majority is able to see that Fidesz does not have anything to say about Hungary, about the rotting healthcare, scrappy education, hundred thousands of Hungarian emigrants, only has two program point, the frenzied* "*sorosing*" *and* "*migranting*"*, as well as the intemperate disparagement and vilification of Jobbik.*"

The "Soros = Fidesz" and "Jobbik ≠ Soros" subtopics are used in a defensive manner denying the claims made by Fidesz-KDNP that Jobbik is connected to Soros. As a counter reaction, several posts mentioned that Fidesz used to have formal ties to Soros in the past. Similarly, it can be showcased well in a single quote: "*The statement of Fidesz: Tamás Pintér and Jobbik are part of the Soros-deal that was made for power and money and they allied with those who want to make Hungary an immigrant country, also tear down the fence and execute the quota. The truth: not the representatives of Jobbik were Soros-scholarship holders, but Fidesz's*."

Left-wing Opposition

Concerning the posts of the left-wing opposition in Hungary, four subtopics could be identified:

1. propaganda,
2. "It is more important than Soros",
3. sorosing is ridiculous,
4. Soros = Fidesz.

Three out of four subtopics are the same as it was in case of the right-wing opposition, but there are differences in the tone of the posts. The subtopic of "sorosing is ridiculous" – even if it does not appear directly in every post – marks that the approach of the left-wing

politicians is distinct from Jobbik's. The left-wing politicians did not deny vehemently their alleged connection to Soros, instead they used humour and sarcasm as a reaction to the communication of Fidesz-KDNP. Correspondingly to Jobbik, the posts could be put into multiple subtopics and their structure is variable. "1*300 billion is totally alright! Nobody should be concerned about that, neither with Elios! Because Soros and fence.*"

"*Migrant, migrant, migrant, Soros, migrant, Soros, Soros, Brussels, migrants, Soros, Soros, migrant, migrant, migrants to apartments and to barracks, migrants to everywhere, zombiemarch, migrant, migrant, Soros, UN, Brussels, migrant, migrant. By the way, it is 15th of March, when the Hungarians kicked out their tyrants….We should also do this! Because to us, Hungary comes first!*"

In the case of the first quote, it starts with what is more important than the topic of Soros, and it follows with an ending related to the "propaganda" subtopic and mimicking the communication of Fidesz-KDNP. The second quote incorporates three subtopics. It begins with repeating the topics associated with the governing parties (propaganda) and follows with sarcastic remarks to Peace-marches by mentioning zombiemarch (sorosing is ridiculous). A Peace-march is an irregular gathering of Fidesz supporters. At the end of the quote, the writer mentions the Hungarian national holiday of 15th of March ("it is more important than Soros").

The following quote – appearing on a picture – presents perfectly the way left-wing politicians inserted humour into their posts concerning George Soros, while it is also a sting into an important matter to the governing parties. "*In FIFA's opinion, football is played for goals. Hungary decides, not FIFA!*" The candidate added: "*Furthermore: Soros…*"

Conclusion

To sum up, it is noticeable that there are similar aspects between the communication of the right-wing and the left-wing opposition. They found nearly the same points to fight against the government. In contrast to that, the governing parties argued against the European Union and the United Nations, instead of the opposition. Besides, their communication is based on a negative central propaganda. Surprisingly, only the left-wing opposition had serious ideas about the future concerning the European Union and the United Nations. Instead of a deeper cooperation the governing parties and the Jobbik party could imagine a stronger Europe with sovereign and independent nation states.

One of the important differences were that the governing parties' candidates posted the same pictures, quotes and videos with optional individual comments, while the candidates of the left- and right-wing opposition posted individually. This resulted in a strange situation while collecting and reducing the data, running into the same posts repeatedly. Consequently, one important difference in the content of their posts is that while the candidates of the opposition posted about their own achievements and tried to offer an individual solution, the candidates of Fidesz-KDNP posted from the perspective of the whole party and granted a solution from the government or Viktor Orbán. It is important to note that the candidates of the opposition did not want to post that much about the refugee crisis, they had to do that to defend themselves from the governing parties' accusations. Despite the amounts of posts about the topic there was no real discussion between the three sides.

The candidates of the opposition were forced to talk about George Soros too, even if it was not one of their main campaign topics. There is a clear difference in tone between the

left-wing and right-wing opposition, but it comes clear from the subtopics that both sides thought that George Soros was only a tool for propaganda and instead of him, the campaign should be about important policies like healthcare, education or emigration of Hungarians.

The candidates of Fidesz-KDNP shared most of the posts from central government oriented pages, therefore the assumption can be made, that the campaign against Soros was also a central directive. It is crucial to point out that George Soros, as a person, is not important anymore; he is just an idea with different associations for each side: for the Fidesz-KDNP he represents the flood of immigrants and for the opposition he means propaganda.

For these reasons, the opposition and Fidesz-KDNP was not able to communicate about the nature and role of George Soros in a discussion, their only interaction with each other were trough accusations and denials concerning this topic.

As a final conclusion, it is evident from the analysis that the Facebook communication of Fidesz-KDNP is centralized and directed by a common narrative in connenction with the three topics. On the other hand, the posts of the opposition are more fragmented and show more variety in style, tone and content. Another common feature of the opposition is that they are forced to reflect and react to arguments made by Fidesz-KDNP. One of the most noticable difference between the two sides of the opposition appears in the topic of refugee crisis, but in the other cases there is no harsh division between the left and the right.

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DIGITAL LITERACY AT THE PARTIUM CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

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Abstract: The initial research problem is the paradoxical situation of Romania: a good digital infrastructure, coupled with low levels of digital skills. The present paper offers a case study on this infrastructure-skills mismatch, digital competences were studied via online survey on a stratified sample of students, teachers and staff at the Partium Christian University of Oradea (N=260). Our contribution is valuable in the proper integration of digital tools in the learning process and contribute to the development of a special digitalization strategy of the university.

Keywords: digital literacy, digital skills, digital learning technologies

Introduction

The contextualization of digital literacy implies a summary of the post-communist evolution in Romania. Following the regime collapse in 1989, Romania has witnessed radical transformations, three aspects of which are particularly relevant for our research: education, IT infrastructure and digital competencies.

Educational expansion lead to an increase in the average schooling figures, though there is a significant gap between Romanian reality and education-related EU indicators. Wide spread labour market integration difficulties are closely related to skills mismatch and an inflexible educational supply.

The digital profile of Romania is paradoxical: good IT infrastructure, urban broadband coverage above EU average, paired with low levels of digital competences. Lacunae are possibly related to the developmental focuses of the Romanian educational system which has undergone a series of structural transformations affecting the quality of education. The innovation (and digitization) of the learning process seems to be neglected to a certain extent, which leads to the delayed implementation of new teaching methodologies, even in university settings.

Our research aims to analyze the digital literacy of employees and students in a regional Romanian higher education institution, the Partium Christian University of Oradea. We implemented the *General Technology Competency and Use* framework developed by Dr. François Desjardins in Canada, using an online survey with an extended version of the *Digital Competency Profiler* (*EILAB, Faculty of Education, University of Ontario Institute of Technology*) questionnaire, on a sample of students, teachers and administrative staff.

Conceptualization of digital literacy

The term *digital literacy* was actually an alias of *computer literacy* in the 80s and 90s and referred to basic computer usage skills/knowledge. Take the example of the well-known *European Computer Driving License* (*ECDL 2009, 2018*): in its initial form its mere focus was computer usage. The test framework has since undergone substantial transformation, today ECDL has a skill assessment toolset including self-evaluation and online exercises (http://www.digitalliteracy.eu/).

The *American Library Association* defined a person as digitally literate if she or he "possesses the variety of skills – cognitive and technical – required to find, understand, evaluate, create, and communicate digital information in a wide variety of formats; is able to use diverse technologies appropriately and effectively to search for and retrieve information, interpret search results, and judge the quality of the information retrieved; understands the relationships among technology, lifelong learning, personal privacy, and appropriate stewardship of information; uses these skills and the appropriate technologies to communicate and collaborate with peers, colleagues, family, and on occasion the general public; uses these skills to participate actively in civic society and contribute to a vibrant, informed, and engaged community". (Cordell, 2013; ALA, 2013, p. 2)

The EU employs a similarly broad meaning of digital literacy which is a key component of the *Europe 2020 Strategy* through the *Digital Agenda for Europe*. The *European Commission's' Digital Framework 2.0* and the *DigComp Conceptual Reference Model* describe five competence areas: information and data literacy, communication and collaboration, digital content creation, safety, problem solving.

In the synthesis above we only named a few from the plethora of approaches, their comparative analysis is out of the present paper's scope. Having analysed the operational value, adaptability and clarity of several explicative models, we opted for the coherent and straightforward *General Technology Competency and Use* (*GTCU*) *Framework*, developed by Canadian researcher Dr. François Desjardins.

Figure 1. *General Technology Competency and Use Framework*
Source: https://eilab.ca/



The model describes four orders of competency: technical, social, informational and epistemological. *Technical* covers practical knowledge developed through experience with the technology, and refers to interactions with the technology itself. *Social* describes an array of knowledge mostly reflecting the communication experience of the individual. *Informational* reflects the theoretical and practical knowledge regarding aggregation, identification, organization and interpretation of information. *Epistemological* reflects specific knowledge developed through formal studies, applied to specific usage of digital tools.

Research focus and methodological framework

The main objective of our survey was the assessment of digital competences within the academic community of the Partium Christian University (students, teachers, administrative staff), with an emphasis on the competences employable in digital learning. Lacking previous data on the digital competences of the target group we opted for an exploratory research schema.

The mid-term goal of the research is the participation of the university in the international, comparative research program of the *EILAB, Faculty of Education, University of Ontario Institute of Technology* (*Digital Competency Profiler*), the authors are presently discussing the terms of cooperation with the prospective Canadian partners.

The survey tool – developed on the *LimeSurvey* platform – consisted of an extended version of the *EILAB Digital Competency Profiler* (*DCP, https://dcp.eilab.ca/*), which had been operationalized through a validated online self-report questionnaire constructed upon the *General Technology Competency and Use* (*GTCU*) *Framework* . The "indicators consists of 26 categorized activity items (five for technical, and seven each for social, informational and epistemological), each with two measures: *frequency of use and confidence of use*, conceptualized as twin, synergistic indicators of digital competence." (https://eilab.ca/general-technology-competency-use/)

Our questionnaire included 32 blocks with ICT-related tasks (epistemological, informational, social and technical dimensions), their frequency and confidence of use plus the preferred device. Additional blocks included questions on demographics, university status and ICT equipment ownership.

The target population was composed of 96 teachers, 55 administrative staff and 772 students (1 October 2017), sample composition was the following: 44 teachers, 15 administrative staff, 201 students.

The survey was completed between 8 and 25 May 2018, we managed to obtain a relatively high response rate (28.16%) due the application of several non-response reduction techniques.

Romanian Country Panorama

Digital Economy and Society Index (*DESI*) is a composite index created by the European Commission (2018) for grasping digital development along five dimensions (connectivity, human capital, use of Internet, integration of digital technology and digital public services).

If we rank the 28 EU states, Romania occupies the last position, even though the trend is slightly positive.

Figure 2. *Digital Economy and Society Index, Romania 2018*
Source: https://digital-agenda-data.eu, European Commission, 2018)



Gains has been mostly made in the field of connectivity. Romania's fixed broadband take-up reached 67% of households (still below 75% EU average), just under 40% of rural areas are covered, pointing to a deep urban-rural digital divide. 4G mobile cannot be accessed by everybody, despite a leap in coverage from 45% in 2016 to 72% in 2017. *Connectivity Index* has the highest valued in urban areas: 53% of household has fast (>=30 Mbps) broadband access while the EU average stands at 33%, due to the large share of fibre deployment in urban settings the ultra-fast broadband (>100Mbps) is found in 43,8% of households, the EU average is only 15,4%.

Despite growing (urban) internet penetration, the evolution of *Human Capital* dimension is neglectable. In terms of internet users' share in the population Romania occupies the last place (61% as opposed to the EU average of 81%). Moreover, a large number (71%) of Romanians lack basic digital skills, while the corresponding EU average stands at 43%.

The *Use of Internet* dimension synthesizes Internet usage for *News*, *Music-Video-Games*, *Video on Demand*, *Video Calls*, *Social Networks*, *Banking*, *Shopping*. Performing video calls and social networking places the country on the 13th and 4th place in the EU (53% and 82% of Internet users in 2017), but the other components put Romania in the last cluster of the EU states.

Integration of digital technologies by businesses is problematic, Romania remains at the at the bottom of the ranking and the public sector is not performing better: Romania's performance is well below EU average in the adaptation of *Digital public services* (Digital Economy and Society Index, 2018 Country Report Romania, 2018).

Digital Literacy at Partium Christian University

Following survey completion, the database was exported and analysed in R, mostly through descriptive statistics and visual profiling. Research data is presently (fall, 2018) undergoing more advanced statistical testing, the results will be detailed in forthcoming articles.

Ownership and usage of ICT equipments

The data suggests certain differences between teaching staff and students in the ownership of not portable IT devices: home desktop computers are owned by 50.35% of the students, the figure is somewhat higher in the case of teachers (56.82%). Nevertheless, laptop ownership can be considered typical in the case of students and teachers alike (100%, 93.53%), so both subject categories have access to conventional computing devices.

Concerning the ownership of mobile devices, smartphones have become omnipresent in the last decade, the situation is similar in the case of surveyed students, with only 2.49% of them not owning one. This figure is higher in the case of teachers, 11.36% of them have not adopted smartphones (yet). Tablets, in turn, are more likely to be owned by teachers than students (52.27% vs 35.32%), though they do not seem to be particularly preferred by the former category.

Figure 3. *Ownership of digital equipment (N=260)*



The adaptation of digital and online learning technologies requires reliable, fast internet access, which does not seem to be lacking in the interviewed population. Most of the students have unrestricted wireless (89.05%) or mobile internet (91.04%) access, the figures being similar in the teachers' group (88.64%). In terms of internet access there is a key difference favouring teachers: the majority of them (79.55%) has fixed broadband internet, whereas only 46.77% of the students can benefit such a good infrastructure. This discrepancy in broadband access can be explained by differences in housing conditions, just to name a few: the university dormitory has no cable, but wireless internet, while teachers live in family flats with good communication facilities.

Figure 4. *Devices used in the accomplishment of ICT-related tasks (N=260)*



Ownership data lets us presume that digital device use patterns are distinctive features of the studied subgroups, students seem to be somewhat more reliant on the use mobile technologies. To check this supposition, we synthesized answers related to device usage for each of the 32 tasks included in the survey questionnaire, the results confirm our supposition. Students are more likely than teachers to use their smartphone or tablet for task execution, although both groups favour laptops or desktops for the fulfillment of more complex tasks.

Frequency of performing and confidence in the accomplishment of ICT-related tasks

Various digital competences were assessed by measuring on a five-point Likert-scales the task/activity execution frequency and task performance confidence for a number of 32 activities (4 dimensions).

Figure 5. *Frequency of task/activity performance (N=260)*



Scores for the task execution frequency and their associated performance confidence were calculated as simple averages, a similar straightforward calculus was used by the researchers who had constructed the original profiling questionnaire. The plots above represent task execution frequency and confidence spread across competence-dimensions and subject categories, providing the visual profiling of the sample population. For the frequency, confidence profiles are similar, in the forthcoming paragraphs only usage frequency is detailed.

Figure 6. *Task/activity execution confidence (N=260)*



Epistemological dimension

Figure 7. *Epistemological competence-dimension, task frequency (N=245)*



We assume that competences linked to these dimensions are of key importance for the optimal adaptation of digital learning technologies by teachers and students alike. The plot above illustrates that activities related to these competences are rarely pursued by both teachers and students, with one single exception: teachers more frequently use and share agendas or calendars than students. The dissimilarity can probably be explained by the special communication (and time management) needs of the teachers.

Informational dimension

Figure 8: *Informational competence-dimension, task frequency (N=245)*



Informational competences are mostly related to information and content searching on the web, including study and entertainment materials. This category includes two more technical items (navigation, aggregators), which are not so relevant in terms of readiness for online/digital learning. The above plot helps us to grasp the main differences between the teachers and students: online video watching is common, music/movie downloading is frequent in the latter category. One can suppose that members of younger generations prefer online access to entertainment content over "obsolete" fixed media, like the CDs or DVDs. We can conclude that using online streaming platforms (mostly YouTube) is trivial and ubiquitous in the case of students and teachers can also confidently use them but usage frequency is lower.

Social dimension

Figure 9: *Social competence-dimension, task frequency (N=245)*



Social competences refer to the use of digital equipment for communication, collaboration, sharing and publicity (promotion, visibility enhancement), activities related to these competences encompass more contemporary and "classical" tools. In the former group social networking (i.e. social media) is widespread in the teachers' group and is practically habitual in the case of students. In the realm of "classical", more conventional solutions we should point at the very high usage of text chat or messaging, which is more common than audio communication. However, it is important to mention the inclusion of "old-school" SMS in the same category with the fancy messaging applications of the mobile era. Even though several solutions exist, video chat/phone is not widespread. Instructors should bear in mind that email is not the first choice of the students, new generations might find it complicated or even awkward, as opposed to the myriad of real-time chatting apps. Whereas everyday communication and self-image management seems to flow unhindered via social networking and messaging, digital tools seem far less common in solving professional/study issues. The usage of collaborative cloud solutions is average, the online promotion of ideas, works and research endeavors has not become a routine.

Technical dimension

Figure 10: *Technical competence-dimension, task frequency (N=245)*



Performing activities of this sort require rather technical competences, although the inclusion of the composition of this group is somewhat arbitrary. Visual profiling demonstrates the lack of large differences between teachers and students, although students seem more familiar with multimedia editing and relatively recent solutions (cloud, streaming, smart device management), teachers – quite obviously – more frequently use conventional document editing.

Conclusions

One can suppose that generational differences affect digital preparedness, so that students should perform far better than teachers in ICT-related tasks (McCrindle & Wolfinger, 2010). Our findings show just a slight advantage for the students: both quasi digital insider students and quasi digital outsider teachers exhibit relatively low level of digital competences, most apparent at the epistemological dimension, which is peculiarly important in terms of readiness for online learning. We would like to point out the particularly low level of enrollment in online courses, the lack of (basic) programming/scripting skills and the low frequency of complex calculations pursued with ICT equipment. As far as the social competence-dimension is concerned, students and teachers quite rarely promote their work or research on the internet, though the usage of ubiquitous social networking systems is fairly high. The major difference between teachers and students lays in the latter's higher familiarity with mobile technologies.

Our findings demonstrate certain lacunae in the competences of both students and teachers; the lack of key competences certainly hinders the spread of digital technology in the learning process. We might state, that the Romanian phenomenon is to a certain extent reproduced at the Partium Christian University: despite a relatively good digital

infrastructure and an above-average high-speed internet coverage, the usage of digital technologies and equipment in the educational process is rather underdeveloped.

Teachers, students and staff should probably be enrolled in special training programs regarding ICT usage and the employment of digital learning technologies. Our research highlights systemic problems requiring institutional solutions: the university would gain from the development of a viable digitalization strategy (based on widely available best practices, recommendations and procedures), with its due operationalization followed by actual implementations.

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DEFINING POPULISM: POSSIBILITIES AND DIFFICULTIES

Gergő Hajzer

Abstract: The emerging wave of populist political actors has triggered the redefinition of a long-term used phenomenon. In this short paper three patterns of definition of populism is described. These three possibilities are: (1) populism as an ideology, (2) populism as a tool or strategy for mobilisation, (3) populism as a political communication style. Meanwhile all three dimensions are widely used and criticized applying them at the same time would cause misunderstandings and misconceptions. The paper focuses on describing the benefits and limits of each concepts for further researches.

Keywords: populism, ideology, communication style, strategy, review

Introduction

Populism – populist, a noun and an adjective. But what do they mean? Defining populism is one of the biggest debates among scholars. This paper aims to summarize the current ideas and provide an alternative to understand the phenomenon of populism. As van Kessel says (2015, p. 2): it's a cliché to start writing about populism by mentioning that there is no widely accepted definition of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is a cliché that must be applied. In political science literature the definition of populism is covered but there is no common understanding whether it should be treated as an ideology, strategy, communication style or something else. There is no common understanding either in the effect of the phenomenon in contemporary democracies. Most scholars see populism as a threat to democracy that erodes the institutions by using democratic practices and pushes the political system into dictatorship or to illiberal democracy. (see: Bartolini, 2011; Arditi, 2007; Canovan, 2002; Stanley, 2008). In the long run, the new populist elite can rearrange and redistribute political power by causing the devaluation of democratic institutions. However, many scholars think that populism can have a positive effect on democracies too. It can construct new cleavages, new movements, new parties that use new techniques in mobilisation, and eventually in a short period of time populism can make the political landscape broader (see: Postel, 2007; Urbinati, 1998; Drake, 2009). A possibility to dissolve the contradiction between the positive and negative notion is to state that populism affects the democratic institutions differently depending on its manifestation in consolidated or new-born democracies as it is detailed by Levitsky and Loxton (2012, 2013) or Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012).

Scholars have mostly researched political actors being populists and, in the meantime, they tried to define what populism is. Finding common characteristics is the key element in this procedure, however the base of their definition always differs. One could solve the problem by formulating a simplified definition but in this case the content of such can be so wide that even those parties could be categorized populist who had not been previously connected to the phenomenon. In the opposite, by narrowing down the concept, one can feel the absence of certain political actors. And of course, we can also ask the question: do we really need to identify a party or a political leader as populist? Why don't we just concentrate on certain elements of the phenomenon thus defining the characteristics of populist political actors? Furthermore, why not to think about every political actor as populist thus focusing on analysing the range between moderate and extreme populists?

Researches on populism deal with these aspects but they differ in the core definition, however there are some similarities that lead to the appearance of certain common understandings of populism, what we can also call definition frameworks. This paper concentrates on describing the three frameworks that have evolved during the vast amount of studies on populism in the recent years. These frameworks of understanding define populism as (1) an ideology, (2) political strategy, (3) political communication style. All three approaches are scientifically well-based and acknowledged however they are discrepant concerning their angle of analysing populism.

Populism as an ideology

By defining populism as an ideology first we should take into consideration that it should not be understood as a classical, complex ideology such as liberalism or conservativism. If there are populist leaders, then do they identify themselves as populists? Is there a mass of people or supporters who identify themselves as the populist crowd? Despite some common characteristics there is no typical populist policy or political programme as such and there are no supporters that can be called populists. Thus, populism cannot be a full-grown ideology but a so called "thin-centered" ideology (Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004; Stanley 2008; Abts & Rummens, 2007; Kaltwasser, 2012) that gets attached to a "thick" ideology making it more complete. The attempt to dissolve this ambiguity by putting populism into the "thin-centered" ideology category seems to solve the above-mentioned problematic issue however it also creates more inconsistency. Simply because a "thin" ideology can be quite vague and misleading since it has the necessity of getting attached to a "thick" ideology. As Paris Aslanidis (2015, p. 92) says: "almost any political notion can acquire the status of a thin-centered ideology as long as it contains an alleged 'small' number of core concepts that the claimant perceives as being unable to supply a comprehensive package of policy proposals."

As Mudde's definition continues: populism is "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volante générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). Later Mudde (2007) also used his definition for focusing on right-wing populism that received strong success among researchers of such as Hawkins (2010), Pauwels (2011), Kaltwasser (2014) Roodujin et al. (2012).

The key concept of Mudde's definition is the split in the society that was created by populism. In connection with populism, the idea of the two antagonistic social groups struggling for power has been a key element before Mudde where the Shils (1956, p. 101) gives the unique aspect of populism where the people are not just equal but superior to their rulers.

Although populism cannot be understood as a pure right or left ideology. It can appear throughout the whole spectrum of the political ideologies. However, in Europe populism is often associated with xenophobic politics and extremist, radical right-wing parties and politicians as mentioned by van Kessel (2015, p. 2) although he also adds that in other regions it can be associated with other movements. Success has been achieved recently by populist movements from the left spectrum of the political sphere such as by the Syriza in Greece or the Podemos.

However, Mudde's definition is quite short and applicable for using scientific researches especially for quantitative researches because it makes the identification of populist-non-populist actors possible and easier. It draws a fine circle of populism however this circle is premeable despite its basic intention: parties marked as populists can later become non-populists thus inevitably causing issues in identification in a long run.

Populism as a strategy

Another option for defining populism is to handle it as a political strategy. This assumption is mainly popular among researchers examining Latin-American populism. According to this approach populism should be examined as a tool in the policies, and in the mobilization methods of political actors. In contrast to the previously mentioned "ideology" concept, here the concept of populist policy exists, and it can manifest as a mobilization by economic reallocation, nationalization or by an anti-establishment manifestation (Madrid, 2008 p. 482; see also: Acemoglu et al., 2011). However, this kind of approach cannot survive the appearance of different historical variations, especially in Latin America. Weyland (2001, p. 14) puts the leader to the centre of the strategy as a common phenomenon. In his definition the populist leader has or would like to have executive power that is secured not by an established elective procedure or institution but by the people directly.

Based on Weyland's definition the key element of populism should not be sought in the content of the policies and in the discursive style but in the relation of the different political actors. Taking further this idea, Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (2011) defined populism as a top-down mobilization created by a well-defined leader who wants to change the political and economic elite for those who belong to his/her defined group aka "the people". Urbinati though mainly thinks of populism as an ideology but in her analysis she focuses on the mobilization aspect of the phenomenon by sticking it to a centralized leadership or a specific leader. Ideology and rhetoric can be populist, but a centralized leadership is needed for a popular movement to become populist. However, if any of the three elements is missing then the phenomenon cannot be called populism (Urbinati, 2013, p. 139).

However, for Barr's concept (2009, p. 38) a specific leader is also needed "to gain and maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages." With his definition he also highlights the analysis of the linkage between the political institutions and the populists. In the meantime, his leader is not necessarily a charismatic individual

but more of an outsider like Alberto Fujimori. Though Barr can be considered as a bridge between the strategic and communication style approach he does not analyse the content of the messages, but he focuses more on the broader political context of the actor.

Populism as a communication style

Populism can be also described as a communication style. The focus of the analysis in these researches shifts from the policy or the consequences of populism to the context and the content of the actual messages. Concerning the context Paul Taggart (2003, p. 11) mentions six key elements that completes populism. After detailing the six elements he concludes that the "heartland" is in the centre of populism and not "the people". The heartland which "is a construction of the good life derived retrospectively from a romanticized conception of life as it has been lived." Communicating this artificial concept as the will of the people, populist actors seek for grabbing and monopolizing the attention of the electorate. Thus, populism can be also described as the basic fundament of attention-based politics (Merkovity, 2017). Examining the phenomenon from the point of view of the objective will not provide enough variables for demarcation. Instead of the "why", the "how" will play a more important role in distinguishing populist styles. How does populist communication operate? What are its main features? De la Torre (2000, p. 4) answers these questions by defining populism as "a rhetoric style that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between el pueblo [the people] and the oligarchy". Building on de la Torre's Manichean discourse concept that assigns moral definition to everything, Hawkins (2009, 2010) identifies elements of this struggle of powers in his comparative works about Chavez' rhetoric. Thus, the populist style helps politicians to create or reassure identities of a selected group. The creation of and the struggle between "us" and "them" as the key element of populism appears in the historic analysis of American populism from Michael Kazin too. He defines populism as a language for mobilizing the "ordinary people" against their opponent, "the elite" (Kazin, 2017, p. 1). This language can be used by either side of the political spectrum in order to get the support of the crowd. Therefore, the populist style can appear in the use of more moderate political actors, not just extremists as it is often described. The style that is built on the antagonistic struggle between the people and the elite can be used for communicating different content by various actors. The robe stays the same meanwhile the content inside it changes. The research on populist style neutralizes further the phenomenon by giving the possibility to every single party, movement or other political actor to be populist. Thus, losing the traditionally negative connotation of populism, researchers can investigate the extent of the phenomenon in various contexts and give answers to what degree a political actor is populist. This results in different degrees and types of populism (Deegan-Krause & Haughton, 2009, p. 822).

Such an approach was also used in Jagers' and Walgrave's (2007) work in the Belgian context. Their holistic and universal approach to define populism operated with three elements and two types of the phenomenon. The three elements are: (1) it refers to the people and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with the people; (2) it is rooted in anti-elite feelings; and (3) it considers the people as a monolithic group without internal differences except for some very specific categories who are subject to an exclusion strategy identification. They distinguished thin populism that only has the first element and thick populism that has all three elements. Meanwhile in the analysis they investigated

Belgian party communication, finding the different elements and categorizing the parties into types. This concept of empty populism where the communicator fills the emptiness with the content of its own messages depending on its political stance but building on the appeal of the people also creates various types or subtypes of populism. For example, in this sense Macron and le Pen both use the populist style but in the content of their messages they differ. Defining core elements of the populist style used by all kinds of political actors regardless their ideological background and analysing the appearance or effect of these elements is mainly done by the methods of qualitative or quantitative content analysis. Concerning populism in the European political environment, the populist political communication style is emerging and the identification of certain patterns appearing in various countries opens new possibilities for cross-national, comparative researches (Aalberg et al. 2017).

Conclusion

Populism as a widespread phenomenon is getting more and more attention by researchers. The varied branches of social science give diverse possibilities to define the populism. In this short paper three different approaches to defining the phenomenon of populism has been presented. These definition frameworks discuss populism from various angles though they should not be handled as strictly limited or isolated approaches. overlapping is possible and sometimes necessary in order to modify or create new possibilities in defining the core concepts of populism. As a strategy it aims to mobilize the electorate with the help of a charismatic leader. As an ideology it splits society into two homogeneous groups, and it is manifested alongside other ideologies regardless of one's position on the political spectrum. These conceptualizations of populism focus on the identification of populist political actors thus drawing two circles: the "populists" and the "non-populists". Apart from this binary conception that is often accompanied by negative connotation of the phenomenon, defining it as a communication style provides the opportunity to first neutralize and then examine the extent, the scale, and typology of populism. Defining populism as a communication style captures the actual reality and context of the examined period or political actor. It does not want to conceptualize the ideological background of the actor but focuses rather on the act of persuasion. This can and can be changed easier either because of a strategic decision inside a movement or because of an exterior effect. The intensification of the use of populist style in moderate political actor's communication can also signify that while the ideology as a more rigid political construct cannot change from one day to another, a communication style can be adopted faster in order to gain more success in elections.

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HOW TO RESEARCH PEOPLE'S EXPECTATIONS OF WEBSITES: MENTAL MODELS AND PARTICIPATING OBSERVATION AS USABILITY INSPECTION METHODS

Csilla Herendy

Abstract: Those days are gone when products were combination of what the designer thought would be fancy and what the client thought would be good. Companies trying to develop usable websites, which fit to the user's need. How can these websites and apps be made clearer and more usable to users?

In the following paper I'm going to show not only fundamental testing methods for improve website usability, but also three methodologies, which might be familiar from social sciences. Diary study, ethnographical observation and mental model research are widely used at social sciences but not current at usability research. I suggest using these methods at UX studies and testing too, with tried methodology. I'm writing shortly also about some practical examples too.

Keywords: diary study, mental models, eye-tracking, online focus group, participating observation, testing methods, user experience; website usability (UX).

Introduction: Usability and User Experience

Researching and testing online surfaces is becoming integral part of online communication research. "Software usability is no longer a luxury, but rather a basic determinant of productivity and of the acceptance of software applications." (Abran, Khelifi & Suryn, 2003). Basic keywords of user and usability research are becoming more and more current. It is getting so widely recognized and adopted that its basic keywords have ISO definitions. One of the most important keywords is "usability". The definition of usability in the ISO 9241 standard is the following: "The extent to which a product can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified context of use" (ISO, 2013).

Writing about basic usability facts, Jakob Nielsen summarized usability in one of his early articles in 2012 that "Usability is a quality attribute that assesses how easy user interfaces are to use" He also defined its 5 quality components:

- Learnability: How easy is it for users to accomplish basic tasks the first time they encounter the design?
- Efficiency: Once users have learned the design, how quickly can they perform tasks?

- Memorability: When users return to the design after a period of not using it, how easily can they reestablish proficiency?
- Errors: How many errors do users make, how severe are these errors, and how easily can they recover from the errors?
- Satisfaction: How pleasant is it to use the design? (Nielsen, 2012)

As we can see, researcher and practical gurus are also interested in topic; there are more definitions available for usability. Keywords of it are the following: learnability, efficiency, memorability, satisfaction, usefulness, practical acceptability, and system acceptability.

Another important term is UX "user experience" which is also a well-known buzzword of the topic. To understand it's meaning we should go back shortly to the roots: before user experience design, there was "user-centered design." This term, "user-centered design" first appeared in Donald Norman's book, in *The Design of Everyday Things*. In this book Norman, talking about "user-centered design" concentrated on the needs of the user, instead of focusing on the system itself and the aesthetics of the interface, as it was usual at the time. Later on, in the 90s Norman joined Apple Computer as a "user experience architect" that "the identifier made its way into a job title".

In an interview on UX Week 2008 with Adaptive Path, Norman said: "I invented the term because I thought human interface and usability were too narrow. I wanted to cover all aspects of the person's experience with the system including industrial design graphics, the interface, the physical interaction and the manual. Since then the term has spread widely, so much so that it is starting to lose its meaning." (Lyonnais et al., 2017)

Nowadays, User experience is often defined as "the overall experience of a person using a product such as a website or computer application, especially in terms of how easy or pleasing it is to use" (Kuniavsky, 2003) or "User experience encompasses all aspects of the end-user's interaction with the company, its services, and its products" (Norman & Nielsen, 2016) and "person's entire experience using a particular product, system or service" (Law, 2008) each definition retained a most important core elements.

User Techniques Offline and Online

In the meantime, different user techniques were already wise to the facts. One of the defined user techniques is "muddling through", by UX guru Steve Krug. This definition means, that users don't figure out how things, like websites work, they muddle through on it. They don't care about objectives and imaginative way of navigation of the website's owner. No matter, how difficultly they solve the problem, next time they'll make on the same way.

Another user technique attaches to this: users always try to find the easiest way to solve their problems, and try to find shortcuts, not only in the real world (pls. see Figure 1.) but on websites too. Users don't care about the official way to solve problems on websites, they try to solve their problems in the easiest way.

Figure 1. *Shortcut in the real word*
Source: https://www.quora.com/Which-is-better-for-a-web-designer-to-learn-first-UI-or-UX



In the real world and also on the web basically we are looking for something concrete, and we decide if we ask for help or look around and find it ourselves (Krug, 2006)

Jakob Nielsen wrote about search-dominant and link-dominant users. Half of all users are search-dominant, about a fifth of the users are link-dominant, and the rest exhibit mixed behavior (Nielsen, 1997). The search-dominant users will usually go straight for the search button when they enter a website: they are not interested in looking around the site; they are focusing on task and want to find specific information as fast as possible. In contrast, the link-dominant users are interested in content, they are rather looking around on the given site, and prefer to follow the links around a site: "even when they want to find specific information, they will initially try to get to it by following promising links from the home page. Only when they get hopelessly lost will link-dominant users admit defeat and use a search command." (Nielsen, 1997)

Krug mentioned that search-dominant users on the websites might be the same people who look for the nearest clerk as soon as they enter a store.

Typical research methods

A number of researchers deal with questions of the usability of websites (Marcus, 2013; Weinschenk, 2015; Nielsen et al., 2010), as well as the questions of the usability. Academic literature on their concrete testing methods and positive case studies is scarce and only touches on the subject, while it would be of primary importance with regard to the action plans mentioned above. A reason for this might be that researchers of the topic are usually practicing experts, and academic publication is not a central part of their activities (Herendy, 2018).

Detailed usability aspects can be researched with several different usability research methods. Basically, researchers are interested in how easy navigation on a given site is, how understandable terms used are, how transparent its information architecture is. Researchers

are also interested in the ease of use, number of errors. It is getting more and more obvious that the user is an essential factor, it is important to know and research them. Users are becoming an absolutely non-negligible factor: not only in the public sector but also in the public administration sector (e-government). Research is substantial, because websites that are tested in the development phase are more usable than those that employ no such checks. This might be even more relevant in the case of public administration sites, which we are sometimes obliged to use, provided that we aim to avoid personal administration. (Herendy, 2018).

Estimating usability of websites, the researchers typically use some of following methods by Rohrer (Figure 2.), and don't typically research users' preliminary expectations of gives apps, surfaces, although interviews, focus groups and ethnographic field studies are available methods.

Figure 2: *When to Use Which User-Experience Research Methods (Rohrer, 2014)*
Source: https://www.nngroup.com/articles/which-ux-research-methods/



To get to know users motivations, expectations, conceptions and ideas connected to the online solution, it is useful but absolutely not typical to research directly their mental models. Researchers can also use two other methods from social sciences: participatory observation, diary studies.

Old-timer Research Methods from Social Science Used in Cutting Edge UX Research
Mental Models, Participatory Observation, Diary Studies

Mental model research

During usability studies and testing, data collection focuses on the mental model of the user with relation to the topic, in addition to issues of usability.

The first person to talk about *mental models* was K.J.W. Craik in his 1943 book, The Nature of Explanation. After Craik's death, the concept was dormant for many years, until the 1980s when the term reappeared. Later on, in the '80s, there were two books published with the title "Mental Models" (Weinschenk, 2011). Since that time – there are many definitions for mental models that have been around for at least 25 years. One of them is from Susan Carey's 1986 journal article "Cognitive Science and Science Education," which states: "A mental model represents a person's thought process for how something works (i.e., a person's understanding of the surrounding world). Mental models are based on incomplete facts, past experiences, and even intuitive perceptions. They help shape actions and behavior, influence what people pay attention to in complicated situations, and define how people approach and solve problems" (Weinshenk, 2011).

The importance of mental models is highlighted by various studies such as in Mental Models (Young, 2008) "Mental models give you a deep understanding of people's motivations and thought processes along with the emotional and philosophical landscape in which they are operating" or in Emotional Design: Why We Love (or Hate) Everyday Things "A mental model is what the user believes about the system at hand" (Norman, 2004).

Norman emphasizes that a "mental model is based on belief, not facts, it is based on their predictions about the system and a mental model is internal to each user's brain, and different users might construct different mental models of the same user interface". He adds, "one of usability's big dilemmas is the common gap between designers' and users' mental models. Because designers know too much, they form wonderful mental models of their own creations, leading them to believe that each feature is easy to understand. Users' mental models of the UI are likely to be somewhat more deficient, making them more likely to make mistakes and find the design much more difficult to use" (Nielsen, 2010).

People always have mental models, but they are different. People create mental models very quickly and change them very quickly. Yet it is important to research these models. The aim of the research is to understand people's (e.g. the target audience's) mental models.

If the website's strategy is based on research, the website will meet the needs of citizens. Research helps align the needs of people with the mandate of the organization. While research helps drive strategy, it is important to note that most people do not know how to articulate what they actually need. To quote Henry Ford: "If I asked people what they wanted, they would have said a faster horse."

That is the reason why the organization needs to conduct a survey, to explore users' thinking (mental models) and find the underlying needs and motivations that prompt participants to propose certain features, functions or approaches.

If a given organization gets to know the users' mental models better and uses them as the basis for its websites, people will more likely use their sites.

Methods for research and gathering information about mental models

There are some useful research methods that can be helpful while gathering information about user's mental models. "These are invaluable tools to help you understand your audience's thoughts, behaviors, beliefs, and needs within a well-defined area of activity".

One of them is Indi Young's "audience mental model" (Young, 2008) which helps to visualize data about why users do the things they do and help you step back from the researchers own viewpoint in order to better anticipate the needs of your audience" (Chisholm, 2016).

Weinschenk emphasizes the importance of understanding what users think about a certain system, software or product (Weinschenk, 2011).

Some widely used methods for gathering information are the *card sorting test* (open card sorting, closed card sorting), *focus groups, interviews, surveys, questionnaires, participatory design or usability testing* (Herendy, 2009, 2012). Although these methods are usually helpful for accessing mental models, there are some limitations to isolating and studying mental models.

We can better access mental models using methods written by Susan Weinschenk or Indy Young methods, and it is also beneficial to use old-timer research methods from social sciences. We can also access user expectations with ethnographic research and diary study. Although we can find two of these methods on Rorher's landscape, the author of this paper suggests an innovative way to use them.

Participatory Observation and Diary Studies

Participatory observation is a method with ethnographical fundamentals, and it is also used in market research. Using ethnographic research method the researcher is part of the community under investigation, and he or she can monitor user's behavior in real life. Author of this paper is quite convinced about that we can use this data while creating the information architecture and menu-structure of the given website or app.

Diary studies are a form of longitudinal research, which means, research takes place over a long period of time with the same participants. Typically, users self-report their activities at regular intervals to create a log of their activities, thoughts and frustrations. Diary study can be also helpful at website development, if we would like to know better how users apply our solution in a specific or everyday situation.

Choose one method…

The researcher should choose the one method, which is the best for the actual goals.

It is useful, if websites based – at least partly – on user's needs, habits and thinking during their development and tried to get to know their readers as much as it was possible. Among other methods, their developers have gathered client requirements, conducted online survey research, analyzed user statistics and carried out card sorting tests. These methods are becoming used on a daily level in the business world, not only by bigger companies, but smaller enterprises too.

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SZOBORI BÚCSÚ: A TRADITION REINVENTED MULTIPLE TIMES

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László Mód

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to analyse an annual Hungarian festival, *Szobori búcsú*, from the point of view of invented traditions, *lieux de memoire*, and imagined community. We will study the varying intentions, contents, popularity and ideas connected to the festivities, starting from the early years at the turn of the century and ending with the re-invention of the *búcsú* in the 2000s.

There have been clear points at which the values and norms have been intentionally changed: from playful patriotism to Árpád cult to Socialism to Catholic Christianity. We can see that patriotism, even during the Socialist era, is the constant force in the various forms that the *Szobori búcsú* has taken. Ópusztaszer, the Árpád Memorial and the annual *Szobori búcsú* each in their way provide us with an illusion of eternity.

Keywords: associations, Árpád, Catholicism, cultural heritage, festivals, Gesta Hungarorum, heritage, Hungary, invented tradition, imagined community, lieux de memoire, memorials, mythology, nationalism, Ópussztaszer, parks, patriotism, places, politicians, Socialism, statues

Introduction

What makes certain places more meaningful than others? How are history, tradition and a sense of place intertwined in a way that creates cultural heritage? How does continuous practice create a sense of place? The purpose of this article is to analyse an annual Hungarian festival, *Szobori búcsú*, from the point of view of invented traditions, *lieux de memoire*, and imagined community. We use the theories originally presented by Hobsbawm and Ranger, Pierre Nora and Benedict Anderson, respectively, as points of reference.

An invented tradition, by Hobsbawm's (1983, p. 1) definition, is a "set of practices of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past". A *lieu de memoire* is, by Pierre Nora's definition, a certain site where a sense of historical continuity persists. He includes festivals and monuments in this category. The main purpose of these sites is to create a sense of continuity, an illusion of eternity. (Nora, 1989, p. 12)

A fair number of historical and anthropological writings refer to an imagined community as a large entity that we feel loyalty towards in much the same way as we would towards a much smaller entity. Imagination plays a role in the fact that we do not personally know

everyone with whom we feel an affiliation with in such larger entities. We have similar feelings towards nations as we would more naturally feel towards family and kin. This is tied to the process of how modern nation states took their form, and to their identity formation, which took place in the 19th and 20th centuries. (Eriksen, 2010, p. 119)

In Hungary, national identity has many foundational symbols, but one of them is tied to the "Hungarian Conquest", the entry of Magyar tribes into the Carpathian Basin. Even though a certain amount of mediaeval literature exists on the entry of Hungarians into the basin, the monastery of Szer was identified as the site of the first assembly of the Magyar tribes only in a mediaeval *gesta* written by the chronicler Anonymus, *Gesta Hungarorum*. The interest in old manuscripts was rekindled when they were published in the 18th century. Gradually, during the 19th century, especially after the manuscripts had been translated into Hungarian, Szer became meaningful to the contemporary national imagination. (Vályi & Zombori, 2000, pp. 53-55) It is therefore not surprising that the place played a role in the Hungarian Millennial festivities in 1896. A large monument was built on the site to celebrate the anniversary.

The area around the ruins of Szer monastery is nowadays operated as a national heritage park. It has, generally speaking, been the subject of extensive scientific discussion, including our own research (see: Kovács, 1997, 2004, 2006; Landers, 1996; Mód & Simon, 2011; Savolainen, 2002, 2005; Sinkó, 1996; Vályi & Zombori, 2000). In this article, we concentrate in particular on the *Szobori búcsú*, an annual festival held at the park.

The Beginning of the *Szobori Búcsú* Festival

To commemorate the millennium of the Hungarian Conquest, seven monuments serving different purposes were erected with state support at various locations. Five of them symbolically marked the borders of the country. They faced the neighbouring countries (Austria, Serbia, Russia and Romania), thereby proclaiming the integrity of the Hungarian state. At the same time, these monuments were also intended to remind the minorities living within the territory of Hungary that they belonged to the Hungarian nation and to stress the unity of the political nation. This project must be seen as part of a phenomenon that has been analysed in depth by a number of researchers, among them Anthony D. Smith and Arjun Appadurai. (see: Appadurai, 1996, pp. 178-199; Smith, 1989. pp. 340-367) In essence, these monuments linked the symbols of the mythologised past to specific places, they were part of the nationalisation of space. They designated places that proved suitable sites for rites representing the nation. The monuments were actually an excellent means for extending the millennium celebrations because, at that time, there were almost no objects of that type outside the capital city. In certain respects, the monuments made the myth of Chieftain Árpád and, in a broader sense, the notion of the Hungarian state tangible and visible. (Feischmidt, 2006, pp. 371-376)

The discovery of *Gesta Hungarorum* made Pusztaszer a focal point of the Hungarian past. According to Anonymus, it was here that the Hungarians arriving in the Carpathian Basin held their first assembly. Hungarian thinking on public law regarded the assembly of tribal leaders as the establishment of Hungarian constitutionality. Within the frameworks of the celebrations marking the millennium, it appeared self-evident that a monument should be erected at Pusztaszer; and one was duly placed beside the ruins of the mediaeval abbey. The base was officially unveiled on 27 June 1896, but the superstructure was not completed

until a year later. Departing from the original proposal, it was topped not with an allegorical statue of Hungaria, but with the figure of the chieftain Árpád, moreover shown in a seated position, which gave rise to much debate at the time. (Varga, 2017, pp. 116-120, 176-177)

After the inauguration of the monument, a group of citizens from Szeged organised commemorative rites in Pusztaszer that at first mainly resembled excursions. Over the years, more and more people joined them until the Pusztaszer Árpád Association was formed in Szeged on 21 June 1902. Their principal aim was to keep alive the memory of the leader of the Hungarian conquest and to erect a church as a monument on the site of the ruins of the mediaeval monastery. At first, the celebrations were held at the end of June, then at the end of August, and later they were moved to the first Sunday in September. The members of the association began to call the commemoration itself the Statue Pilgrimage (*Szobori búcsú*) or Árpád Pilgrimage. Towns and villages in Csongrád County were represented with delegations at the annual celebrations held in September. (Kovács, 2006, pp. 23-29)

Lengthy and thorough planning sessions preceded the celebrations. In the case of the pilgrimages, the organisers drew on elements of the ritual tools widely used at the end of the 19th century. Commemorative speeches were made each year at the monument, by different persons on each occasion. In many cases, poems were written for the occasion, sometimes recited by their author. The programme always included the National Anthem – *Himnusz* – by Ferenc Kölcsey and Appeal – *Szózat* – by Mihály Vörösmarty. The celebrations generally began with the former and ended with the latter. Religious ceremonies were also held at the celebrations. These were generally Catholic masses, as the majority of participants belonged to that denomination. On occasion, Protestant services were also included in the programme. Practically every year there was also a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument. All these elements of the celebrations were generally part of the morning programme; then, after lunch, the afternoon programme was mainly devoted to entertainment for the participants in the form of competitions (poetry recitals, horseback riding, wrestling, sack races) and conjuring tricks. Almost every year, various gifts and objects (pocket knives, handkerchiefs, combs) were distributed to the children. The organisers departed from the pattern described above if they wished to celebrate a special anniversary. In 1902, for example, the Pusztaszer Árpád Association held a special assembly at the monument and consecrated trees planted in memory of the seven chieftains. The commemorations were also held during WWI. They generally consisted of a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument, but did not include the afternoon programmes. (Raffner & Bárdoss, 1922, pp. 12-218)

After 1920, Hungary's borders and its economic and political positions changed radically, resulting in a crisis for different social groups. Pusztaszer was one of the few places that represented the glorious past. When organisation of the celebrations was resumed with great impetus in the early 1920s, the celebrations were based on elements similar to those from the pre-war period. However, due to the country's situation, the commemorative speeches were imbued with the demand for a return of the territories annexed to the neighbouring countries following WWI. In 1936, the owner of the site leased the area around the monument to the association for 99 years, and the contract gave members the right to conduct archaeological excavations and erect buildings. In the interwar years, new plans were put forward for the site as a place of remembrance. The members of the association wanted to build a church where followers of the so-called Hungarian religion (on Árpád cult, see: Sinkó, 1989) could hold their ceremonies, and statues of Hungarian kings and Transylvanian princes would be placed in the national pantheon. In 1937, an artesian well was drilled and named Árpád's Well. In 1938, the Transylvanian gate at the

main entrance to the park was completed for the day of the fair; it included a flag that could be raised to its top. In 1939, the celebrations were not held because of the outbreak of WWII. (Kovács, 2006, pp. 41-63; Raffner & Bárdoss, 1922.)

The *Búcsú* Survives Socialism

The last *búcsús* after WWII were held in 1946 and 1948. Nothing followed during the Rákosi dictatorship. After the Hungarian uprising in 1956, annual festivities were recommenced in 1957. They were now under the auspices of the Socialist Party and the Patriotic People's Front, given the name Worker-Peasant Meetings. Thousands of visitors attended the meetings, which were held in September just as the pre-war *búcsús* had been. (Vályi & Zombori, 2000, pp. 72-74.) However, the site did not evolve much until 1970, when the popular sociologist and politician Ferenc Erdei suggested in his book *Town and Country* that a memorial park should be built at the site. He was critical of the pre-war usage of the area, condemning its previous upper-class nationalism, but at the same time he took up the plans that had already been conceived by the Árpád Society. He suggested conducting archaeological excavations in the area. (Erdei, 1971, pp. 173-174) Archaeologist Ottó Trogmayer remembers that he was given orders to dig up remains of the Hungarian Conquest (Trogmayer, 1995, p. 3), despite the fact that such an endeavour was not possible, which both scientists no doubt knew perfectly well (see also: Kovács, 1997, p. 102). In Erdei's (1971, pp. 171-173) view, the main thing that was to be celebrated in the park and its annual gatherings was the Hungarian State, its continuity through the ages. Because of the focus on statehood and the political nature of the event, the annual event was moved to 20 August, the national day of Hungary, in 1978 (Kovács, 2004, pp. 30-32).

Image 1: *Annual celebration during the Socialist era (Photo: György Enyedi, September 1975. Móra Ferenc Múzeum).*

The popularity of the annual gatherings continued throughout the period of the political change-over. At this point, coming to the park had become a generational tradition for many people. The anthropologist Michelle Landers (1996, pp. 254-264) interviewed visitors in 1993–1994 about the meanings of the site and came to the conclusion that regular local people despised the elites for introducing the nationalistic and political content to the park, since for them the park represented the great outdoors, opportunities for recreation and memories connected with family. When we asked the present park director about the politicians, he said that no matter what the ideology or era, politicians keep coming to the park to give their speeches and then they go away again. He said that if they are kept happy during their visit, they will be happy to give economic support to the park's operations. (Hieta & Mód, 2017a.) This is in alignment with Lander's (1996, pp. 226-239) findings from the 1990s.

The Reinvention of the *Szobori Búcsú*

Even though the park continued to host activities on the national day in 2007, to mark its 110th anniversary, the *Szobori búcsú* that had been on the first Sunday of September (the Day of the Virgin Mary's Birth) was started again. The event was designed to be as similar as possible to the early *Szobori búcsús*. The local Catholic bishop agreed to support the event, and he also received the first *Szer üzenete* (the Message of Szer) prize, which was awarded to him for helping in the restoration of the old monastery bell. (Hieta & Mód, 2017b.)

Image 2: *Horses and carriages from nearby villages take part in Szobori búcsú (Photo: H. Hieta 2017).*

The "Message of Szer" prize was a new invention. The actual prize is a replica of a mediaeval ring that was found during excavations of the site. (Hieta & Mód, 2017b.) The prize can be given to a Hungarian Christian who has done excellent work in nurturing the nation and local community, who in their life and work embody the Szer message – faith, endurance, bravery and love for country – to their fellow Hungarians. (ÓNTE 2017.)

The intended message of the new *Szobori búcsú*, according to its inventor, is to give thanks for and commemorate the history and survival of the Hungarian nation. The first assembly in Szer put an end to the Eastern nomadic lifestyle, and eventually tied Hungarians to Christian Europe. The survival of the Hungarian state and its apostolic king was tied to the Pope in Rome. (Hieta & Mód, 2017b.) From this point of view, enthusiasts who today come to the park only to find ancient Árpád are missing a bigger part of the picture. Since the Christian tradition of the Szer monastery has a direct continuum running from the Middle Ages to the present day, it is therefore more real and credible.

Conclusions

In conclusion, let us go back to our three theoretical points: invented tradition, imagined community and *lieu de memoire*.

An invented tradition is a set of practices of a ritualistic or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition and which thus automatically imply continuity with the past. In the case of *Szobori búcsú*, one can wonder whether it is a question of one invented tradition that has continued through various political eras or whether the tradition has been re-invented several times. There have been clear points at which the values and norms have been intentionally changed: from playful patriotism to Árpád cult to Socialism to Catholic Christianity. However, we must bear in mind that political elites and grass-roots level citizens might well have had different and varying understandings regarding the essential reasons for the festivities at the Árpád memorial. What is important, in any case, is that the implied continuity with the past has been a major component of the *Szobori búcsú*. It has survived several changes in the political regime by appearing ancient and beyond the political currents. This is interesting because the *búscsú* is not really a very ancient tradition. It was started in 1897 and re-started in 2007.

When we look at the imagined community aspect of the *Szobori búcsú*, we can see several interesting points. Both the ethnologist Tamás Hofer (1991) and the art historian Katalin Sinkó (1989) have pointed out that the Hungarian national image rests on two conflicting ideas, Hungary as a stranger among its neighbours, represented by Eastern nomadism and Chief Árpád on the one hand, and Hungary as a part of universalist Western Christianity, represented by Catholicism and the king St. Stephen on the other. The *Szobori búcsú* combines both images by bringing a Catholic mass to the memorial erected in honour of the pagan, nomadic Chief Árpád. Already in its early form, *Szobori búcsú* combined the Catholic mass with some amount of patriotic programme, and we can see that patriotism, even during the Socialist era, is the constant force in the various forms that the *Szobori búcsú* has taken since.

This takes us to our third and last point, *lieux de memoire*. A *lieu de memoire* is any site where a sense of historical continuity persists during a time when there no longer are environments of memory. The Ópusztaszer National Heritage Park is an example par excellence. As the present director of the park said in a recent interview, there is a sense of historical continuity from Árpád to the mediaeval kings who visited Szer to modern-day politicians who visit Ópusztaszer (Hieta & Mód, 2017a). The sense of continuity is quite persuasive. As Pierre Nora (1989, p. 8) has pointed out, academic modern history is nothing but sifted and sorted historical traces – in other words, it is rather boring. Ópusztaszer, the Árpád Memorial and the annual *Szobori búcsú* each in their way provide us with an

illusion of eternity. A *lieu de memoire* cannot be true or false because it does not fall into the category of modern history writing.

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THE VIRTUAL CHILD: INDIAN CHILDREN IN VIRTUAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SPACES

Neha Hooda

Abstract: The study explores the television and media consumption preferences of children from urban Indian middle-income homes. The findings are based on an ethnographic study using qualitative research methods of questionnaires, focus group discussions, expert interviews and also content analysis. The respondent group of 520 people comprised of children in the ages of 8 – 13 years and adults working with children and content producers for children. The current results of the research are indicative of a paradigm shift in peer culture increasingly moving to digital spaces, away from the traditional playgrounds, where the contexts of decision making, relationships, life goals and expectations have been redefined.

Keywords: children's television, TV viewing patterns, virtual spaces, localized content, television in India

Introduction

The world that we inhabit today is not only defined by geographical boundaries but exists in digital and physical spaces too. Digital revolution has transformed how we perceive our world and conduct ourselves. Among other things, it has changed our understanding about what our lives constitute, what is acceptable and what we expect from ourselves. Children born in these digital times are most impacted as they are rapidly transitioning from traditional learning platforms like schools, homes, libraries to the virtual environment of the internet. The generation of children today, rely heavily on the use of media to fulfil their needs for information, communication, entertainment and education. Cunningham (1995) quoted in (Valkenburg, 2008, pp. 6-7) that childhood is not only a biologically determined stage of life, but also a social construction that is influenced by historical, social, and economic factors. As noted by Jaglom & Gardner in (Valkenburg, 2008, p. 25), by the time they are 3 years old, children start to make statements indicating identification with television characters. The ages of 5 years through 14 years are a crucial time when children learn to make meaning of the world around them. When children are about 7, they are progressively able to use information about the reality status of a media production autonomously when they watch a frightening fictional media production (Valkenburg, 2008, p. 26). (Götz et al., 2008, p. 16) state: An integrative review of the literature on children and media (Gunter & McAleer, 1997; Singer & Singer, 2001; van Evra, 1990) suggested that after the average age of 7, children have some of the crucial cognitive abilities that allow them

to understand mediated content (once again, mainly in television) the current discourse on the constructed nature of childhood (Aries, 1962; James, Jenks & Prout, 1998; James & Prout, 1990; Jenks, 1996) and of the characteristics of the socially competent child, credits children with being autonomous individuals who actively participate in meaning-making processes, in much the same way as adults in other stages of the life cycle… Cumulatively, these studies have found that the media is a part of children's everyday life experiences and provides both, a wide range of content as well as diverse forms of relationships that are integrated into their realities in a way that extends far beyond the moment of consumption. Media-related experiences, like all other sources of experiences in a child's environment, are integrated in the process of their developing selves, their relationships with their peers, family members and educators.

As stated in (Kim, 1988, p. 47) the impressions that we receive from our environment become an important part of our meaning making process, both internally and externally. In contemporary times that are marked by proliferation of media, children in the age group of 8 to 13 years actively use it (media) as a tool to find their place in the world, define who they are and establish their own identity. This exposure also impacts interactions with peer groups and personal goal setting. Media marks out what becomes popular culture and how they (children) take decisions in life.

In the context of India; social, economic and technological changes have impacted access to and consumption of media service. Economic class impacts access to media in a very important way. There exist three broad economic classes in India, namely; poor, middle and rich. The middle class is further divided into lower middle class, middle-middle class and upper middle class. It is in these sections of the society that the access to media devices and technology is very large for children. The reason for this is the change in social and economic lifestyle of contemporary urban India. Given the demands of modern life style and inflation, often times both parents are required to work long hours. Since work and household chores take up a lot of time, parents let media play the role of a baby sitter or a responsible adult looking out for children. Better paying jobs in the post liberalized India also mean that there is more dispensable income available to parents today in comparison to the past. Higher dispensable incomes and less time for children often leads to parents giving gifts like smartphones, laptops and other devices to compensate for their presence and sometimes encourage children to do better at academics. This phenomenon is very prominent in urban middle-class homes. Given the fact that in today's time parents have awareness about global competition, they want their children to be well informed, smart and knowledgeable. As such, tolerance for media consumption is far higher than it ever was. The children who participated in this study further shared that they had access to television, iPads, tablets, smartphone and PCs. They religiously spent anything between 1-2 hours daily (sometimes even more) accessing media offerings through the internet, mobile communication and television. YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and game apps on smart phones remained favourites for most.

Television in India

It was in 1959 that terrestrial television broadcasting began in India under government control as part of All India Radio. In the year 1976, television and radio broadcasting were split up. Television became an independent unit of the Ministry of Information and

Broadcasting. It came to be known as Doordarshan and enjoyed monopoly in the market until 1991. Then came liberalization and privatization. It impacted media also just like other industries. India witnessed rapid changes in the socio-political systems, technology and economy of the country after the economic liberalization that took place in 1991. Private companies like ZEE TV, SUN TV, ETV entered the media market. Foreign Direct Investment led foreign companies like CNN and STAR TV to Indian shores. This was the start of satellite broadcasts and the beginning of a new era that was set to change the media consumption habits of the people of India forever. From access to one stand-alone channel from 60's to 80's, the 90's presented a buffet of entertainment to Indians through cable networks. Cable networks cashed in on the opportunity and for the first time Indians had access to entertainment which was created in India and also bought from foreign shores. The growth has been on a rise. In the recent years, the industry size of TV has grown from INR 329 billion in 2011 to INR 588.3 billion in 2016 (KPMG India, 2017). The advertising revenue, that largely impacts the kind of programming we get to see, rose from INR 116 billion in 2011 to INR 201.2 billion. As per the audit reports by global organizations like KPMG and Ernst & Young, television shows promise of rapid growth through the coming years. The 2017 FICCI Frames projected report marks out the growth of television industry to be INR 651 billion in 2017 which grows to INR 750.9 billion in 2018 and to INR 876.8 billion in 2019. By the year 2021, the projected growth of television is estimated to be INR 1165.6 billion. We are witnessing the digital convergence of traditionally distinct telecommunication technologies such as satellites, cable television, telephones, computers, and fiber optics, which has enabled media networks to at once broadcast globally, narrowcast locally, and simulcast for multiple viewership (Kumar, 2006, p. 1).

Though the general entertainment channel category dominates the viewership in India, the children's program category has also seen a steady growth of 4-6 percent per year since 2015 (FICCI, 2017). The last two decades have seen a change in the kind of content being watched by millions of middle-class children from small towns and urban dwellings as several international programs are dubbed and made available in a number of Indian vernacular languages. These include Japanese children's cartoons, Hollywood films and more (Banaji, 2010, p. 15). Currently, in the Indian media space, Cartoon Network, Colors, Discovery Kids, Disney Channel, Disney XD, Doordarshan, Hungama TV, Nickelodeon and Pogo are the key players. Doraemon [Figure 1], Shin-chan [Figure 2] and Jethalal from Tarak Mehta ka Oolta Chasma [Figure 3] are some of the prominent characters that children love well into their early teens.

Figure 1. *Doraemon (the blue cat in the middle with a hat with Nobita (boy in yellow shirt and hat) and other friends (Disney India, n.d.)*



Figure 2. *Shin-chan (Disnay India, n.d.)*



Figure 3. *Jethalal from Tarak Mehta ka Oolta Chashma (IMDB, n.d.)*

Research Findings

As part of my ongoing research which aims to map the audio-visual media consumption habits and preferences of urban middle-class children, between November 2017 and September 2018, I conducted primary research at a school in the northern part of India. The methods adopted were participatory observation, survey questionnaire, interviews, discussions and content analysis. The interaction was focused on children, 201 girls and 294 boys, in the age group of 8 to 13 years belonging to urban settings. A ten points qualitative questionnaire was administered to the respondents and they were asked about their media usage habits, television program preferences and the relevance of these programs. For many children their time of media interaction is where they were learning to form opinions about life in general, get informed about latest trends and find a sense of identity by exploring their likes and dislikes. Often times, these media interactions remained unsupervised by adults giving children the freedom to access any kind of materials they wanted. Some of

the children emphasized their tech savvy skills and their capability to unlock smart phones and other media devices that their parents had locked. The study brought out an interesting insight. A child can access much of media content using a smart phone in a room full of adults and still find a sense of privacy and anonymity. The internet has opened up a space unstratified by class, socio-economic status and gender. The life that children lead in the virtual world brings limitless possibilities to them. They can be whoever they want to be. A very small device opens a new world of information, entertainment and communication. The size of this device and the advantage of mobility means that irrespective of the physical space a child exist in, they can still have a very stable world view of who they are and what constitutes their world in the virtual space. Just as the physical environment impacts the meaning making process that a child undertakes, so does the virtual world that he/she inhabits. The assimilation of these two worlds often shapes the choices, preferences, ideologies, relationships that form the foundation stone of a child's life. While it is true to say that media, internet and television help children in many ways, it is just as true that it has also taken children away from playgrounds and planted them in a virtual environment where the contexts of peer groups, bullying, decision making, relationships, life goals and expectations have been redefined. In connection with favourite television programs, the children listed 118 TV shows in total that are being played on the national Indian television with presence on the world wide web. Between both, girls and boys; (Taarak Mehta Ka Ooltah Chashmah, 2008) (Doraemon, 1979) (Doraemon, 2005), (Pokémon, 2003), (Shin-chan, 2006), (Bigg Boss 11, 2017) came out as the top favourite shows. See *Table 1 & Table 2.*

Table 1.*Top five television program viewing preferences of boys in the age group of 8 to 13 years, as recorded in November 2017*

Program Name	Category	Number of Viewers (Boys)
Tarak Mehta ka Oolta Chasma	Indian, Live Action, Fiction	52
Pokémon	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	46
Doraemon	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	45
Shin-chan	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	45
Bigg Boss 11	Indian, Live Action, Non-Fiction	34

Table 2. *Top five television program viewing preferences of girls in the age group of 8 to 13 years, as recorded in November 2017*

Program Name	Category	Number of Viewers (Girls)
Tarak Mehta ka Oolta Chasma	Indian, Live Action, Fiction	93
Shin-chan	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	84
Doraemon	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	65
Super Dancer	Indian, Live Action, Non-Fiction	50
Bigg Boss11	Indian, Live Action, Non-Fiction	41

The results of the study were contrary to the stereo-types popularly held in India that girls prefer romantic and soft stories that are high on emotions, drama and boys prefer out and out action stories that leave no room for soft-expressions. The study showcased that both boys and girls preferred stories of the same kind alike. Children were interested

in stories that opened up a world of wonder to them; of magic, hope and inspiration. The top favourite being *Tarak Mehta ka Oolta Chasma* (*Tarak Mehta's inverted glasses*), a story about a group of families living in a neighbourhood. The narrative is shown from the eyes of Jethalal, the protagonist. The world that Jethalal inhabits, introduces children to the workings of the real world. Children learn to understand that adults negotiate, take decisions, help each other and can also lie for the greater good. They learn how to manoeuvre their way around the adult world much like characters in the program. Children noted that the tone of the program was some-what comic and without profanities. This observation indicates that children of today are growing up to be media literate. They understand what they are comfortable watching and what they classify as uncouth or unacceptable. Such subtle considerations have now started factoring in the decision-making process of content makers as well. As such, children have started to emerge as a separate target audience.

The next favourite category, as reflected by the study, was Japanese animation. *Shinchan*, *Doraemon and Pokémon* were the favourites. See *Table 3*.

Table 3. *Top five television program viewing preferences of boys and girls in the age group of 8 to 13 years, as recorded in November 2017*

Program Name	Category	Number of Viewers (Boys and Girls)
Tarak Mehta ka Oolta Chasma	Indian, Live Action, Fiction	145
Shin-chan	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	129
Doraemon	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	110
Bigg Boss 11	Indian, Live Action, Non-Fiction	75
Pokémon	Japanese, Animation, Fiction	70

These programs show stories about children going to school and their troubles and joys that revolve around school, homework, friends, parents and proving themselves. What is interesting to note here is that these programs may be reflective of Japanese culture but have been very well received by Indian children for over a decade. To make the stories relatable, the dialogues are dubbed in Hindi. Such a translation is context specific and not an exact transliteration from the original language. An interesting observation from this study also points to the fact that most stories have male characters as protagonists and the female characters are in support roles. This indicates a lack of role models for female children. It can also indicate that today, children need not necessarily look at role models confined by genders. This leads us towards the new dimension of an ungendered digital world that is shaping up the preferences of children and the media producers.

Gender, socio-economic class, appearance and other factors that may have a bearing on interactions in the real world can be easily altered, changed or manipulated in the digital/virtual world. This also gives an opportunity for understanding children without societal limitations and giving them a space to express themselves freely. Irrespective of gender, children who participated in the study, found humour, discovery and problem solving as areas of interest.

Conclusion

The ever-evolving tools of media help children experience the present world in a very different way in comparison to how the millennials experienced life. Media tools like television, internet and films introduce the larger world of social reality to children on a constant basis through still images, moving images, text, audio and help in the process of meaning-making. Media use, television and internet in particular, fill several gaps in a child's life. It is through media exposure that often times children learn to perceive what is right, wrong, acceptable and unacceptable in their real life. The childhood of today is global where the learning process is constant. In the past a child mostly learnt from the home environment and the one at school. In today's time, the learning process is constant, unlimited by geography and global, as media opens up a global world for the users. It also makes it possible for children to learn about different perspectives on history without having to physically leave their geographical location. It would be right to say that to a large extent media enables and empowers children. It also presents an opportunity to become tolerant adults due to constant access to a much larger world which is full of different thought processes and ideologies in comparison to what the physical world presents.

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CRIME SPACES – THE REPRESENTATION OF CRIME IN EASTERN EUROPEAN HBO SERIES

Sándor Kálai

Abstract: After the huge success of *In Treatment*, the HBO's second wave of production focused on the creation of more ambitious series, still adopting the franchise logic. The aim of all of these series is to reveal social problems through the representation of crimes. The first part of this paper focuses on "concepts" (generic complexity, interpretive cooperation), the second is interested in "percepts" – spaces are shown by images with their possible symbolic value: the audiovisual materiality is not only showing to the viewer the spaces, but through indexing them, it emphasizes indirectly the need to feel and understand history through spaces.

Keywords: HBO, franchised series, Eastern Europe, complexity, crime, investigation

Introduction

In 2015, HBO Europe launched new, local produced series in several Eastern European countries. It started with *Umbre* (*Shadows*), in Romania, it was followed by *Mamon*, a Czech series, by *Pakt* (*The Pact*), a Polish one, in the same time as the Hungarian series, *Aranyélet* (*Golden Life*) was aired. The simultaneity indicates that this is a conscious strategy of producing ambitious series in that specific geographic area (Benedek, 2015). In each case, the story revolves around crimes, and all of them are franchises, adaptations of formerly realized series. It is interesting to see that the Czech and the Polish ones are the adaptations of the same original series, *Mammon*, a Norwegian production from 2014. *Golden Life* is based on a Finnish series, *Helppo elämä*, *Shadows* is the remake of an Australian comedy series, *Small Time Gangster*.

Franchises, as adaptations of existing television series, can have several advantages: they make it possible to produce a series from a script already developed, so that risks can be reduced. It is a way to implement complex television series that can become progressively independent from the original (Barthes, 2011).

In this paper I would like to begin by analysing the generic complexity of those series and to continue by focusing on the relationships between crime, investigation and spaces. We will see that the series, even if they are adaptations, give a representation of Eastern European countries' social problems. Accordingly, crime fiction, and all the analysed series are based on crime narratives, plays a very important role in revealing what is wrong in a given society (Kálai, 2014). In this brief presentation we will concentrate only on the first

seasons of the aforementioned series, as well as we are leaving aside, for the moment, other series like: *Wataha* (*The pack*), *Valea muta* (*The silent valley*) or *Pustina* (*Wasteland*).

Generic complexity

In what follows, we try to highlight the generic complexity of those series, using John G. Cawelti's formulas theory. Literary formulas, like adventure, romance or mystery, as story patterns "are embodiments of archetypal story forms in terms of specific cultural materials." (Cawelti, 1976, p. 6) We assume that those franchises circulate basic stories that can be combined with the cultural material of the country adopting it. According to Cawelti, formulas, as cultural products, articulate a pattern of fantasy that is acceptable by cultural groups, they allow to the members of a group to share the same fantasies, they depend largely on audience response, and their evolution is a process by which new interests and values can be assimilated into conventional imaginative structures (Cawelti, 1976, pp. 34-35).

The plot of *Mamon* and of *The Pact* brings together some basic patterns: it is, first, the rivalry between two brothers, one is an investigative journalist, the other is a rich entrepreneur. The object of the investigation of the journalist is his brother's illicit activity, who commits suicide at the beginning of the series. The journalist discovers the existence of a secret corruption-network created by former student colleagues who agreed to leave the network or by committing suicide or by offering up their own children as sacrifice. The pattern of sacrifice introduces a biblical reference, the history of Abraham. This plot allows the representation of the relationships between finance, politics and media. Here we can observe the interaction of several formulas: first, it is the story of a mystery that must be understood and disclosed, to link suicides committed by entrepreneurs in the present, as well as crimes committed in the past. Therefore the mystery involves the investigation, done especially by the journalist. The journalist loves a woman who is part of the investigation, so, as a minor story arc, we also have romance. On the other hand, we find here some elements of the melodramatic formula: first, it is a professional story, that of a journalist, on the other hand, we can follow the rise and fall of a circle of entrepreneurs, related to the sphere of politics. Finally, we can also find the structure of the adventure story: the protagonist must overcome obstacles, not only to prove his innocence but also to save his life. In addition, his brother entrusts him, before his death, with the duty to watch over his family. The journalist thus becomes the inheritor of the former knights: he becomes the protector of the widow and of his nephew. We will see that even with its well-known elements, the two series succeed in anchoring the plot in the history of the countries, by integrating elements of cultural materials.

Golden Life is a panoramic history of Hungarian society presented through the case of an ideal Hungarian family and the family's friend. In the plot we can find the elements of the social melodrama: the heightening of feelings, the multiple moral conflicts and many interconnected action lines. But those elements are not contributing to the sense of rightness in the global order, like in old melodramas. Another obvious feature of this formula is the elements of classic gangster stories: the welfare of the family depends largely from the activity of the father's best and oldest friend, a sort of godfather for whom the family became a surrogate. The end of the first episode stages a war between various groups: this formula allows the network of gangsters, politicians and police to manifest. The police

forces are present in the plot: there is a policeman who wants to arrest Hollós, the friend of the family. But all is not about the resolution of old crimes in the manner of a traditional criminal story, *Golden Life* borrows rather elements of hard-boiled crime fiction and thriller.

Shadows transforms an Australian comedy series into something more serious and dramatical. The main character of the series is a cab driver, Relu, who lives between two worlds and wants to hide the existence of one from the other – as all this is highlighted in the first episode: he is a member of the group of the Captain, a mafioso of Bucharest, for whom he works as a henchman: he must recover the money which the debtors owe the Captain. On the other hand, there is his own family, his wife and his children, for them he wants to present himself as a simple cabdriver. During the series it is more and more difficult to keep these worlds a part. It's the story of a man who lives two lives at the same time with all the ups and downs of the situation. The series seems to keep comic elements form the original. At the same time, its episodes offer a social panorama: each time, there is a case to solve (finding kidnapped prostitutes, finding a doctor who does not want to pay, helping a police friend who wants to sell weapons). The series' episodes are more independent from one another compared to the three other series' logic (on differences between series and serial, see Benassi, 2011). It is the melodramatic formula that prevails by the representation of a professional career and by the representation of gangsterism. The investigation is dismissed, police representatives are subordinated to the gangster.

In general, as media productions adopted the standard of generic hybridization, viewers see here little complexity. On the contrary: the help provided by prefabricated fabulas that he recognizes is added to his viewer's competences. In this regime, unless the series wants to provoke a surprise effect (and, in these cases the surprise is more provoked by the series' audiovisual complexity), they guide the receiver' interpretive work.

Crime, investigation and spaces

The opening of *Mamon* shows us faces and newspapers' pages: this emphasizes the themes of the relationship between the characters and their profession. The first images show a TV screen with the news of Daniel Vlcek's suicide. The whole series is based on a mediatized presence: one of the main places is the newsroom with journalists, and we can find cameramen, computers and screens everywhere. At the end of the series the whole story turns into a book written by the journalist, entitled *Stolen Privatisation*.

Thus, this is the story of the members of a generation who were young at the end of the ancient regime. They are all children of functionaries and studied together abroad. The privatisation is in the center of the events: each time, in the past as in the present, the goal of the characters is to become richer. The entrepreneurs are connected to the political power – it is the Minister of Finance who embodies it – and to the forces of criminal investigation which is represented by a prosecutor covering them. Politics and finance are presented as essentially corrupt, and it is the journalist who has to fulfil the function of control.

The story takes place in Prague, but it is not the well-known city (or, more precisely, well-known for others than Czechs) that appears, the events take place in the houses or apartments of the politicians and the entrepreneurs, with all the signs of wealth (decoration, object, cars). Practically there is no representation of poverty in the series. It is interesting to note – compared to the Polish version of the series – that all the protagonists have gone to universities not in the Czech Republic, but abroad, in 1990 in Budapest. The Hungarian

capital, with its recognizable tourist signs, appears in a few scenes. The latest images, taken from an amateur film recorded in Budapest, show us the formation of the group.

As well as the Czech one, the Polish series takes on the same story, that of a generation, whose members became corrupted politicians and entrepreneurs. This series retains the original titles of the episodes that make concrete references to the biblical history of Abraham. All this is reinforced by the fact that the events take place during the Holy Week, the denouement especially on Sunday, the last episode bears the title *Doomsday*. This aspect reinforces the symbolic character of the Polish series.

The opening also shows us faces this time, newspapers that are consumed by fire, but especially skyscrapers and highways. Unlike the Czech series, the events are located here in the post-communist space of Warsaw. These images punctuate the narration, those spaces are shown from above, in wide shots. And, unlike the Czech series, we do not leave here the country for another, because the former students studied near Krakow.

In these series, the police have only a minor role compared to the journalists, they only run after the events. The institutional spaces of the police appear only for a couple of times. An example of that kind of space in the Czech series is the hidden office of the policewoman where she can work freely on her computers.

In the same way, the Hungarian series takes as a starting point the success of a family that manages to lead a luxurious life in one of Budapest's villa districts. The problems begin with the death of the father: his house – here as well as in the two other series – represents the old world.

The family's villa is the epicentre of the plot. The house is the indicator of the ownership: it is not the family who is the owner, but their friend to whom they are subordinate. The villa is also important as a place of accumulation of signs of wealth. It plays an important role, with the mixture of private places (rooms) and common places (living room), in the regulation of familial relations (tensions, proximity or remoteness). Its condition reflects the family's crisis: some of the furniture must be sold. Moreover, one of the regulators of power in this series is the real estate transaction: building or demolishing houses or apartments, selling, buying or renting them. The history of the family also makes the representation of different institutions possible: schools, hospitals, banks, places of pleasure (one of the sub-plot is related to what is called a ruin pub with English tourists) and there are also images that show us the well-known panorama of the Hungarian capital. A contrast appears here with the poor room of the gipsy friend of Mira, who wants to leave the country for London.

From the second episode, the police will have a more and more important role. A police officer has been investigating Hollós's (the family's friend) affairs for two years. And it's the seventh episode that shows him on the verge of success, but instead of stopping Hollós, he's the one who dies. The whole series operates with the codes of thriller and hard-boiled crime fiction. The presence of this genre is reinforced by the role played by the corrupt policeman who tries to prevent the young policeman to carry out his duty following a phone call from a secretary of state, a friend of Hollós.

In the Romanian series the main character, the taxi driver is between two worlds, he leads a double life. His car allows him to move between spaces and people, and for the viewer it makes possible the representation of Bucharest's urban settings in the background, through its windows (and often Romanian music can be heard). Even more, the car can be the home for him. The first episode shows the intermediate spaces, like the Captain's restaurant: a space designed to regulate business and men. The episode also shows the captain's house with its exaggerated luxury and it is only at the beginning of the second

episode that we see the house of Relu, which is only half-plastered, but the interior testifies a relatively high standard of living.

The narrative is based on the gradual intermingling of spaces, which will be the source of conflicts. Just as the Captain is a sort of father for him, Relu takes the same role in the relation to the mafioso's son.

This is the most naturalistic series among those analysed in this paper, in this sense it continues the tradition of Romanian cinema (Kaceanov). It is more explicit than the others in the representation of the bodies, of the sexual acts, or of the spaces presented: the social worlds represented here are very different compared to the other series. It is the only series that is not in the quest for beautiful places.

We know very little about the characters' past. The series gives an insight of the Romanian life by confronting the world of ordinary people and of the rich mafiosos. For Relu it becomes more and more difficult to maintain the separation of these worlds, and at the same time he's getting more and more deeper in crime – hence the importance of spaces outside the city (for example the field to bury a corpse). Although, the police are interested in the Captain's business, the official investigation is almost totally absent from this series.

Conclusion

The first part of this paper focused on "concepts" (generic complexity, interpretive cooperation), the second was interested in "percepts" – spaces are shown by images with their possible symbolic value: the audiovisual materiality is not only showing to the viewer the spaces, but through indexing them, it emphasizes indirectly the need to feel and understand history through spaces.

All of the series place their plot into the present. With the exception of the Romanian series, which gives rather dramatic and often funny view of different aspects of Romanian life, the other three are more ambitious because they try to grasp the relationship between the present and the past. The source of evil is no longer found in the old regime, but in the disorder followed by the so-called regime change. The series highlights a feeling of malaise that characterizes the region, the stories talk about insecurity, family problems, corruption, political, social and economic disorder. It is in the head of the viewer that the series will seek an implied order that allows to understand the disorder. And, as we saw it, ambition does not lie only in the attempt to grasp the causes of evil, but also in the audiovisual and generic complexity. Definitively, television series in Eastern Europe have entered into a new phase.

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SILENT VALLEYS AND NOISY CITIES, CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF ROMANIA THROUGH ROMANIAN HBO SERIES

Anna Keszeg

Abstract: In Romanian HBO series there are several geographic locations. Besides Bucharest, a city where the plot of Umbre (2014) is taking place, Valea Mută (2016) presents a rural and provincial landscape from the neighborhoods of Brașov. The purpose of the research is to analyse the mediated geographies based on opposing spatial structures in both series. The main theoretical frame of the research is that of production studies, therefore those spatial structures are important as elements of the series' production values.

Keywords: production studies, spatial structure, production value, mediated geographies, medium concept

Introduction

The arrival of HBO in Romania (and in Eastern Europe) had a very important consequence on the region's visual and television culture notably because of the introduction of quality television's phenomena. As Anikó Imre puts it, quality and television still are contradictory terms in many of Eastern European societies because of the small cultural prestige of television in the region's cultures (Imre, 2018). Despite the fact that those new television formats can have a biased effect on the local filmmaking by deepening the gap between local and international production strategies, they are here to represent the region in the international entertainment industries. In my vision, HBO series are important representational possibilities for the region, that's why the elements of local societies present in the series are so important. My article has a double aim: on the one hand I want to ask a question regarding the role of places in Romanian HBO drama series from a production studies point of view and on the other to analyse the social semiotics of space in two Romanian HBO series, *Shadows/Umbre* (2014) and *The Silent Valley/Valea Mută* (2016). I also have to mention that the two series represent almost the totality of Romanian HBO's original drama production: there are three other Romanian productions released by HBO, the Romanian version of *In Treatment*, a comedy series called *Stand up Café* and a third comedy series, *Shall we kiss*, but in those cases space plays a completely different role than in the dramatic series. Yet a comparative analysis of spatial structures in each of those series can be fruitful, and it is to be done in another context. In the two mentioned series there are several geographic locations. Besides Bucharest, the city where the plot of *Umbre* takes place, *Valea Mută* (2016) presents a rural and provincial landscape

from the neighbourhoods of Brașov. Both series are adaptations – *Valea Mută* is based on a Norwegian television series, *Øyevitne/Eyewitness* (2014), while *Umbre* adapts the Australian production, *Small Time Gangster* (2011) – which implies a relocation of the plot in different spatial, thus social realities. Therefore, the investigation of Romanian social problems based on spatial differences becomes a crucial question, even more so because the two series both deal with crime.

For a better comprehension of the analyses that follows, I'm quoting the short summary of the two series from imdb.com.:

Shadows: Relu is a family man. He has two children, a wife and a double life. Seen through the eyes of his family, Relu Oncescu appears to be an ordinary taxi driver. No one suspects that Relu works as a collector for Capitanu', a local mobster. Neither of the two worlds (his family and the mafia) knows of the other's existence. Relu manages to keep everything under control, but not for long. After accidentally killing a man, he tries to get out of the underworld, but he can't find his way back. Day by day, the secrets he keeps become increasingly oppressive and the lies begin to surface, one by one.

The Silent Valley: Filip and Horia are two teenagers who seem to be bound by no more than just their friendship. However, one night, when visiting Horia's cabin, they discover their mutual attraction to each other and have an illicit encounter. When a car stops close to the cabin, Filip and Horia find themselves in the middle of a nightmare: they witness a multiple murder. Afraid that the disclosure will bring to light their relationship, the boys decide to stay silent. But, soon, the secret becomes unbearable and Filip and Horia go through a series of frightening events.

Production Values of Romanian Crime Series

One of my first hypotheses concerning Romanian drama and crime series, is that HBO is applying the same strategy that worked for the network and for the cultural industries in the case of Nordic countries: after the Nordic noir they are inventing an Eastern European noir. In the case of Nordic noir, the process started with the rise of the Nordic genre after Stieg Larsson's *Millennium Trilogy* turned into an international bestseller and blockbuster. In the case of Eastern countries there is no starting point for a similar international popularity; however, the marketing and aesthetic strategies adopted in the construction of the Nordic genre are used to build up an Eastern, and a Mediterranean noir model. One of the components of the term is that of noir, a concept with a serious history. On the one hand noir refers to the "French term describing American crime dramas and psychological thrillers from the 1940s and 1950s" with a specific aesthetic and narrative style. In the 1970s, Neo-noir reshaped the notion of noir with movies emphasising the social complexity of modernities' main issues. The notion of noir became a pattern which is now used to describe a certain dramatic approach to social issues. For Nordic noir this pattern can be described as follows: "Nordic noir follows the same narrative (as the neo-noir), stylistic and thematic concepts, for example, crime and thriller, tragic plots, melancholic and desperate antiheroes as well as unusual camera placement, heavily subdued lighting and a pronounced use of shadows. The difference is that Nordic noir uses recognisably *Nordic* phenomena, settings, light, climate and seasonal conditions as well as language(s), characters and themes such as gender equality, provincial culture and the social democratic

welfare state" (For the quotations and the aforementioned elements of the definition see: Waade & Jensen, 2013, p. 191).

From a production studies point of view all these features can be considered "production values" used to make the cultural product attractive on the international market. Production value is a notion which allows the combination of the aesthetic and the economic aspect of a book, a series, a movie, etc. and "most commonly refers to the *balancing act* of economic, practical and market interest, on the one hand, and aesthetic and quality interest, on the other" (p. 190). Production values contribute to the rise of the "medium concept" which encompasses "the region's predominant auteur cinema, while merging it with the conceptualisation of film, stylisation, and marketing that draws on genre cinema" (p. 190).

Due to its relatively small corpus of analysis, this article cannot propose a definition of Eastern noir production values, but it can certainly point out some of the components of Romanian noir. Hence our second point of investigation is to define the production values of the Romanian noir. The pattern of noir tradition is largely visible in the plot of the two series (complicated crime stories with many institutional implications, a corrupt society in which individual freedom is very hard to be conquered and melancholic characters who are hardly resenting their otherness – Relu, the protagonist of *Shadows* is smarter than the other members of the crime network and the boys from *The Silent Valley* are struggling with their sexual identity). In the case of *Shadows* the inspiration of the Romanian auteur cinema and of the Romanian New Wave is largely visible in the adopted aesthetics. Anna Bátori in her book on space concepts in contemporary Hungarian and Romanian cinema called the camera use specific for Romanian New Wave cinema *vertical enclosure* ("This – the Romanian New Wave – is the first filmic epoch that gives special significance to the representation of the interiors of prefabricated dwellings which, as an indirect reflection on the restrictive policy of the Ceaușescu regime, becomes a crucial representational tool in the New Wave. While shooting in labyrinth-like interiors, Romanian New Wave dwells on the metaphoric presence of the camera – which indicates an aesthetic connection between the pre-socialist and post-2000 productions" (Bátori, 2018, p. 198.)). Vertical enclosure – as we'll see it – is characteristic equally for the shooting techniques of *Shadows*. For *The Silent Valley* that reference to Romanian New Wave is not so visible hence the critical acclaim was very moderate in the case of this mini-series: critics usually emphasized that it has a poor adaptation quality. As for the light and the climate playing a huge role in the Nordic noirs, in the case of our series there is an important reference to the moderation of the climate: curiously there is permanently enjoyable weather in the two stories however the protagonists are not enjoying its advantages – as if the temperate climate is in constant opposition with the main characters' mood. If climate causes melancholy in Nordic noir, climate is in permanent contrast with depression and bad mood in the Eastern noir – a feature of Eastern Europeanness. We can however reflect on the allusions to Bucharest's well-known dog-days: there is a strange sex scene in *Shadows* where the protagonist, separated from his wife, but still in sexual relations with her, has an encounter with her in the cold-room of a butchery because of the unbearable heat of the city (another possible place for the act being the back-seat of his car). An important production value of *Shadows* is the language: the vernacular Romanian of Bucharest with many commonly slangy expressions, sayings and idioms is one of the strengths of the series. In the case of *The Silent Valley* is a lack of adaptation in this regard too. The main themes of the two series are the problems of a society in transition, the corruption and the nepotism of all state institutions (politics,

education, health care system, police, etc.), the conflicts between individual freedom and group (family, gang) interest.

Space and Spatial Structure in Romanian Series

As revealed by a systematic semiotic analysis of the two series, Romanian series operate with many oppositions in the case of spatial structures. Here – due to a lack of space – I'm only presenting the systematic analysis of *Shadows* with only a couple of references to *The Silent Valley*.

In *Umbre* (*Shadows*) a double-faced Bucharest allows the central character to have a double identity connected to the diurnal and the nocturnal city. Moreover, the two professions of Relu, the protagonist, are mightily anchored in space: in his ordinary life he is a taxi driver, while during the night he works as collector for a local mobster. Consequently, the complex nature of the hero assures the reinvestigation of the classic opposition between underworld and mainstream society, which was the object of crime fiction from its early origins. Similarly, *Valea Mută* (*Silent Valley*) explores another traditional spatial opposition between urban and rural realities investigating exactly how crime produces the counter-myth of the transparent sylvan society.

The opposing pairs of the spatial structure are the following (Figure 1): urban – rural; center – periphery; interior – exterior; diurnal city – nocturnal city. The representation of urban places in popular literature was always built on the common knowledge about the differences between bad and good: well-famed and deprived sections of towns, diurnal and nocturnal dangers of the places are the recurring features of our knowledge about cities. What Castells called "the dual city" (Castells, 1994) regarding the contemporary metropolis with its capitalist superstructure and urban injustices is the city of popular culture: a place of segregation, of subtly or strongly visible social differences.

In *Shadows* the symbolic dualism of the places is largely visible in the differences between the spaces of the family and the spaces of the mafia which merge into another as the story evolves. The difference between private and public spaces presents another particularity: as private places, we have the houses of the protagonists in a hierarchic order from the poorest to the richest. The axis of private to public and to peripheral is dominated by the opposition between the diurnal and the nocturnal meanwhile that opposition is not a contrastive but a shaded one: there are places that can assure the passage from one feature to the other. Houses are diurnal places under the complete control of the owners. Yet their unfinished nature marks their shifting role: they can become nocturnal places when they are discovered or used as such. The buildings of the public institutions and the places of amusements are diurnal places where democratic society is apparently in control but hidden forces are governing under their facade. Places of amusement have the same structure: their daily spaces are doubled by nocturne and hidden corners like Capitanu's restaurant where Nico's secret office represents the epicentre of the mafia's actions.

An interesting category what I called *local non-lieux* is the meeting points or relay-points of the story: places which are not frequented by ordinary people (buildings in progress) or places very frequented by ordinary people (malls, gyms, thermal baths, gas stations). Those places are at the intersection of diurnal and nocturnal logic: their functions are socially controlled but in a very loose manner, so they are open to all kind of licit to illicit activities. A very remarkable scene in *Shadows* is that of the shopping mall where

Relu's daughter has the first romantic meeting with the mafia's head, Capitanu's son. and where at the same time the cabdriver is chasing a corrupt doctor who is supposed to be in a game center. The shopping mall is designed for shopping but there is place in it for romantic encounters, illicit sex, movies, sag, menace, addictive and aggressive behaviour. And finally, there are the outskirts completely governed by nocturnal forces offering yet the possibility of redemption for those in conflicted relations with licit or illicit social order: Relu's looking for a house for his family which cannot be reached from the auto-route, Puiu – playing a double role of a false naive – and Capitanu – experiencing a crisis after his son's accident – are referring to the woods as to places of salvation and rest.

And the whole spatial system is governed by cars moving freely between those places and becoming often places at their own: the cab is a place to be for Relu good for sleeping, eating, drinking and having sex. The crucial dramaturgic role of the car has another importance: in Romanian society cars are symbols of welfare and of the confusing modernisation of the country, their role as status symbols is bigger than that of houses or other elements of social wealth.

Figure 1. *The spatial structure of Umbre*



I'm not developing in this article the idea of the street as a fluid element of spatial structure: the whole series is governed by panoramic images of streets and corners: the street is the mediator between social worlds, metaphor of the protagonist who moves constantly between social regimes.

On Figure 2 I represent all those places in the logic of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of distinction. (Bourdieu, 1984). The word of *Shadows* is a that of a society without cultural capital. There are only three moments where a word having a cultural capital can be seen

and even in those moments its lack of autonomy if completely visible: in one scene of the second season Relu is asking ironically a policeman who's playing foot with engineers and doctors if he's a member of the circle of the intellectuals from now; when Relu's boy, Chuckie has a conflict with one of his colleagues, the school's director, a woman, is completely submerged by the dispute between the parents and cannot exercise her role of decision-maker, and finally there is Toma, the mafioso-in-chief who is often referring to human values and general education and who's places try to manifest a bourgeois welfare but who is surrounded by the same impecunious people like his less elitist colleague, Capitanu. The opposition under this point of view is between places with less or more economic capital: Puiu's house being situated on the one extreme and Capitanu's on the other of the welfare axe.

Figure 2. *Places and cultural capital in Umbre*



A last element to be emphasized is the symbolic function of unfinished buildings: families and entire communities are living in unfinished buildings which are completed in the interior but their exterior is left fair-faced. The unfinished buildings are creating an Eastern European aesthetic of concrete (different from its contemporary artsy meaning) which has a double role of expressing the struggles of a society under construction and the affirmation of a society which prefers it that way, a society choosing deliberately never to be accomplished. This aesthetic of the unfinished, concrete buildings already in use can be another production value of Romanian noir completing the task what the elements of Danish design fulfil in *The Bridge* or in *The Killing*: they are here to characterize a style of living, a way of life.

In conclusion we can argue that *Shadows* can be read as the starting point of a Romanian noir tradition with a huge emphasis on possible production values: the uses of camera, the vertical enclosure, the references to Romanian New Wave cinema, the language, the climate, the settings, the themes of corruption, nepotism and struggling late-modernity, the

spaces and places, the unfinished buildings are contributing to the definition of a 'medium concept' which has the capacity to became a formula. It remains to be seen if that's the case.

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CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION METHODS IN EUROPE

Zsolt Menyhárt

Abstract: The development strategy, regional and subsidy policy of the European Union are increasingly being linked to each other. On one hand, the development resources have become a high priority for all member states, on the other hand it requires a different conceptual approach on the sponsor's side, on the government's side and on the recipients' side. The multilevel governance (MLG) is a model which is able to describe and analyze the so-called government activity in the modern and changeable society. MLG focuses on the nature of the government and on the relation between stakeholders. We emphasize that in this model it is highly recommended to involve the local entities in the decision-making process. The model has existed for almost a decade, therefore it is possible to state some conclusions. This paper will try to enlighten the correlation between the cross-border cooperation and the EUs Cohesion policy, in practice reflected in the Hungarian model.

Keywords: Cohesion instruments, public sphere, public financing, multi-level governance, democracy models

Introduction

The border regions are becoming increasingly important in the framework of the European Union's Cohesion policy because of the new way of territorial based cooperation. It is a need in the point of my view in the 21st century providing a flexible and synchronized platform for thinking and acting together.

According to the European Commission, a macro-regional strategy is an integrated framework relating to member states and third countries in the same geographical area, addresses common challenges and benefits for strengthened cooperation for economic, social and territorial cohesion. The main bottleneck is the rule of the three no's – No new EU legislation, No new EU institution, and No new EU funding – that is at the base of the strategies: the actors in fact strongly ask for the 'embedding' of the macro-region strategies into the EU programmes post 2020, so that they can have specific financing. Nevertheless, the ways in which to achieve this goal are many and above all far from easy.

Strengthening territorial dimension

Considering the definition of the European Commission, it does not take issue about the European governance which is focusing on regulations, administration procedures and community conducts. The European Union exercises its own power, determines common

goals and blazes the trail not only for member states but for the subnational authorities too. The EU provides for an increased focus on openness, participation, responsibility, efficiency and coherence of the implementation. These kinds of principles are providing the framework for the cooperation without borders.

The so callled "open method" is the key in this model which means widespread participation by the stakeholders.

The regional and local governments should be involved through national and European associations in shaping policy. It has been an aim of the Commission for a while but the way how they tried to broaden the cooperation could be modified. They have to bring greater flexibility into how Community legislation can be implemented in a way which takes account of regional and local conditions. It would be important to establish and publish minimum standards for consultation on EU policy.

It is also important as well to evolve such established partnership arrangements that go beyond the minimum standards in selected areas committing the Commission to additional consultation in return for more guarantees of the openness and representativity.

Multilevel governance

Simona Piattoni thinks that the "Multilevel governance is probably the most apt descriptor of the activity of governing in contemporary societies." (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p.16)

Multilevel governance calls into question two constitutive elements of the political order of the modern era: the distinction between the public and the private, and the hierarchical or nested nature of governments at different territorial levels.

"Multilevel governance must be rather understood as a (dis)ordering framework" (Rosamond, 2000, p. 111) which calls into question the empirical, analytical and normative foundations of the sovereign, unitary and distinctive nation-state.

Gary Marks refined the multilevel or multilayered governance conception. It would be crystallized into two competing views: intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism. (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, pp. 33-40) The novelty in this brand new approach is the restructuring of political allegiance. Unfortunately, the 'Europe of the Regions' literature distracted many scholars into thinking that, indeed the regions could become the new elementary aggregating units of the Union-to-be.

Many European regions might have wanted to use the opportunities offered by Cohesion policies to simply collect greater financial resources, develop their regional economies, and provide more political credit.

Based on the definition by the Committee of Regions, the multilevel governance (MLG) is a partnership between the European Union, its member states and regional and local governments. The aim of this partnership is to achieve common goals and action plans. According to Kaiser (Kaiser, 2014, pp. 94-118) we determine four aspects concerning the Leipzig-process:

- Exploring of the territorial resources,
- Exploiting the advantages in the competition,
- Cohesion conceptions in territorial manner,
- Extended implementation of the MLG.

"*Most important is the claim that governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture variations in the territorial reach of policy externalities. Because externalities arising from the provision of public goods vary immensely – from planet wide in the case of global warming to local in the case of most city services – so should the scale of governance. To internalize externalities, governance must be multi-level*." (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, pp. 4-5) European policy is like any public policy, it's a combination of goals formulated by policy makers and instruments to achieve them. There are two contrasting concepts which are often used in the policy literature: Multilevel governance Type I and Type II.

The first one – MLG Type I – is serving the simplification, which preferred a limited number of local and regional authorities. The level of authorities is limited as well. The core of this vision is that the different authorities are independent and they have to identify the overlapping mechanisms (so called non-overlapping). Frank Delmartino introduced the worthless role of the regions at the beginning of 19th century, illustrated and traced back their history to the nationalist movement in Belgium. In his view, all governmental levels are unnecessary between the central government and local administration. However, we cannot accept Delmartino's theory, we are convinced that regions must participate in policy-making process. (Hooghe & Marks 2001, pp. 4-5)They have an important "role as a mediator because of their special geographical status.

The second vision called MLG Type II which is the polar opposite of the previous model. This model would express three or four management levels and the government competences are often overlapped.

In Switzerland, where Type II governance is quite common at the local level, these jurisdictions are aptly called *Zweckverbände* in German terminology or functional associations in English – it means that their primarily orientation is to achieve an intended goal or purpose.

Relation between multilevel governance and representative democracy

According to this view, without a pre-existing demos in which strong ties of solidarity have already developed, no redistributive policy would be possible. In reality, the history does not proved this thesis, and does not show such a clear sequence between the creation of a nation and the establishment of representative democracy.

'Representation as delegation' implies a principal delegating to an agent to make decisions that best promise to secure the welfare of the principal. As many theorists have remarked, this notion of democracy smacks of elitism: the representatives are supposedly able to better decide what furthers the welfare.

Territorial cooperation in Europe

The European Union has introduced two instruments designed to facilitate cross-border cooperation across its external borders: these are the Pre-Accession Instrument (IPA) and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). Whereas the first is intended for candidate countries that are seeking to accede to the EU in the short or medium-term and therefore relates to borders that will in time become internal, the second is aimed at countries that are not necessarily intending to join the EU and thus relates to external borders that are destined to remain so for the foreseeable future. Neighbourhood policy is involved in the extension

of the Phare and Tacis programmes and also the MEDA programme for the Mediterranean area. The first two of these programmes were developed in response to the changes in the geopolitical order at the end of the 1980s. The third is part of a wider perspective, namely that of the development of the territories around the Mediterranean Sea. In all three cases, the objective is to establish an area of stability extending beyond the continent of Europe and to prevent the external borders from becoming lines signifying marked disparities.

In 1989, the EEC inaugurated the Phare programme with the goal of providing financial aid for the economic and political transition of Poland and Hungary, two socialist countries that had been members of Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). They were undergoing substantial political change foreshadowing the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. Negotiations in Poland between the Government and the Solidarność trade union led to partly free elections in spring 1989, and there was a partial dismantling of the Iron Curtain in spring 1989 in Hungary. Phare, which was later extended to other countries, was designed to provide aid for the transition of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War (with the dismantling of the Iron Curtain), and from 1994 it became an instrument of the pre-accession strategy of these countries. The objective was in one sense economic, since it was a question of facilitating the transition from a planned economy to a capitalist economy; but it was also political, since it involved promoting the emergence of democratic regimes based on the rule of law. All the countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013 received aid (with the exception of Malta and Cyprus).

The ENP is supported by a financial instrument, first the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), and then the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) since 2014. The MEDA programme had the objective of providing financial aid for the Union's Mediterranean policy, as defined in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. This EU initiative, which involves a dozen countries on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, was designed to promote an area of peace and stability and to build a zone of shared prosperity around this maritime area. The point of this policy is the premise that the Mediterranean is a region containing significant disparities in development, which need to be smoothed out in order to avoid the emergence of tensions. The process was reinforced by the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, which brings together the 28 EU Member States and 15 adjoining countries (some of which border the Adriatic, such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro).

In 2000, Phare was converted into a pre-accession programme with the 2004 enlargement in mind. In this context, it was supplemented by two new instruments: the Structural Instrument for Pre-accession (ISPA) and the Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development (SAPARD).

The MFF serves the regions?

Under the Multiannual Financial Framework, a total of EUR 376 billion is allocated to "Cohesion policy instruments"; of this some EUR 40 billion would be earmarked for a "new" fund for trans-European infrastructure which will have a radically different modus operandi to the programmes co-financed by the Structural Funds. The Commission decided – relating to the new approach – EUR 11.7 billion for the territorial cooperation, which is 4.48% of the total.

European regions are to fall into the following three categories:

1. less developed regions (whose GDP per capita is below 75% of the EU average)
2. transition regions (GDP between 75% and 90% of the EU average)
3. more developed regions (with GDP per capita above 90% of the average)

This classification determines the amount of the Structural Fund allocation for each region.

The proposed general regulation accords considerable importance to the territorial aspect, providing for several new tools:

- local development actions, based on the experience of the LEADER approach, drawing on the EAFRD (rural development), constituting the epitome of the bottom-up territorial approach, based on local needs and implemented in an integrated manner as it is possible to combine several funds.(Wampler & McNolty, 2015, p. 10.)
- integrated territorial investments (ITI): these type of investments concern integrated projects in urban areas, giving cities the opportunity to manage funds earmarked for integrated urban actions, those contributing to meeting the objective of territorial cohesion;
- innovative actions in sustainable urban development: the proposed regulation provides for an allocation of 0.2% of the ERDF to such actions;
- joint action plans, which should allow for a better integrated approach to public policy, insofar as they combine several funds into a large-scale joint operation. (Hanson & Sigman, 2013, pp. 3-10.)

The three strands of territorial cooperation:

As is currently the case, territorial cooperation programmes will fall under three strands:

1. *cross border cooperation* (between areas on either side of the same border, including maritime borders as well
2. *transnational cooperation* (between neighboring regions in respect of European Union's strategic priorities)
3. *interregional cooperation* (not dependent on the geographical location of the areas)

As at present, it is the cross-border strand that will absorb the bulk of the funds, with an allocation of EUR 8.569 billion for the whole period, or more than 73% of the total territorial cooperation budget, as against EUR 2.431 billion for transnational cooperation (just over 20% of the funds), and EUR 700 million for interregional cooperation which constitutes less than 6% of the budget.

Macro-regional concept and Cohesion policy

The concept of macro-region historically precedes its relatively recent emergence as a notion and instrument of ETC. Macro-regional concepts can be traced back to the inception of the INTERREG programming period at the end of the 1990s, and have as an object of scientific inquiry, featured widely in academic papers and studies related to the study of regionalization. The term macro-region was first formally defined in the context of discussions around the Baltic Sea Strategy, which was to become the first region to adopt a macro-regional strategy in 2009. A macro-region has consequently been understood as an area including a territory from a number of different Member States or regions associated with one or more common features and challenges (European Commission, 2001, pp. 20-30)

The concept has considerably evolved since its first use in the context of the INTERREG programming period. Macro-regional strategies (MRS) represent a major emerging instrument of governance in the EU that involves a plurality of state and non-state actors around a series of functional problems in a given territory. Macro-regional strategies are becoming more and more popular. In 2014, around a third of the EU population lived in land border regions, the GDP of which was some 28% of the EU total, implying the GDP per head of 88% of the EU average.

Recent research has identified some of the main obstacles to the development of border regions. There are often socioeconomic disparities between regions on the two sides of the border which reduce the opportunities to cooperate and avoid integration externalities. Language barriers and cultural differences can restrict the interaction between the people and can modify mentality and approach as well. (European Commission, 2017, p. 127)

Cohesion policy promotes integrated and place-based approaches to foster economic, social and territorial cohesion, while at the same time recognizing the role of sustainable urban development in realising overall EU objectives. Almost 9% of the cohesion policy budget (31 million €) is allocated to integrated territorial and urban development in the current period. The ERDF contributes the largest part and the rest coming from the other ESI Funds.

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SELF-MEDIATISATION AS A FEATURE FOR ATTENTION-BASED POLITICS

Norbert Merkovity

Abstract: According to scholars, the use of mediatisation could be understood as a communicative representation of politicians (Mansbridge, 2009) or spin doctoring (Esser, 2008), but either way it ends in self-representation and in "self-initiated stage-management" (Esser, 2013, p. 163). From this perspective, the concept of mediatization is interchangeable with self-mediatisation, where the politicians could do self-broadcasting and start their own race for the attention of the voters. This study will introduce the phenomenon of self-mediatisation as a feature of attention-based politics: when politicians use social media in order to attract, maximize, and direct the attention of followers and journalists.

Keywords: political communication, self-mediatisation, attention-based politics, social media, adoption of media

Introduction

Politicians are using social media platforms to have direct connections with their electorate, every outsider could answer this to the question 'What do politicians do on social media?'. Meanwhile researchers of political communication are trying to explain the nature and aims of their communication (e.g. Aharony, 2012; Ábrahám et al., 2015; Klinger & Svensson, 2015; Loader et al., 2016; Lyons & Veenstra, 2016; Merkovity 2017; Ševa et al., 2016). Mediatisation and media logic are two of many phenomena that frequently appear in these studies.

If we start from media logic, we could say that it is usually used to explain – in simplified terms – the news selection mechanism of media and the nature of politicians' mediatisation (Altheide, 2013; Altheide & Snow, 1979). At present, media logic has become a popular subject again due to the emergence of horizontal media (Shaw et al., 2006), making it necessary to review this theory in political sciences. In political communication, the use of horizontal media in politics raises questions regarding what logic is used by politicians when they communicate on social networking sites (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). Is the traditional mediatisation still in use, or do the politicians use these sites following a new form of logic? This article claims that media logic and mediatisation will be more visible in politicians' use of social networks, since they will not be tied to the communication style of their organisation and they will have the opportunity to formulate their own messages. The aim of this paper is to study the nature of politicians' mediatisation on the basis of

previous research and to provide a possible explanation for their behaviour through self-mediatisation and the race for voters' attention.

From Mediatisation to Self-Mediatisation

Examining the relationship between politicians and media has been the subject of scientific research for long. Daniel Boorstin was one of the first researchers to analyse this relationship in the age of the television. He argued that the media produces pseudo-events for the audience that the politicians adapt to. They recognize how the media constructs reality and how they can use this knowledge in their actions (Boorstin, 1992 [1961]). Boorstin has highlighted the unspoken mediatisation of politicians, but this expression did not take on its final meaning in political communication. Some researchers consider it as an all-encompassing, collective term (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014), while others interpret it as an 'incomplete and still unfolding historical project' (Livingstone, 2009).

Mediation is a cognate concept that aims to explain the transmission nature of communication process and mass media, but mediation is unable to respond to the nature of actions and reactions between the players of political communication. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of mediation might be preferred over mediatisation in the Western literature, and is used in much wider terms compared to transmission (see: Couldry, 2008; Livingstone, 2009). However, Jesper Strömbäck states that mediatisation is a process where the independence of politics from media (more precisely, from the editing/display formats used in media) can be analysed (Strömbäck, 2008). Four phases of mediatisation may be distinguished in this analysis process, where the mediation of politics, e.g. the recognition of media's transmission, is the first phase of the mediatisation of politics. In the second phase, mediatisation uses media logic during the operation of politics, and media logic becomes dominant in the third phase; politicians adapt it, leaving the party logic completely in the background. In the fourth phase of mediatisation, besides adaptation, politicians adopt media logic, and they use it not only during campaigns, but in the interim period as well (Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). Therefore, the four phases of mediatisation describe the political inclusion process of formats used by media.

Although mediatisation (and media logic) has got critics (e.g. Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Hepp, 2012), it is in the focus of political communication and media studies research. Gianpietro Mazzoleni states that a clear distinction has to be made between mediation and mediatisation. He considers that mediatisation is a complex process that shows a strong link with media logic. Mediation is the natural and predestined mission of media, where communicators endow events with meaning for their audience (see: Mazzoleni, 2015). Accepting this view, we should make a distinction between transmission and the process it is involved in. One of the first analysers of mediatisation and media logic, David L. Altheide, states that mediation refers to the media logic effect of the medium that is present in the communication process. In that process, the (media) formats of information and communication technologies unite with the place and time of events. Mediatisation is the process by which all this takes place, including the institutionalization of media and the combination of its forms (Altheide, 2013, pp. 225-226). Altheide's mediatisation theory is more than an 'unfolding historical project', and regards media logic as its integral part rather than a separate phenomenon. Therefore, mediatisation is an organizing principle that includes media logic and media formats, and can be found in the information and communication

processes. Accepting that theory, its additional characteristics can also be determined, that improve understanding of mediatisation in the context of social networking sites.

However, we have to add one more feature. Mediatisation is not linear on social networks, but a multi-directional and multidimensional process, where its impacts include strategic adaptation; this concept is not normative, and consequences do not depend on normative aspects (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). As long as mediatisation can be regarded as automatism in media, politicians have professionalized the art of news management in order to control the consequences of free publicity. Furthermore, they use mediatisation to frame and pack the events (Brants et al., 2010; Negrine et al., 2007). Politicians exploit automatism, which brings us to the self-mediatisation of politics (Esser, 2013; Meyer, 2002). This means that focus is shifted from the parties to the politicians, and mediatisation can be interpreted as their communicative representation (Mansbridge, 2009), but it can also refer to 'spin doctors' (Esser, 2008), although, in each case, ends at self-representation and 'self-initiated stage-management' (Esser, 2013, p. 163). Thus, mediatisation cannot be considered as an automatism in the world of politics, but as a functional principle that results from the operation of media, more specifically in this study, from the operation of social media. The only question is whether we can any examples outside of social media?

Examples for Self-Mediatisation

The intention to grab the attention of the voters was always part of political. Politicians were using the 'media of their age' to some extent and while they were doing this the self-mediatisation process of their age went through. The common element of this behaviour is attention. In democratic circumstances, attention is typically linked to conquering votes and achieving interest in topics, that is, it can be grasped in the relationship between the political actor and the voter. In this form, we could find this phenomenon in earlier times as well.

The Commentariolum petitionis of Rome from the late period of the Republic mentions several techniques for drawing attention (Cicero, 2006), and it is fair to regard these as an early description of attention based politics. For example, the manual by the brother of the famous rhetor, Marcus Cicero gives a detailed account of the moments when attention can be attracted. For example, when the candidate marches to the forum, he should make as many people march with him as possible, thus demonstrating the magnitude of his support, or he should make connection with wealthy people in order to win the acknowledgement of the high societies (as well as for financial support). Another element linked to attention in the era was the white toga (toga candida), which had the special purpose of signifying to the society the people who were applying for political offices. With this method they could distinguish themselves from the crowd, and direct attention to themselves.

Directing attention is inherent in the concept of attention. For example, very few people knew of the American president Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) at the time that he was forced to spend most of his time in a wheelchair. He never showed up like this in public, most of the time he stood in one place or was supported by his helpers. The president did not let people judge him based on his physical condition, as his advisors thought that he would never have been elected president in knowledge of this. He also agreed with journalists that they would not take pictures of him in a wheelchair (Gallagher, 1999, p. 94). However, the reason why people from the media engaged in this game has never been revealed. Yet directing attention was made complete by the 'new' medium of the era, the

radio. Roosevelt was one of the first politicians to give regular speeches on the radio. The texts of these speeches reflected the image of a strong leader ready for action, who – mainly as a result of his wife's tours in the country – knows the issues of the United States and the world. Through this one-way channel, the president appeared virtually in the living rooms of the listeners (Stone, 1991, p. 87), thereby realizing the model example of directing and canalizing attention.

In addition to directing attention, French president Charles de Gaulle (1959–1969) also used television regularly in order to raise attention. This is still a one-way channel, which also has a visual aspect. The president, perhaps even unintentionally, set the aim of gaining the attention of the public through his television (and other public) speeches and his indispensable gesticulation. This is why French presidents have paid attention to their television appearances since the fifties of the last century, as it is through these appearances that the French public makes a connection between the political actor and the political position since de Gaulle (for more details, see: Gaffney, 2010). American president Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) used television in a similar way, and making way for popular political communication. Symbols played an important role in his speeches, and their role was to grasp and direct attention, preferably in a more expressive way than his opponents did. Thus, raising attention became secondary, and an image came to the foreground, emphasising the person himself rather than the content of the speech. In the case of Reagan, this tactic for directing attention served the purpose of concealing the 'deficiencies' in his political program. That is, he focused attention on the goal instead of the road that leads there. Of course the president needed to be aware of the impact of the media on image in order to do this (Covington et al., 1993, p. 797). Reagan also had an impact on other American and European politicians, who increasingly put emphasis on their image instead of their political program.

The last example is from the recent past, and it represents the era after the Internet. In his 2008 US presidential election campaign, Barack Obama (2009–2017) was eager to address online communities. Prior to the elections, the power of online communities for shaping politics seemed more like a myth than actual political potential. Obama used YouTube, MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, and other social sites for maximizing attention. A favourable image in itself is not enough if it is not accompanied by constant attention, which forces the opponent to the background. Through the phenomenon referred to as the 'Obama effect', the campaign team offered a peek into the daily life of the campaign through bits of exclusive content to followers on social media, which attracted the attention of traditional media, which then initiated further discourse about the candidate. Another result of attention maximizing is the involvement of the – traditionally apolitical – youth in the campaign as volunteers. The campaign brought 3.1 million individual (monetary) supporters and more than 5 million volunteers. In addition to this, the candidate became a constant topic in conversations among the voters, and he actually reached celebrity status (Cogburn & Espinoza-Vasquez, 2011; Marx et al., 2009).

The past examples listed here demonstrate the communicative use of attention for political purposes. However, the different aspects of grabbing attention can not only be described at the time of election campaigns or media appearances. It is visible in the use of social networking sites in politics that has brought forth the intensification of the self-mediatisation phenomenon.

Self-Mediatisation and the Attention-Based Politics

It is important for politicians how they look in vertical media channels and what is shared in connection with them in horizontal media, but it is equally important for them to mediate contents to their followers intentionally by eliminating gatekeepers, and control their attention. The latter only depends on them; they do not have to influence editors or journalists to reach their goal. Furthermore, it can be concluded that the consequences of self-mediatisation are visible in the race for the attention. Politicians often tend to force their own information on followers and journalists through social networking sites, by which they frame information in advance, before they get embedded in public consciousness. By reason of the nature of informational communication (representation), 'here and now' type of information prevails, which is also reflected in vertical news production (see: Blumler, 2014).

Moreover, this is not a phenomenon of a particular countries' politics, but it could be seen in most of the countries. Historical and cultural differences between states, and differences in political systems could echo back. However, as the homogenizing nature of social networks makes its impact on the race for the attention and the use of self-mediatisation is becoming universal.

The race for the attention could be seen as the rise of *attention-based politics*, where the traditional communicative space of politicians changes the platform. In attention-based politics, the emphasis will be on the use of media. Online communication will be important, as it accommodates different events of social life. Voters also play an active part in this communication, they are not passive like the consumers of traditional media. However, active participation does not entail interactivity, as the majority of political actors will avoid situations where they engage directly with voters, for example through dialogue (see: Aharony, 2012). Thus attention based politics, as we saw in the examples cited, is not linked to interactivity, its essence is drawing, maximizing and directing attention. It is more similar to self-mediatisation, or the other way around, self-mediatisation is an important feature to shape the contemporary race for the attention.

As descriptive definition, we could state that "attention-based politics describes the process in which politicians use their communication to draw the attention of the biggest possible crowd of the audience (voters) to themselves or to the themes they propose in the multitude of information or news flows. In the meantime, this attention should not be confused with agenda setting, as it is not about policies but about the politicians, or the manifestations of political questions by politicians" (Merkovity, 2017, p. 52).

Conclusion

Research show that politicians use social networks for communication in a press conference-manner, typically not exploiting the opportunities of two-way communication (see: Aharony, 2012; Ábrahám et al., 2015; Lyons & Veenstra, 2016; Negrine et al., 2007). Features of network media logic (self-mediatisation) can be seen, but the nature of mass media logic is also visible in their communication.

Politicians typically use online communication means as one-way channels, just like they use vertical media. This form of representation, more particularly, self-representation function prevails political discourses in horizontal media as well and ends in self-

mediatisation. It can be explained by the fact that representatives can effectively avoid unintended consequences of interactivity (e.g. criticisms) in social media use in such a way that they make multi-directional platforms uni-directional with their communication. The aim is to avoid critics from the electorate and to gain more followers. This brings us to the conclusion, information technology and formats enabling politicians to personalize messages, what they use to maximize the attention of the followers. However, the race for the attention and adopting the mediums of an era was always part of politics.

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THE SELF-REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ROMANIAN POLITICIANS ON FACEBOOK. ROLES, FRAMES AND SOCIAL MEDIA ENGAGEMENT

Andreea Mogoș

Abstract: The Romanian politicians increasingly use social media to communicate both to the media and their voters. The current research focuses on the top six Facebook pages of the Romanian politicians. The quantitative analysis over variables such as post type, shares, likes and comments aims to reveal public communication and branding strategies employed by the politicians. The frequency and semantic analysis focuses on the text of the posts and the qualitative analysis of the photos, videos and status posts with the highest engagement rates explains how Romanian politicians employed the social media to construct their public image.

Keywords: content analysis, frame, political communication, self-representation, social media

Self-presentation and online identity construction

The concept of self (re)presentation was presented in the works of Goffman (1959), who proposed *the dramaturgical model of social life* in order to explain how meaning is constructed interactively. The main concepts used in the dramaturgical framework are: performance, setting, appearance, costumes, props, manner, the actor's front, scripts and Front Stage, Back Stage, Off Stage. Even though the Goffman model was proposed to explain behaviour and experiences in real-life, it can be also used as a basis to understand how individuals are constructing their image and their self-representations via social media, in a virtual environment.

The digital interaction influences presence, self-presentation, and sociality. Markham (2013) suggests that "certain aspects of virtual and networked practice complicate and blur conventional dramaturgic categories (the individual, the interaction, and the situation)". Digital media influences the enactment of self, the interplay of self and other, and the construction of meaning in context. Internet features and digital mobile devices impact how people experience space, place and time, how the self is constructed and presented, how interaction takes place, and how individuals make sense of both local and global situations.

Framing

The public never gets the overall reality, because the message producers (media, politicians, artists) only offer a slice of reality, or a frame. Entman (1993) suggests that framing consists of "select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text (…) to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation". Krippendorff (2017) considers that framing has a *metaphorical meaning*, that of a picture frame through which the world is presented, while de Vreese (2005) discusses the *generic frames* vs. *issue specific frames* (only pertinent to the specific issue that is under investigation.) Burgers et al. (2016) go even further, talking about a *framing device*, pertaining to how the frame is linguistically packaged, and a *reasoning device*, connected to the frame's conceptual content.

Politicians as media producers

Politicians use Twitter and Facebook as communicative platforms, both in relation to private users (citizens, audiences), and in order to influence and network with news media professionals (Larsson & Moe, 2012). With the advent of social media, journalists and politicians have become both actors and sources through mutual interaction in online spaces, a phenomenon which is called *mediatized interdependency* (Ekman & Widholm, 2015).

Visuality, through the mobility of social networks, modifies individuals' mediated lives. The use of smart mobile devices leads individuals towards the development of new forms and conceptions of mobile mediated visualities. Serafinelli (2017) suggests that social media creates new expressions of social connections and visual communication.

In terms of the content distributed via social media, research shows that more trivial topics (e.g. when politicians comment on everyday life) seem to generate news impact. News reporting focuses on both the professional and personal/private aspects of politicians, hence reflecting the increased blurring of the private and professional in politics at large (Wodak, 2011).

On the other hand, Facebook engage citizen-users in new forms of multi-communication practices relating to both news journalists and politicians. The interactivity with users and the emergence of user-generated content can harvest new forms of contra-flows. Thus, social media can thereby contribute to a more engaged public and enable new forms of accountability.

The current research focuses on the top six Facebook pages of the Romanian politicians and it aims to reveal the public communication and the branding strategies employed by the politicians and to explain how Romanian politicians employed the social media to construct their public image.

RQ 1: How the Romanian politicians used Facebook to communicate about themselves and to set the agenda of the media?

RQ 2: Who produces more trivial topics and who is engaging the citizens in the public debate? RQ 3: What type of post performed the best for each politician?

Methodology

The dataset is extracted from Facebook via API interrogation of the public Facebook pages of the Romanian politicians with the greatest number of fans (as of January 31st, 2018):

1. Klaus Iohannis – 1.812.608 fans
2. Victor Ponta – 812.854 fans
3. Gabriela Firea – 488.651 fans
4. Traian Băsescu – 401.639 fans
5. Elena Udrea – 371.432 fans
6. Dacian Cioloș – 350.245 fans

The time frame used for the data collection ranges from January 1st, 2015 to March 31st, 2018.

Both quantitative and qualitative research methods are used in order to answer the research questions. Quantitative analysis of variables such as post type, shares, likes and comments aims to reveal public communication and branding strategies employed by the politicians. Frequency and semantic analysis of the text posts is performed using *Voyant* tool. The qualitative analysis of the photos, videos and status posts with the highest engagement rates is made to explain how Romanian politicians employed the social media to construct their public image.

Analysis and discussion

Each of the six politicians displays a specific pattern regarding the post type (event, link, note, photo, status, video) used over the researched period. The posting behavior is clearly affected by the political and social events that took place over the last 5 years, with an increased frequency prior, during or after major event on the political and social scene.

Figure 1. *Posts by year (2015-2018)Events timeline:*



November 2014

- Presidential elections – Klaus Iohannis unexpectedly defeats PM Victor Ponta

November 2015

- After the Collective club fire and massive street protests, PM Victor Ponta resigns
- Dacian Cioloș is appointed PM

June 2016

- Local elections – Social Democrat Gabriela Firea is elected General Mayor of Bucharest

December 2016

- General elections – Social Democrat Party (PSD) gets the majority in the Parliament

January 2017 – March 2018

- Three Social Democrat PMs are successively nominated and two of them changed shortly after
- Massive protests stop the GEO no13 in February 2017. President Iohannis joins the protesters in the street.
- Dacian Cioloș launches Platforma Romania 100, a civic movement.

From a quantitative point of view, peaks can be easily detected either during electoral campaigns (May 2016 for Gabriela Firea and November 2016 for Elena Udrea and Traian Băsescu) or major events (October 2015 for Victor Ponta).

In terms of the content displayed on the FB pages, there are politicians that feature particular behaviors: former President Traian Băsescu mainly writes posts commenting on the current events or even the content of the TV talk shows, Victor Ponta shares links to media stories, while Mayor Gabriela Firea posts mainly photos of her and her family. Traian Băsescu and Victor Ponta are basically doing the same thing, but in a different manner: commenting and offering their frames about the current events and political actors.

Figure 2. *Post types (2015-2018)*



An in-depth analysis of the links shared by Victor Ponta, shows that in 2016, 2017 and the first months of 2018, Victor Ponta shares mostly links to media stories published by Romanian media outlets: news agencies (Agerpres, Mediafax, Dcnews), websites connected to traditional media outlets (Evenimentul zilei, Ziarul financiar, Digi24, Cotidianul, Adevărul, Cațavencii), news portals (Hotnews, ziare.com), Blogs (Ion Cristoiu, Gelu Diaconu), and several questionable news sites (stiripesurse, inpolitics, luju).

Figure 3. *Victor Ponta's links sources*



The posts engagement figures show a visible trend: Klaus Iohannis's and Dacian Cioloș's posts receive the greatest relative rate of the positive reactions and the highest number of shares. The explanation is quite simple since most of their supporters are rather young and active social media users, with demographic features that differ from those of the typical Social Democrat Party electors.

The high engagement of Klaus Iohannis's and Dacian Cioloș's posts from February 2017 is connected to their involvement in the street protests against the GEO no13, which was perceived as a direct attack to the Romanian justice system.

Figure 4. *Post types: reactions, likes, shares, comments*



In 2015, the newly elected president, Klaus Iohannis, was still riding the popularity wave. At that time, his fans were giving likes to photos showing the presidential couple celebrating their marriage anniversary and the coming spring on March 1st (226,910 likes) or along with prominent figures (President Obama and his wife – 108,633 likes, the Romanian Royal family – 82,204 likes, Pope Francis the 1st – 69,777 likes).

Figure 5. *President Iohannis's most liked photos*

In 2016, a former TV journalist and a rising star of the Social Democrat Party, Gabriela Firea, was campaigning for the Mayor seat of the Romania's capital city, Bucharest. Her FB strategy seems to be different: the main values underlying the visual content are the family (31,165 likes, 26,900 likes and 26,169 likes), the orthodox Christian confession (26,169 likes), the national pride (tricolor ribbons, national costumes).

Figure 6. *Gabriela Firea's most liked photos*



Dacian Cioloș is a champion of post shares in 2017, on one hand because he supported and participated in the the massive protests against the EGO no.13, which aimed to change the Penal code, and, on the other hand, because he was perceived as a valid alternative to the social democrat governance by the civically engaged FB users.

Figure 7. *Dacian Ciolos's most shared posts*

The former President, Traian Băsescu, prefers the *status* as a post type, commenting the current events or even the content of the TV talk shows. Out of the 229 posts published in 2016 (displaying 35,991 total words and 7,448 unique word forms) the concepts pertaining to Romania/Romanians, to the field of politics, legislation, the President, Europe, the Anticorruption National Directorate (*rom*. DNA). The personalities that appear most frequently in Traian Băsescu's posts are: Klaus Iohannis, Dacian Cioloș, Laura Codruța Kovesi, Liviu Dragnea, and Victor Ponta.

Figure 8. *Semantic analysis of Traian Băsescu's 2016 posts*



Elena Udrea, a former Minister of Tourism and a prominent figure of the Democrat Liberal Party, a politician who was already imprisoned for corruption, displays a different pattern in her posts, even though she also offers her own frames about the politics and justice. A number of her 121 posts published in 2016 are referring to religious feasts or practices (*faith/believer, prayer, God, Lent, religion, Virgin Mary*) and posts about being positive (love, positive, freedom, wonderful) can also be traced.

Figure 9. *Semantic analysis of Elena Udrea's 2016 posts*

Conclusion

The professional use of Facebook during the electoral campaign in 2014 started a new stage of evolution of the political communication in Romania. The brief analysis of the post type, content, frequency and engagement is suggesting that each politician adopted (willingly or not) a role. Thus, President Klaus Iohannis is seen for a several years a Savior (or the providential hero), while former PM Victor Ponta recommends himself as the insider, who controls and shares information, Mayor Gabriela Firea is guardian of family and national values, former President Traian Băsescu is the old wise man, who has the clues to what is happening, former PM Dacian Cioloș is a powerful citizen engagement trigger, and Elena Udrea seems to be a pious ex-convict.

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FROM POLITICAL TO POLITICIZED – HOW LATE-NIGHT COMEDY BECAME A SPHERE OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Dorottya Molnár-Kovács

Abstract: This paper argues that late-night comedy is not only becoming the primary news source for an increasing portion of the population in the US, but also a platform of political activism (Pew Research Center, 2004). While doing so, it simultaneously becomes a public sphere in the Habermasian sense of the word: a discursive space aiming to influence political action, a carrier of public opinion (Habermas, 1989, p. 182). Why is late-night comedy a suitable genre for democratizing politics and involving previously passive citizens in participatory democracy (Landreville, Hobert & LaMarre, 2010)? Can political commentary in late-night shows ever be unbiased? Is it oppositionist by nature or liberal by nature? – are all questions I attempt to cover in my paper.

Keywords: late-night shows, political communication, politainment, narrative analysis, political discourse.

Introduction

From the genesis of the genre, politics has always been a prominent source of comedic material for late-night shows in the USA as well as in Europe: it gave a chance for viewers to laugh about the often troublesome stories dominating the news. Telling jokes about politicians and current affairs, making fun of key figures of the ruling government, acting out political parody skits – sometimes even while implicating partisan opinions – is what political humor has always been about. The political relevance of late-night shows in humanizing political candidates as guests have long been realized – at least by popular opinion and media commentary – but for a long time these programs were criticized for just that. Trivializing serious issues of governing and focusing too much on the candidate's personal image rather than his or her policy positions and also substituting serious political arguments with entertaining gabs (Peterson, 2008; Sella, 2000, p. 75; Parkin, 2010, p. 3). The stakes are high during a TV appearance of an election candidate: extensive research proves that by exposing viewers to certain information about political figures (directly or indirectly), the media can prime voters to focus on those qualities when evaluating said figures (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987, pp. 114-116).

However, since the beginning of the Trump-presidency on January 20, 2017 (and possibly even before that) the tone of voice in many late-night shows seem to have changed. Instead of the usual light-hearted jokes and parodies about the White House, hosts have chosen to

take their show's priming power more seriously and call viewers to action: to protest, to call their local governors and to actively support a particular – almost exclusively liberal – point of view (Rutenberg, 2017). When a comedian starts using their platform to promote a specific issue and call for viewer action in the subject, the space becomes politicized as well as political. When a comedy platform becomes a place of political activism – and often resistance – it simultaneously becomes a public sphere in the Habermasian sense of the word: a discursive space aiming to influence political action, a carrier and leader of public opinion (Habermas, 1989, p. 182). Politainment is not a new phenomenon by itself but with the shows of John Oliver, Stephen Colbert, Seth Meyers or Jimmy Kimmel to name a few, the genre is becoming the primary source of news and commentary for a mass number of people – especially the younger generation – and a serious player in the political activism game (The Pew Research Center, 2004, p. 2). Meanwhile, they become news stories themselves. In my paper I argue that late-night comedy in the United States have recently become a sphere of civic activism rather than just a communicative space where politics is a regular theme.

Trading conservative viewers to a liberal agenda. The case of Jimmy Kimmel and the Graham-Cassidy Bill

Using Narrative Analysis, I have followed the coverage of a then-proposed GOP healthcare bill by late-night show host Jimmy Kimmel in ABC's *Jimmy Kimmel Live* during 2017. The goal was to try to detect the narrative techniques used for a serious topic like the one in hand to work in a communicative space that is fundamentally built for light-hearted humour. I analysed the episodes aired during May, 2017, and Sept-Dec, 2017. I was also interested to see how this platform is perceived by the media when it is serving a political agenda rather than simply trying to entertain.

From the beginning of the show in 2003 until very recently *Jimmy Kimmel Live* was known to be fairly un-political with the guests usually from the Hollywood elite with the occasional political personas appearing. That is why it has generated lots of media attention when last year Kimmel became one of the biggest advocates for universal health care and a very strong voice nationwide against the then newly proposed Graham-Cassidy healthcare bill.

The story began in May 2017 when Kimmel shared details of the birth of his son, Billy, who had a congenital heart disease and had open heart surgery the first week of his life. In the monologue Kimmel was advocating universal health care saying:

"If your baby is going to die and it doesn't have to, it shouldn't matter how much money you make. I think that's something that whether you are a Republican or a Democrat or something else, we all agree on that, right?"

At the beginning of his involvement in this political debate in May, we heard a very personally involved, but safely worded and specifically non-partisan framing of his views on healthcare. The monologue was breaking the traditional norms of a late-night monologue for another reason: it abandoned comedy to share a personal life struggle as sometimes done by late-night hosts in the event of a national tragedy or a loved colleague dying. At this point Kimmel tried to connect with viewers across party lines and unite in a common idea: having money should not matter when it is about saving a child's life.

In spite of his clear goal here to try to find common ground, media outlets have already commented on his actions in a rather conflicting manner. The conservative-leaning New York Post has published an opinion piece with the title "Jimmy Kimmel's obscene lies about kids and medical care". The Washington Times (right-leaning as well) has also published a harsh analysis/opinion piece titling "Shut up Jimmy Kimmel, you elitist creep". Charles Hurt's article summarized the most common criticism Kimmel usually receives on the occasions he turns political, saying that he is incompetent in the subject and as a comedian in Hollywood has no place using his viewer base for his own political agenda. Other media outlets criticizing Kimmel after the May 1st show included the right-leaning Fox News, and the liberal Daily Beast and CNN, while left-leaning media covering the show in a supportive way included (among others) USA Today, LA Times, New York Times, Time Magazine, Business Insider, and the Boston Globe.

Later that year, in September 2017, Kimmel's narrative has changed when Republican senators Bill Cassidy and Lindsey Graham have proposed a new health care bill to overturn Obamacare. Kimmel got involved in the campaign after Bill Cassidy kept referring to a standard he named the "Jimmy Kimmel Test", promising in several media outlets that any health care reform he proposes would have to pass this. Meaning any child born with a pre-existing condition, much like Kimmel's son, Billy, would get the healthcare he or she needs without exception. In September, Kimmel claimed, the proposed bill does not do that.

This is when Jimmy Kimmel Live truly started to become a sphere of political activism that did not end with the healthcare debate, but later continued with him proposing gun reform or speaking out against the Republican candidate for the Alabama Special Election, Roy Moore (McCluskey, 2017).

Kimmel spent a whole week in September talking about the healthcare bill, not only personally attacking Bill Cassidy, but also urging viewers to call their congressman and actively oppose the proposed bill. The politicized monologues escalated into a feud with Kimmel against many media outlets including CNN, the Washington Post, Time magazine, The New York Times, Variety and many others debating Kimmel's understanding of the bill. When the proposal was eventually withdrawn from Congress, CNN reported that Kimmel "killed" the health care bill, proving once again his influential role in the matter (Pallotta, 2017). With openly supporting a liberal agenda, Kimmel has reported to have lost 30% of his Republican viewers, but apparently his ratings overall still rose during this time (Schwartz, 2017).

Taking jokes seriously. The narrative strategies of a comedian vs. traditional news media in a debate.

When making a political argument, Kimmel abandons his usual anecdotal commentary and gets unusually factual, explaining in detail the content of the healthcare bill he is opposing. The goal of being funny is obviously overwritten by an attempt on being persuasive and to be taken seriously. In his Sept. 19 show he says:

"Most of the congress people who vote on this bill probably won't even read it. And they want us to do the same thing. They want us to treat it like an iTunes Service Agreement."

The late-night political narrative has two important qualities. First of all, it is bold and brave, which is not necessarily a quality of traditional news sources because of the expectations to be objective (or at least to try to maintain the illusion of objectivity).

Secondly, the style has to be at least, entertaining, and at best, funny, which is a rare quality of serious political talk shows. In the same show he continues:

"I never imagined I would get involved in something like this. It is not my area of expertise (…) And by the way, before you post a nasty Facebook-message saying I'm politicizing my son's health problems I want you to know: I am politicizing my son's health problems. Because I have to. My family has health insurance. We don't have to worry about this. But other people do."

A lot of the times the narrative becomes personal, which would also be unorthodox in a traditional news coverage. In 2011 Gabriella Szabó and Balázs Kiss wrote about the age of post-objectivism in the news media. Where separating facts from opinions, staying impartial and neutral has not only become an unachievable ideal, but also an outdated business model, as pursuing objectivism is not what attracts the most views anymore (Szabó & Kiss, 2012).

The effect of popular culture on the political discourse

The main disagreement between Kimmel and the (not exclusively) conservative media is not about the details of the Graham-Cassidy health care amendment, but whether it is a comedian's place to get involved in shaping the public discourse about the matter. Matt Lewis of CNN summarized the problem in a tweet on May 3rd, 2017 saying: "GOPs health plan might be good or bad. But we shouldn't base public policy on the anecdotal, if compelling, experiences of a famous comedian". The reporter's words suggest a willingness from the public to form their political opinions based on the satirical, comedic commentary of the news by late-night show hosts. Which seems like a valid fear since numerous studies show that the American population's disinterest in the traditional news format is growing, while they are more than willing to tune in to alternative, comedic presentations of the news (Larris, 2005; Arpan, Bae, & Chen et al., 2011).

Studies on political communication rarely focus on the effect of popular culture, more specifically comedy shows on the political discourse. Even though back in 2004 in a research project of The Pew Research Center of the People and the Press one out of every two people (50%) already reported that at least sometimes they learn about the ongoing campaign from comedy shows such as *The Daily Show* or *Saturday Night Live*. The same study shows that those who get their information from entertainment sources tend to be the least informed group about current events in politics (The Pew Research Center, 2004). This is in contrast with additional data suggesting that viewers of late-night shows tend to pay more attention to traditional news as well (Feldman & Young, 2008). Jimmy Kimmel's highly publicized involvement in the withdrawal of the GOP healthcare bill further indicates that when it comes to news media, comedy shows matter more and more and it would be wise to study their effects on the political discourse.

It is important to note that the case of Jimmy Kimmel is not a singular one, but it is part of a pattern that represents a turn in the role of late-night comedy and politainment programs in general. Other late-night hosts that are part of this pattern are (among others) John Oliver, who since the start of his HBO show, *Last Week Tonight* have been calling viewers to action multiple times – with some impressive results to show for it. In 2016 specifically, after the election results were announced he addressed his audience, completely abandoning the role of the comedian, and without trying to be funny used his platform to

encourage active political resistance. Other examples may include Seth Meyers and his show, *Late-night with Seth Meyers* on NBC. He and his team has transformed *Late-night* into a very politically pointed show long before Election Day, 2016 with their widely acclaimed *Closer Look* segment, but they have become increasingly politicized since the election. One good example from his show is when in his monologue after the Charlottesville terrorist attack he also abandoned the role of the comedian and talked to the audience as a citizen and the nation's conscience, condemning the actions of the president and essentially calling out the public to do the same when it comes to casting their votes.

Conclusions. Late-night comedy as an ideal platform of civic activism

A 2008 experiment that explored humor's impact on the cognitive processing of political messages by exposing participants to late-night political jokes as well as their non-humorous equivalents showed that humor reduces argument scrutiny (Young, 2008). Political jokes are often made at the expense of politicians in power. Critics of the genre argue that the show hosts' arrogance and condescension, the laughter and the spectacle all manufacture an illusion that the viewer is part of an enlightened class and understand something that others simply cannot. It activates a very primitive instinct in the human mind, playing to the tribal fear of being part of the outgroup, the group that just does not understand.

This is part of the reason why late-night comedy is an ideal platform for political resistance and why – at least since November, 2016 – Seth Meyers, Stephen Colbert, John Oliver and often Jimmy Kimmel have become the voice of this opposition in the national media. While Jimmy Fallon, host of the original late-night show, *The Tonight Show* for example, is often criticized for being too apolitical.

The narratives of comedy and politics are traditionally very different and arguably incompatible. When you caricature your political opponent to get a laughter, that cannot be countered with a rational argument. Trying to argue with a joke only proves one's lack of a sense of humour which does not serve one's public image. This means that in a sense late-night hosts can use their platform for civic activism, knowing that their parodies and jokes cannot be successfully fended off, but also enjoy the safety net of comedy when they are being attacked.

Of course, comedians have always used current affairs for comedic material. But – and Bill Maher is not a good example for that – late-night shows have till the last couple of years tended to play a little safer when it came to partisan politics. They were more careful not to offend anyone and not to be too serious. Bence Nánai, in his paper *The Talk Show Paradox*, argued that classic late-night shows like David Letterman's *The Late Show* or Jay Leno's *The Tonight Show* were so independent in their time, that a joke at the expense of Republicans had to be followed by one at the expense of Democrats (Nánai, 2008).

While that might be a bit of a stretch, most late-night hosts have definitely seemed more careful before the 2016 election campaign. One interesting thing is that since these talk show hosts have taken an active stand and started to openly support one party – usually the liberals – over another, their ratings have generally increased. It happened with Jimmy Kimmel as well as with Stephen Colbert's *The Late Show* since he made Donald Trump the main subject of nearly all of his monologues, further indicating that with a super-segmented media atmosphere, audiences tend to prefer a viewpoint compatible to their own, rather than an objective voice, and political bias can actually boost ratings.

With politainment programs getting increasingly involved in serious political and social issues, it seems as though audiences have not only chosen sides and got used to biased late-night shows but they have also become more open to hard-to-process, dry subjects such as net neutrality or health care reform. And with that they have also grew more patient than they were given credit for before. John Oliver's 20-minute, and Seth Meyers' 10-minute-long segments have both proved to be successful despite the fact that both are scrupulously careful of presenting accurate and well researched material, often on subjects that would not work in a tabloid talk show format (Framke, 2017).

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PUBLIC LANDSCAPE AS COMMUNICATIVE SPACE: EXPLORING THE THIRD DIMENSION OF PUBLIC SPACE

Jérôme Monnet

Abstract: This article proposes an analysis of urban public space as a medium of communication, based not only on the physical interconnection of different places in a city but also on the different communicative uses of the urban landscape: street signs, monumental architecture, shop displays and advertisement, street art, protests or parades, all contribute to the representation of public space as symbol of society.

Keywords: Public Space; Urban Landscape; Architecture; Public Art; Street Art; Orientation; Advertisement; Governement Communication

Introduction: Landscape as the Third Dimension of Public Space

Communicative space is commonly understood in two distinct ways. On the one hand, in communication sciences, it refers to the medium through which messages and information travel: the press, the telecommunications network, advertising, political speeches, etc. In engineering and geography, on the other hand, it refers to the physical spaces that connect other types of space together, such as streets, roads, canals or railways. In the former definition, the concrete spatial dimension is often ignored in favour of an abstract conception of the media or informational sphere. Conversely, in the latter, the informational role played by physical infrastructures beyond simply connecting places together is often underestimated.

This dichotomy between, on the one hand, an abstract sphere in which human beings exchange information, and on the other hand a material space within which places are connected, emerges in conceptions of public space. Philosophers and sociologists like G. Simmel, H. Arendt or J. Habermas, among others, developed major theories on the role of spaces where people can meet to express opinions, accept differences of opinion, debate and reach consensus; in the 20th century, these theories were linked with the conception of liberal democracy. In parallel, however, an entirely separate vision of public space developed in the technocracies responsible for the planning and construction of the roads, in a context dominated by the functionalist ideology illustrated by Le Corbusier: the roads infrastructure was designed for the sole purpose of connecting areas characterised by separate activities (residence, work, consumption, leisure, etc.).

As a geographer and urban planner, my purpose here is to observe, from a distinct angle, public space as it is actually used by human beings in a wide variety of conditions

across the entire planet. My point of view, therefore, is not the idealist position of political philosophy (public space as it should be, open to all forms of expression and discussion in a perfectly democratic society), nor the functionalist standpoint of technocracy (public space as a physical means to move from one place to another). My viewpoint is more consonant with the position of the interactionist micro-sociology illustrated by Lynn Lofland (1973, 1998) from a pragmatic and constructivist perspective: public space is defined and produced by all the different practices that take place in the presence of strangers. I propose to classify this diversity into seven main categories: 1-Connection, 2-Information, 3-Commerce, 4-Conviviality, 5-Abandonment of things and beings, 6-Regulation and resistance, 7-Symbolisation.

So here it is the 2nd category of practices that will concern us. Whereas in order to identify the possible routes between places (category No. 1), we usually look at a map of the streets of a city in two dimensions, instead we will focus here on the "third dimension": the landscapes that we see while on the move. That is why I choose to refer to "public landscape", insofar as it is the vertical dimension of public space that informs and communicates with users. In the sections that follow, we will review the different subtypes of uses that make up this broader category.

Directing Behaviours

All of us use public landscape to situate ourselves in time and in space. Public clocks replaced the sundials of the preindustrial era for telling the time; the bells of Christian churches or the Muslim muezzin's call to prayer punctuate the divisions of the day; bells too may mark the beginning and end of the day for workers or schoolchildren; sirens announce the arrival or departure of ships in harbour.

Bell towers, minarets and other monuments that stand out in the landscape also help us to find our way in and around the city. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, it is common for residents to give directions using Sugarloaf Mountain and the statue of Christ the Redeemer as landmarks. Below this regional scale, monumental facades, distinctive architectures, big squares and wide avenues provide valuable directional information. At an even more granular level, the architecture of buildings tells us about their function and the services they offer. At individual street scale, we obtain information from shopfronts, commercial signs, signposts and urban signage of different kinds (names of streets, neighbourhoods or monuments, maps, tourist and historical information, etc.).

Much information that we glean from the landscape has been placed there intentionally by actors who want to guide us, either for reasons of public interest (indicating how to get to a place), or for their own private interest (e.g. to attract customers, a subject we will return to later). As well as this guidance, there is almost always information on the rules of expected or forbidden behaviour for users of different kinds: one-way streets, bus or cycle lanes, traffic calming measures, pedestrian crossing zones, CCTV warnings, etc. (fig. 1).

Figure 1. *Street signs in Paris (France), May 2009 (© Jérôme Monnet)*

Monumentality: The Architecture of Glorification

In the previous section, we considered utilitarian uses of information via public space. Now, we examine how monumental architecture and in particular the public facades of buildings have been used to glorify the rulers that ordered their construction.

Everywhere on the planet there are examples of religious architecture placed before the public as an expression of grandeur, superiority, wealth and complexity: pyramids, stairways, towers, walls, gates and galleries, often vast and highly decorated, are part of the universal architectural vocabulary of religious places and buildings.

Some of this vocabulary is reproduced in buildings that represent military power, notably the power of conquerors whose fortresses and citadels are not solely designed to protect the troops against attack, but also to express power and to intimidate subject populations. This is true not only of peoples colonised by foreigners, but also the urban populace to whom the rulers wished to present an image of invincibility. One famous example of symbolic reversal is the "taking of the Bastille" by the revolutionaries on 14 July 1789 in Paris: the invasion of the citadel and the liberation of the prisoners are commemorated as the moment the public recognised the change in political regime.

Figure 2. *City Hall in Trieste (Italy), July 2014 (© Jérôme Monnet)*

From the 15th century, the cities of Europe also became the stage of the emergence of a specifically civil monumentality, through the palaces and stately homes of the social elite and the halls or assembly rooms of the merchants or guilds (fig. 2). This monumentality was further reinforced with the industrial revolution, when it glorified the wealth of owners, economic development and technological progress: railway stations in their turn became monuments, and factories took their place in the public landscape with grandiose facades punctuated with ornament, statues or towers. This trend culminated in the architecture of the skyscraper, with the race for height and technical prowess pursued by leaders of the financial or industrial sectors. It may be that the skyscraper has passed its pinnacle, since giants of 21st-century capitalism, with their focus on the information and communication technologies and services, represented by the famous GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon), prefer to glorify their modernity in greener and more horizontal ways, by establishing their headquarters on high-tech campuses.

Another contributor to this list of monumental uses of public landscape to promote religious, political and/or economic powers, is the urbanism of the "tabula rasa", new cities created either by colonial powers in conquered territories, or as part of a process of internal colonisation apparent in the example of Brasília, or equally in the French, Soviet or Chinese "new towns". In these cases, it is the urban morphology as a whole that expresses the cosmology of the planning state.

Commerce and Services

In the previous section on the architecture of glorification, what matters is the use of public landscape to communicate power, and possibly no other function than the communication of power. This is how commerce differs in its use of public landscape: almost invariably, its communication is linked with a transaction. For a commercial entity, therefore, the

function of public landscape is to make the public aware of the availability of goods or services. In this case, we can say that there is a genuine exchange: sellers of goods or providers of services need the landscape to tell the public what they have, whereas the public uses the landscape to locate and identify whatever corresponds to its needs and wants. Public landscape thus becomes an interface between supply and demand that is expressed in different subtypes:

- *Shop signs*. Visible from a distance, these devices tell potential customers what service or goods can be found in a specific place "open to the public" (often within a building): they enable people to distinguish between a baker and a post office, a service station or a doctor's surgery, a police station or a bar,… When brands are concentrated in certain streets in dense urban areas, they have a major impact on public landscape by adorning facades with a variety of aesthetic forms which combine words and symbols that represent the product sold, the place, or the identity of the owner (e.g. Harbour Hotel or Smith's Pharmacy).
- *Displays*: Here, the aim is to show the merchandise in the place where it is actually sold. Material goods lend themselves most universally to attractive display (fig. 3): markets all over the world are prized by tourists for the visual presentation of food items (fruit and vegetables, fish, joints of meat or other preparations) or manufactured products (particularly craft goods). However, it is also common for stores to position a temporary display in public space to make its goods more visible to passers-by: racks of fruit, newspapers or postcards, ice cream or pancake counters. In certain respects, cafe and restaurant terraces can be seen as a means of display. In general, however, nonmaterial services are less likely to use display to communicate in public space (though one might cite the hairdressing salon that displays the different hairstyles it offers).

Figure 3. *Shop fronts in Los Angeles (U.S.A.), January 2013 (© Jérôme Monnet)*

- *Shop windows*: although product displays and racks can be found both inside and outside commercial and non-commercial premises, the shop window is a particular device for communication between public and non-public space, since it separates

them physically while maintaining a visual connection between them. It thus protects the interior from bad weather while maintaining the visibility of the displays from the outside. While examples of brands and displays dating back millennia can be found in different urban civilisations, the shop window is a device that was created in the context of the industrial revolution in Europe and has spread by means of globalisation, contributing in its own way to the homogenisation of the planet's public landscapes.

- *Advertising*: like the shop window, this has spread through the globalisation of public landscape, with the proliferation of information that I will describe as "remote" because, unlike the systems of communication considered previously, it is not located in the place where the service is provided. In certain cases, this display may indicate a destination and a distance ("service x can be found 5 minutes away" on foot or by car), but advertising increasingly seeks only to familiarise the public with a product without indicating where it can be found, perhaps even communicating nothing about the product, but only a brand image, an abstract value. In recent decades, the use of the urban landscape for advertising has proliferated to an impressive degree. After the spectacular concentration of billboards at iconic locations (Piccadilly Circus in London, Times Square in New York, Shibuya in Tokyo), or tunnels of advertisements lining major traffic arteries (e.g. in Mexico or on the roads into French towns), after the proliferation of lollipop signs in public spaces redeveloped for strolling, shopping, tourism and leisure, there seems to be no limit to the capacity of advertising to invade every kind of space. In the last decade, different European cities (Venice, Madrid, Paris…) have seen advertisements painted on pavements and roads, stuck on public stairways or projected onto facades. In particular, it has become common to see facades, or even entire buildings, completely "wrapped" in an advertisement, on the pretext that a small fraction of the profit would go into restoration work (fig. 4)…

Figure 4. *Building advertising wrap in Venice (Italy), May 2009 (© Jérôme Monnet)*

- *Tracking technologies*: apart from physical surfaces, advertising has also set out to conquer the virtual space embodied in portable information-communication devices (smartphones, tablets, connected vehicles, etc.). These days, the advertising screens located in public space can adapt the information they broadcast to the information detected in the devices of passers-by and by mining the socio-economic profiles revealed by personal data. Similarly, stores can send individualised messages to devices informing passers-by of some nearby special or promotional offer. Finally, it will soon be possible to modify the content of shop windows or displays to match the profiles of the people who pass in front of them.

Street Art and Freedom of Speech

The architectures of power, like shop signs and displays, or like advertising, employ a visual aesthetic vocabulary that finds its ultimate expression in public art.

In different urban civilisations, public art has been expressed not only through the architecture of glorification already mentioned, but also through decorative elements that draw on sculpture and painting, instantiated for example in the proliferation of statues surrounding cathedral gateways. In the cities of Antiquity, whether Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Greek, Roman, Chinese or Khmer, to cite just a few better known civilisations, archaeology has revealed that wall paintings and statues were used to represent the divinities that ruled the cosmos, the humans who governed on earth in their name, and the heroes honoured for their remarkable feats. Even to this day, buildings and public places are adorned with allegorical figures such as Victory, Liberty, Justice or Progress (fig. 5).

Figure 5. *Statues on the Yangtze Bridge in Nanjing (China), April 2012 (© Jérôme Monnet)*

It would thus seem that public art is an important priority for leaders, whether ecclesiastical or civil, or indeed economic in the case of the sponsors of the modern world. The symbolic power attributed to works displayed in public space is also confirmed in times of political change, military conquest or religious overthrow, when the newcomers desecrate pagan representations or revolutionaries tear down the statues of tyrants (kings, dictators, colonisers). Sometimes, a single artistic object crystallises a society's internal antagonisms, as illustrated by the statue of a naked Diana the Huntress adorning a fountain installed on Mexico's most prestigious avenue in 1942 at the request of the federal government, clothed in an undergarment in 1943 following pressure from a conservative Catholic movement, and then once again disrobed by the authorities 25 years later in order to demonstrate the country's modernity at the time of the 1968 Olympic Games.

Public art in urban landscape can therefore express the official order, but can also oppose or subvert it. This alternative use seems to have grown spectacularly from the beginning of the 20th century. Indeed, while graffiti expressing alternative or critical opinions have existed for millennia, it is only recently that they seem to have acquired any artistic pretensions; under the *Ancien Régime* in France, historians have shown that politico-artistic opposition mostly took the form of the clandestine circulation of songs and poetic pamphlets. Contemporary public space, on the other hand, has become a flourishing arena for a multiplicity of expression that varies in its oppositional content and artistic form: graffiti, flash mobs, satirical or critical street performances, etc. (fig. 6).

Figure 6. *"White wall, red mist of anger", anarchist slogan in Paris (France), May 2017 (© Jérôme Monnet)*

In this respect, mural painting is a good example of the contemporary diversification of public art. Following the Mexican revolution of 1910, and supported by the new regime, a significant muralist movement developed to promote leftist progressivism by means of this avant-garde aesthetic. From the 1940s onwards, however, what had initially been revolutionary in both its artistic expression and its political message became an official art that lost its liberating social ambition in Mexico, but maintained its subversive charge in the United States by becoming a preferred mode of expression for the demands of the "Chicano" movement until the 1970s, before undergoing an extraordinary revival in the "Hip-Hop" movement. Since then, graffiti and tagging have spread to walls on every city in the world. The developments of the last decade show a twofold trivialisation of an art form long considered marginal and transgressive by graffiti artists and authorities alike: firstly,

the graphic aesthetic of Hip-hop has been adopted by a wide variety of "mainstream" art forms and by advertising, and secondly, the commercial art world has begun to develop a specific and profitable market for what the mass media now call "street art", in which the element of protest has become no more than part of the sales pitch.

The Choreography of Public Movements

Whereas in international parlance "street art" usually refers to the application of graphic techniques to urban surfaces, in France the term *arts de la rue* (street arts) is used more to refer to what in English are called the "performing arts" (music, theatre, circus, acrobatics, puppets, etc.). These "street performances" which, since the end of the 20th century, have boomed in parallel with street art, would now seem to be primarily individual initiatives, but are nevertheless part of a long tradition of performance in public space, in which the stated aim is historically not so much artistic as religious (processions), military (parades) or civil (ceremonies), and more recently has taken on an economic character (advertising "flash mobs").

These spectacles, which require a fundamental distance between the spectators who watch and the actors who produce and perform, differ from ritual subversive performances such as carnivals and charivaris, in which the urban public plays a key role. Within the framework of seasonal festivities, carnivals have long provided an opportunity for the expression of social and political opposition, which is also expressed spontaneously, not to say unpredictably, through upsurges of protest against the established order, riots and other forms of insurrection. This anti-establishment use of public space, known since ancient Rome and maintained over the centuries, has recently been theorised in the form of "Temporary Autonomous Zones" that have been promoted by movements like the "*Indignados*", "Occupy" or "*Nuit Debout*", following the "Arab Spring" of 2010, in iconic city squares around the planet (Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Tahrir in Cairo, Taksim in Istanbul, Wall Street in New York, Maïdan in Kiev, République in Paris, etc.).

Public expressions of disobedience and resistance are not necessary collective. For an Iranian woman, dressing in a certain way may be a means to protest against a dress code that she considers repressive, whereas the provocations associated with punk or grunge can be used to ridicule the tyranny of appearances. "Speaker's Corner" in Hyde Park in London is famous for allowing anyone to harangue the crowd on any subject whatsoever; in other contexts, it can be dangerous and courageous to sing in public. However, public disobedience is not always about politics, far from it: from one city or country to another, people's tolerance of rules and laws varies greatly, and their behaviour in public space visibly reveals this variability.

Symbolic Uses of Public Space: Iconography

In the cities of the contemporary world, the remarkable diversity in the use of public space for communication and expression easily explains why it has become a symbol of a society as a whole and the freedoms it enjoys (or lacks). In photography, in films or on the television, in postcards or tourist guides, as in advertising, public landscape represents

a city in both its topographical and monumental specificities and in its supposedly typical social composition (fig. 7).

Figure 7. *Urban skyline as background for a Beauty Salon's mural in Los Angeles (U.S.A.), January 2013 (© Jérôme Monnet)*

Under these circumstances, "commonplaces" die hard. The iconography of Paris, of New York or of Rio de Janeiro continues to show a landscape that has remained unchanged for a century. This representational conservatism is problematic when it comes to the symbolisation of the local population: for example, while photographs of New York have incorporated the Blackness of a significant proportion of its inhabitants, representations of public landscaping Paris, Venice, Berlin or other European cities still have a long way to go in this regard…

Conclusions: Monopolies vs. Pluralism

We have seen the extent and diversity of the use of the communicative potential of public landscape, whether to find one's way, as a guide towards a destination, to publicise a service, to glorify or to oppose the possessors of power, etc. Public space thus appears to be an important resource and, as with all resources, certain human actors try to control or monopolise it for themselves, whether for economic profit or political power.

We can see forces that are seeking to monopolise certain dimensions of public landscape. For example, the advertising industry wants to exploit as much space as possible for brand communication, to the detriment of non-commercial uses of the urban landscape. Authorities, whether religious or political, retain a monopoly over the conception of public order and art, and seek to repress other forms of expression. More subtly, architectural conservatism can promote a museum vision of the city on the pretext of heritage protection, but in so doing prevent the emergence of new social and aesthetic forms.

Nonetheless, we find that the communicational complexity of public space allows leeway for alternative, oppositional or competing expressions. We can therefore conclude

by recognising that public space plays a fundamental role in the democratic functioning of any society, a role often threatened by populist movements that reduce democracy to an untrammelled transfer of power from the people to the "leaders". Indeed, public landscape is by definition a means of communication where pluralism can be expressed through the coexistence of differences in both messages and in forms of expression.

Just as the advocates of democracy promote pluralism and freedom of expression in the mass media, or the separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial institutions, it is up to citizens in the broad sense – i.e. all users of public space, regardless of their status – to defend pluralism in the urban landscape by the diversity of their uses of public space.

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MEDIATIZATION OF POLITICS AND POPULISATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

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Abstract: Contemporary mediatization of politics has multiple consequences. One of them is populization of political communication. As defined by the authors, it means using populism as a communication strategy by both political entities and media institutions in order to achieve their intended results. In existing studies populist communication strategies are discussed in the context of verbal behaviors, and the authors of this paper propose the introduction of iconic elements into the analysis, which is absent in previous scientific deliberations. They will propose a typology of non-verbal determinants that constitute an underestimated context of interpreting verbal messages created by institutional subjects of political communication.

Keywords: populism, mediatization, political communication, nonverbal communication

Introduction

Mediatization of politics is a particular element of the wider process of mediatization as a whole, defined as "social changes in contemporary high modern societies and the role of media and mediated communication in these transformations [which] affect almost all areas of social and cultural life in late modernity" (Lundby, 2008, p. 1). In the extensive scientific discussion regarding the topic, two dominating approaches have arisen: "institutionalist" and "social constructivist" (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Lundby, 2014; Deacon & Stanyer, 2014). In the institutionalist tradition, mediatization is viewed as a process in which the social actors from outside the media are forced to adapt to "media's rules, aims, production logics, and constrains" (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999, p. 249). This approach focuses more on changes within various social (e.g. political) institutions, in the way of adapting media's logic to their own goals (see: Hjarvard, 2008; 2009). The other view portrays mediatization as a process in which the ever-changing information and communication technologies (ICTs) influence "the changing communicative construction of culture and society" (Hepp, 2013, p. 616).

Media, with their ability to create social reality, influence the way reality is viewed by their audiences, categorising certain objects by the way of attributing them certain qualities. This duality of approach is also visible in the analysis of the mediatization of politics, defined as "a long-term process through which the importance of the media and their spill-over effects on political processes, institutions, organizations and actors have increased" (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014, p. 375). Without discussing the core of mediatization

of politics, we assume that both perspectives combine in the actions of politicians, who through certain actions exploit the media potential in order to follow their own agendas. It is unclear at what stage the mediatization of politics is, in the institutional sense, as this approach assumes absolute autonomy and independence of the media, and the institutional emancipation of media is accompanied by a phenomenon of reverse directionality – the politization of media (Esmark, 2014), however it will not be a part of this work.

Undoubtedly, one of the effects of that mediatization that can be observed, independently of the framework that is used, is populisation of political communication, that is populist rhetoric adopted by all political entities to reach their goals. This prompted the existence of the populist political communication, which could be defined as a use of particular type of rhetorics by political actors and institutions, characterised by emotionality, and which "includes blame attribution and scapegoats" (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2016, p. 10), uses straightforward and sometimes violent language, and presents simplistic solutions to problems. It usually refers to "the people", anti-elitism, and the exclusion of various out-groups. Communication itself is a key field of research on populism: "(…) populism is mostly reflected in the oral, written and visual communication of individual politicians, parties, social movements, or any other actor that steps into the public sphere(…)" (Reinemann et al., 2016, p. 13).

In research on populist political communication, it is the verbal and written communications that are mostly focused on, with visual aspects being discussed only as a side note. But it must be remembered that verbal communication is always placed within the context of its non-verbal counterpart, which is a very important component for the understanding and interpretation of what is being said. We assert then that non-verbal communication can also be a rich source of populistic political behaviour. The use of non-verbal communication as a way of convincing people to your point of view and influencing them can be a very effective tool in building one's credibility and trust amongst the electorate. Because there is a lot of research analysing populism which is based on the verbal component of communication, the authors of this work will focus chiefly on analysis of the non-verbal aspects of the populist political communication. The aim of this work is to present a typology of non-verbal behaviours and their analytical framework, as this will allow for future research to determine the frequency and intensity of the non-verbal cues used by the populist political actors, as well as to define typical non-verbal behaviour of such actors.

Non-Verbal Communication of the Political Actors

Corner (2000, p. 388) has pointed out the importance of iconic and kinesic elements in mediatization of a political persona, arguing that the iconic (or symbolic) channel of political communication came about as a consequence of development of painting, and later on, photography, which enabled the presentation of oneself, and their physical appearance, in a way that, according to symbolic convention, could be read as related to power. Many occasions (photos, videos, marches, conventions, etc.) are used and created in order to be used in presentation of the personality in a favourable way, according to the goals set. Kinesic channel requires good behaviour and the ability to behave and interact in various situations that politicians face.

The aforementioned channels are employed to transmit non-verbal communications, which are constructed using a very expansive instrumentarium. The literature on the subject consists of numerous typologies for non-verbal behaviours, which, if used consciously, may aid creation of the desired image and communicate a particular narrative to the audience. Non-verbal behaviours that in authors' opinion could be used as a basis for analytical framework for analysing non-verbal communication of political actors are related to:

1. individual speakers' features: appearance, kinesics (gestures, facial micro-expressions, facial expressions, attitude of the body, way of movement), haptics, audial area;
2. ambience of speakers: persons accompanying the speaker (colleagues, spouses), background selected for the speeches, the prospect of recording/photo props used during the speeches;
3. behaviour of proximity.

The first area as presented in the typology relates to personal features of the speaker. Their outfit, make-up, hairstyle, choice of a colour scheme – these are all elements that can define the speakers and influence the ways they are being perceived; as worthy of being a leader for instance. It needs to be noted that one's external appearance is a vast concept and is greatly dependent on diplomatic protocol and dress codes appropriate for a given situation. The way people look is not solely determined by what they wear; it is formulated based on the way they chose their accessories, shoes, what hairstyle and make-up they sport, and aided even further by appropriately selected colour scheme, matching the occasion, as well as their personal features (e.g. politicians wearing colours that make them look more attractive).

The first area also includes kinesics, understood as movement with particular attention paid to posture and positioning of the body, gestures and manner of movement (Sikorski, 2011, p. 54). Ekman and Friesen categorised them as: emblems, illustrators, emotion and expression indicators, conversational regulators, and adapters (1969, pp. 49-98). The will to increase the professionalism and credibility of one's image is tightly linked with the amount and extent of gesticulation. McNeil claims that everything that has to deal with attractiveness of one's statements is hidden in human gestures and points to language, gesticulation, and thinking as unmistakeably interlinked (2000, p. 40).

Another important issue is politician's credibility and honesty (in a truth-telling sense), readable based on bodily movement. Ekman's research suggests that people with great ease of gesticulation and of charismatic speech will stop or significantly decrease the gesticulation during moments of lying. This follows from the effort and brainpower needed to constructively use lies. Similar reactions can be prompted from people who are very stressed while performing in front of an audience, or are aware of insufficient preparation before their performance (Ekman, 2015, p. 80).

Core body gestures are particularly important when it comes to non-verbal communication. Confident people will aim to increase their "volume" or actively fill their surroundings with their body; they stand with their feet far apart, cross their hands behind their heads or put them up, prop themselves up widely against a pulpit, desk, or a table. The exact opposite of such behaviour is hiding within one's body and trying to make yourself look smaller. These types of behaviour are described by Cuddy, underlining the important role of body posture and positioning in producing certain types of hormones (such as testosterone and cortisol). Her research suggests that posing in a so-called "power

position" for at least two minutes right before an important performance or interview increases significantly levels of testosterone which directly influences perception of power, strength, bravery and readiness, as well as lowering of cortisol levels, which decreases stress and anxiety. Cuddy points to these behaviours as a source of perception of public figures as confident, risk-taking, and worthy of leading roles they aspire to (Cuddy, 2016, p. 148). Such positions are similar to specifically showcased elements that are in line with open and closed positions. In reading the core body gestures it is important to note the direction and positioning of it with respect to interlocutors. Positioning of the core directly in front of the person spoken to may be indicative of the readiness to fight and talk; turning the core away on the other hand may suggest aversion, hostility, discomfort or a will to escape (Rückle, 2001, p. 236).

The way of movement can be very indicative of leadership qualities and can underline the credibility of populist political actors. A person's walk is determined by their physical fitness, age, as well as their character and attitudes towards work and duties. The way we walk influences not only the way we are perceived, but also the way we feel (Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982, p. 73). The pace is more often than not related to one's temperament and willingness to accomplish a given task; a slower pace might suggest dismay at a particular task, and a quick one – strong motivation and a proactive attitude. The length of steps taken can be perceived similarly. Big, long, confident steps may indicate someone reaching for their established goals, or energetic and tireless activity; small steps on the other side can suggest lack of self-confidence, introverted nature, caution, and conservatism of the actions. Walking to an imaginary beat is characteristic for people with a particular goal in mind, who are also willing to sacrifice themselves in action. Stiff corpus while walking on the other hand showcases pride and conceitedness, as well as self-confidence and self-worth (Rückle, 2001, p. 288). Bending your knees while walking can also be observed, especially in women wearing high heels, and can be read a sing of lack of self-assuredness and stability, especially if the shoes are the wrong size and uncomfortable. Wearing high heels is another matter in its own right; it adds femininity and sex appeal to the image, which are mostly useless features in context of elections, where traditionally it is the male attributes that prevail as a standard for persons to which the leadership of the state is entrusted.

Individual features of the speaker consist also of touch and the way of communicating by its means. In the world of politics, touching is most commonly found in greetings, which are strictly regulated by the diplomatic protocol and etiquette. A handshake can be a very important source of information about the speaker, especially in an informal setting, such as voter meet-and-greet. A faint, delicate hand shake can express detachment and reservations, while a hand shake too forceful can suggest aggression and will to dominate (Collins, 2002, p. 79). On the political stage, greetings often happen with a media presence, with cameras present. Positioning oneself on the left-hand side of the frame allows for the dominating handshake to be seen, as person standing on the left will cover their greeting partner's hand with their own (Pease & Pease, 2014, pp. 74-76).

Non-verbal (paralinguistic) aspects of linguistic communication play, apart from the words spoken during the speech, a very important role in communication. Ciecierska-Zajdel explains it best by including in them "everything in the human voice which is not pure intellectual information […]. The tone of voice, the pitch, the pace, the intonation, the number of interruptions and repetitions, it all caries incredible amounts of information regarding emotions, attitude towards the listener, the goal of the speech, as well as the way the speaker wishes to be perceived" (2012, p. 25). The way speakers present vocal cues can

be a strongly influencing factor, especially on the recipient. Conscious use of this channel of communication can additionally increase the volume of information remembered by the recipient, as well as strengthen the trust and interest directed towards the speaker (Knapp & Hall, 2000, p. 78). The sources claim that "(…) low standard of speech visibly decreases the probability of achieving its goals" (p. 79)

Another area of importance in non-verbal communication is speaker's immediate surroundings, as it can engage various objects and people around them, which can be used in order to appear more professional. Holding a pen, wearing glasses, taking a notepad, as well as the type of a car driven, and background colours can be an important factor.

Pen holders should pay extra attention to avoid using it as an extension of the pointing finger, a gesture that can be interpreted as waving one's finger at someone and pointing out their mistakes. Props should be very carefully chosen, and should not bear any advertising materials. Glasses are often used in such a way, and if selected well (best viewed are black and rectangular frames, according to research) can increase the perception of intelligence even by 30%. Importantly, the speaker should never take the glasses off and put them in their mouth – this can be viewed as a gesture of lack of self-confidence and anxiety, trying to calm oneself down in a manner greatly resembling sucking at one's mother's breasts (Murphy, 2007).

Politicians' image is gravely influenced by the accompanying people: close co-workers, experts, life partners, or the immediate family. Their presence can add value and professionalism to the image. Accompanying persons, if dressed appropriately and coherently (matching the speaker, yet not taking attention away from them) can reinforce the credibility of the politician. The same can be said for co-workers accompanying them during various functions and events, especially if their behaviour is aimed at increasing attention paid to the speaker themselves.

Expositional background is also a very important factor in creating one's image. Furniture and daily objects are of importance, especially when it comes e.g. to size of a desk (Hogan, 2001, p. 109), or chairs and pulpit chosen (Pease & Pease, 2014, p. 243), all aimed at portraying the speaker as tall, and as such, trustworthy.

Last but not least, proxemics is another of the dimensions covered by the typology of populistic non-verbal behaviours. Introduced by Edward T. Hall in 1969, it can be defined as distance, proximity, neighbourhood (Hall, 1969). Proxemic behaviours are related to distance and spatial management involving the people participating in the communication, as well as its influence on the relationships created under given circumstances. Spatial communication is showcased via information being communicated through spatial arrangement, and proxemics can include surroundings, internal design, physical distance between a speaker and a listener, body positioning, and the location of the occupied space (Sikorski, 2011, p. 67)

Proxemic communication plays an important role in political communication and as a tool used to professionalise the image of a speaker. This area of non-verbal communication can influence the perception of the speaker as dominating or submissive, and appropriate spatial arrangement can increase the perceived professionalism or trustworthiness of a person enclosed within. Speaker's attitude towards accompanying persons, the spatial design, awareness of cultural differences, as well as people and objects within their surroundings can significantly increase the credibility of the carefully crafted image. It is important to note the diversity and depth of spatial communication as a concept, as well as to pinpoint the elements which undoubtedly craft the aforementioned credibility.

Conclusion

As presented above, the analytical framework for assessing non-verbal behaviours of politicians should be used to answer whether there exist such non-verbal cues that are more than others indicative of the populist character of the statement being produced. Can certain behaviours and non-verbal communication be used to distinguish between populist and non-populist political entities? If indeed they can, are they supplemental to the verbal communication, or substitutive?

Leni Riefenstahl's seminal aesthetics, supporting Adolf Hitler's regime, so visiblein her documentaries ("The Victory of Faith", 1933; "Triumph of the Will", 1935) played a vital role in exposing the importance of iconic and kinesic elements in creating an emotionally influential political message. Emotional appeal is one of the determinants of populist political communication, and putting these facts together is the best indicator of the need for systematic analysis of behaviour and non-verbal cues produced by all entities partaking in political communication, facing progressive populisation.

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A CONCEPT OF INVESTIGATIVE CROSS-BORDER JOURNALISM. THE ESSENCE AND FUNCTIONING OF VSQUARE PROJECT IN THE VISEGRAD REGION

Dominika Popielec

Abstract: In a democratic system, investigative journalism has an informative and control function, which means that it is also sometimes called the democratic watchdog. As a result of the reporter's investigation, scandals and disgraces of a political, business and social nature stigmatizing corruption, nepotism and immoral behaviour are revealed. The aim of the paper is to characterize this cooperation based on the constructed concept of investigative cross-border journalism. Therefore, the cooperation of investigative journalists within the VSquare project in the Visegrad region was analysed in terms of: the specifics of the entities involved in the project, the subject of journalistic investigations, work methodology, the results of investigations and their impact on the public sphere. Media content analysis, case study and subject literature were used.

Keywords: investigative cross-border journalism, cooperation, watchdog, information, democracy, Visegrad Region

Introduction

Investigative journalism is an indispensable element of the modern democratic system. Often, the results of journalistic investigations affected political, economic and social changes. One of the best-known examples is the Watergate scandal revealed by journalists Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward from "The Washington Post", which contributed to the specific renaissance of this profession (Aucoin, 2007, p. 17). In addition, the scandal has become a model for other editorial offices on how to conduct a reporter's investigation (Downie Jr., 2012). It should be pointed out that in the media of the countries of the former Eastern Bloc after 1989, its investigative journalism was accentuated due to the control of the political and business spheres. There was also a trend described as "The Watergate effect" (Zelizer & Stuart, 2010, p. 171), to call scandals in one's own country with the "-gate" suffix. This was to illustrate the scale of the scandal to the largest political scandal in the United States.

Due to globalization processes, practicing investigative journalism today is not limited to the territory of one country. This is evidenced by the cooperation of reporters from various countries within the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism at "Panama Papers" and "Paradise Papers". In connection with this, an unprecedented initiative of investigative reporters from the Visegrad Group countries was analysed, which undertakes

joint efforts to reveal political, economic and social dysfunctionality in this area. The term "investigative cross-border journalism" has been proposed to determine the nature of this activity. The following research questions were posed:

RQ1: What are the main motives behind the establishment of VSquare?

RQ2: What is the thematic scope of journalistic investigations?

RQ3: What methods reserved for investigative journalism are used by journalists of this project?

RQ4: What is the impact of journalistic activity on the public sphere?

RQ5: What features of VSquare can be distinguished, which can form the basis for formulating the term "investigative cross-border journalism"?

The method of content analysis of the selected journalistic texts, a case study and a comparative method were used. The literature focused on investigative journalism turned out to be indispensable.

Theoretical Frames of Investigative Journalism

Investigative journalism has many definitions and types. Both among of journalism practitioners, as well as in the academic community, there are disputes over whether this profession should be distinguished from journalism in general terms (de Burgh acc. to Rustbriger, 2013, p. 25). These are not the only problems that are being discussed. There is also concerns for journalists to keep track of the ethics of the profession. Its non-observance may cause a legal collision due to the use of a number of specific work methods for obtaining information sources, e.g. eavesdropping, a hidden video recorder or a camera. In addition, investigative reporters bear the consequences of their activity in the most drastic form, e.g. dismissal from work, ostracism of the environment, and even loss of health or life.

Legal conditions are also important, in which journalists and media operate in a broad sense. It should be emphasized that due to its nature, investigative journalism can exist under conditions that guarantee freedom to the media (Raphael, 2010, p. 1). This is possible only in democratic systems, which most often in the constitution indicate free media as an inseparable element of democracy and a free society in the context of an unhampered flow of information. Access to information contributes not only to the transparency of public life, but also promotes social awareness and building a civil society, which corresponds to the idea of democracy.

Investigative journalism can also cause polarization of both journalistic and political circles. In the Polish context, one of the louder 2014 political scandals should be considered as such an example. The unfavourable image of Poland emerged from the subject of eavesdropped conversations of the most important politicians of the ruling camp (Popielec, 2017, pp. 73-75).

Investigative journalism is also the subject of discussion among politicians due to the fact that their public activities should be of interest to the guards of democracy, i.e. investigative reporters. Often, thanks to investigative journalists, hidden information came to light (Anderson & Benjaminson, 1976, p. 5). There are many examples of the positive impact of investigative journalism on the public sphere and even the necessity of its existence in a democratic system, which was emphasized, among others, by the member of the European Parliament, Sophie in' t Velt in the context of the murder of Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak in February 2018. In her opinion, "Investigative journalism is essential for

a healthy democracy. They literally keep power in check. The killings are an attack on democracy" (in' t Velt, 2018).

The definition of Hugo de Burgh is noteworthy: "An investigative journalist is man or woman whose profession it is to discover the truth and to identify lapses form it in whatever media may be available. The act of doing this generally is called investigative journalism and is distinct from apparently similar work done by police, lawyers, auditors and regulatory bodies in that it is not limited as to target, not legally founded and closely connected to publicity" (de Burgh, 2013, p. 17).

What is the difference between investigative journalism and journalism in general terms? The answer to this question can be found in the categorization proposed by David Murphy. He divided the ways of reporting in journalism into:

- general: (level one) – lack of detailed knowledge of the subject being undertaken; work on the topics entrusted by the editorial board; haste; the sources of information are official statements of politicians, spokespersons, representatives of state bodies;
- specialist: (level two) – detailed knowledge of the subject; maintaining constant contact with informants and experts; specialist knowledge helps to see media events in the right perspective;
- investigative: (level three) – preparation for conversation and skilful listening to people; scepticism about the source of information; willingness to discover an "unofficial" image of a person or organization; the investigation takes time (Spark acc. to Murphy, 2007, pp. 5-6).

It is worth noting that investigative journalists, besides using standard methods of collecting information, use a hidden video recorder, a microphone, a camera or a drone. The cooperation with the informer also takes an important place in the work of the investigative journalist, who for some reasons wants to remain anonymous due to the information provided. Such people are often referred to as whistle-blowers due to the fact that they disclose illegal or unethical practices to the media in their workplace. Journalists follow this principle due to the ongoing investigation and the well-being of the informer.

New technologies had an impact on the metamorphosis of the collection of information, in particular the archiving of information and the database being a repository of knowledge for the journalist. The invariable features of the investigative journalism include: collecting and verifying information with due diligence, presenting/explaining/interpreting the examined problem in a manner understandable to the recipient. Based on the analysis of the biggest scandals revealed by journalists, it can be observed that the subject of investigation imposed certain work techniques. The "Panama Papers" scandal should be considered such an example, which involved the analysis of an extensive collection of documents in digital form. Other investigations, on the other hand, will require many discussions with informers or the necessary use of provocations. Leaks are also important, as they provide journalists with tips and information useful in working on the text.

The Idea of VSquare – Assumptions, Goals, Perspectives

The fact that investigative journalism is subject to dynamic transformations not only in the technical or theoretical sense, is evidenced by the emergence of transnational journalistic cooperation for which the VSquare initiative created in 2017 (VSquare.org) should be

recognized. It was created thanks to the National Endowment for Democracy. This is a noteworthy example of cooperation between journalists from countries of the Visegrad Group (V4): Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

Table 1. *Team of VSquare journalists*
Source: https://vsquare.org [Retrieved 20.07.2018]. On Twitter, there is information that VSquare also includes the mono.sk website (Twitter, 2018).

Organization/Media	Country	Journalists
Reporters Foundation (Fundacja Reporterów)	Poland	Anna Gielewska, Edyta Żemła, Anastasiia Moroz, Wojciech Cieśla, Paweł Reszka, Konrad Szczygieł, Patryk Szczepaniak
The Czech Centre for Investigative Journalism(České centrum pro investigativní žurnalistiku)	Czech Republic	Pavla Holcová
Atlatszo.hu, Index.hu	Hungary	Anita Komuves, Szabolcs Panyi
Aktuality.sk	Slovakia	-

The table shows that the largest group in VSquare is that of the Polish journalists working in nationwide media and related to the Reporters Foundation. This is due to the fact that this organization was the originator of the idea and is its coordinator (Wirtualnemedia.pl, 2017). The Czech VSquare pillar is represented by the typically journalist non-profit organization. The VSquare team includes Hungarian reporters associated with investigative non-profit organization <Atlatszo> and the internet portal. Although the VSquare website is lacking one particular person from Slovakia in the team, this does not exclude cooperation with various journalists working for the Aktuality.sk website (VSquare.org). This is evidenced by the published publication by Eva Kubániová.

Anna Gielewska spoke about the need to appoint VSquare and its uniqueness, which stated that the phenomena occurring in those countries have much in common (Szczygieł, 2017), which justifies the integration of journalistic circles in this part of Europe. She also added that this type of undertaking is innovative. Despite the relatively short activity, the project under implementation received funding under IJ4EU (Investigative Journalism for Europe) in the amount of 11,000 EUR (International Press Institute, 2018). This is a significant support for journalistic investigations that make this project independent of various influences, e.g. political ones. It should be emphasized that in investigative journalism, the financial background is important to perform the reporter's work.

Journalists also use the possibilities of new media, in particular the website and social media. Although the editorial office is a virtual newsroom, journalists appreciate the need to meet face to face, which took place on June 2018 in Prague (Facebook, 2018). This served to prepare an action plan and exchange experiences (Ibid.). Based on the analysis of the profile content in social media, it was stated that they inform and promote the results of investigations, e.g. in the form of a link to an article from VSquare.org (Ibid., Twitter).

This journalistic cooperation is independent, cross-border, with the task of caring for the quality of investigative journalism and the independence of the press in the Visegrad Group (VSquare.org). This may be a way to maintain the presence of investigative journalism in the public sphere and to counteract problems that are affecting contemporary investigative journalism. Journalists include the following: reporters and newsrooms lack resources, clickbaits win over quality content, the political and business climate (VSquare.org). It

is equally important to nurture the value of freedom of the press in young democracies, which should be defended in various ways, e.g. in the form of independent projects. This is a remedy for recently observed political pressure on the media in the region. Thus, it shapes independent, vigilant and trained journalism in terms of techniques. Undoubtedly, these features can be combined with the general understanding of investigative journalism.

Journalists declare that "we want to serve as watchdogs over public affairs, governments and businesses, and uncover any abuses of power and corruption" (Vsquare.org), which is the essence of the definition of investigative journalism. In addition, they are aware of the mission that journalists should fulfil in the society. They also want to support and educate journalists in this region. Due to the nature of the subject matter and potential cooperation with whistle-blowers, the journalists introduced the principles of secure communication and document transfer, e.g. in the form of "encrypted e-mail". Moreover, they provided a brief guide – a tutorial on YouTube – on e-mail encryption. The photos and documents that should be subject to similar security procedures as the e-mail itself are an equally important source of information. This means that the failure to remove metadata, e.g. software, date and time or the author of the photo, makes it easier to identify the source of information.

Journalistic Activity Based on the Analysis of the Selected Articles

As the journalists declare, the thematic scope is varied from ecological problems to corruption and politics. The result of the reporters' work is 27 publications, which were published in the period from 4.10-2017 to 23.07.2018. Due to the short duration of the project and the natural time-consuming work on the investigative text, the number of publications should be considered representative. On the one hand, it shows the dynamics of the reporters' work, and on the other, it illustrates the features of a reporter's skills, such as reliability, diligence and credibility.

Based on the analysis of the content of the VSquare.org website, it was observed that the publications are the result of both individual and collective work, i.e. the VSquare team, duet/trio of journalists from various countries (VSquare.org). Although the majority of individual articles over collective ones prevail, we note the cross-border nature of journalistic cooperation. It is worth mention, that 26 articles assigned to the accepted categories were taken into consideration. One publication has the form of an unsigned report, which is why it was not taken into account in the statement. It should be assumed that in the future these values may change in favour of articles prepared collectively.

Table 2. *Nature of the publications in percentage and cross-border investigative journalism*
Source: Own study based on Vsquare.org, https://vsquare.org/investigations/ [Retrieved 24.07.2018]

Type of articles' authorship	Number of articles	Percentage share
Individual	16	61,5%
Duet/trio	3	11,5%
VSquare	7	27%

In addition to the indicated aspect of the quantitative publication, it is worth analysing the emerging topics in the investigative texts. Defining themselves as the guards of democracy,

reporters will deal with public affairs, the activities of individual governments, business and reveal abuses and corruption that have occurred in these areas. Based on the analysis of the content of the publications, it was observed that there is a group of articles that cannot be classified into one thematic area. The controversial relationship between politics and businesses with fraud and corruption in the background can be considered as an attempt of explanation. There is no shortage of investigative articles in which the media and the essence and role of information in modern world constitute an important topic in terms of politics. Journalists also focused on the functioning of the information policy, called the Russian propaganda, of President Vladimir Putin in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There are also investigative articles in which we have both heroes struggling with dysfunctions of the public sphere concerning, for example, journalistic activity of Ján Kuciak, as well as "anti-heroes", for example, the activities of Alexander Usovski in the countries of the Visegrad Group.

Table 3. *Classification of the subject matter of articles on the selected examples*
Source: Own study based on https://vsquare.org/investigations/ [Retrieved 24.07.2018]

Title of the article	Author	Thematic areas
"Ex Orban Friend is Selling – all His Businesses"	Anita Komuves	Politics, business
"Police Tracking Journalists not Murderers" "Man of the Revolution" "Stronger than Evil" "You Cannot Kill the Story"	Wojciech Cieśla Eva Kubániová Patryk Szczepaniak Pavla Holcova	Politics, media
"From Internet Brigades to Troll Factories" "The Dogs of War, the Dogs of Disinformation" "The Hunter of Russian Propaganda" "Information Warfare. Journalists are the Target, Manipulation is a Tool"	VSquare VSquare VSquare Edyta Żemła	Politics, media, propaganda

The purpose of the statement was to verify journalistic declarations in terms of the thematic diversity of articles, which was confirmed. It was found that journalists raise important problems concerning, to a large extent, politics, business, media and the propaganda phenomenon. At the same time, this illustrates the uniqueness of investigative journalism in the context of other activities in the media industry. On the one hand, the subject of the investigations suggests how important investigative journalism is in the democratic system, and on the other hand, it draws attention to the price a journalist can pay for revealing abuses in the public sphere.

By juxtaposing this journalistic activity with the previously mentioned definition frames of investigative journalism, coherence and consistency can be observed between promoting the concept of investigative journalism and its implementation. The selected texts that not only explain and interpret the problem to readers represent the third level (investigative) according to Murphy's classification. This is most visible in the series of articles focused on a specific case, e.g. the Slovak journalist or Russian propaganda. This contributes to a multi-dimensional approach to the presented problem and thus justifies the need for collective journalistic cooperation.

A Concept of Investigative Cross-border Journalism – Completion and Conclusions

The current activity of the cross-border journalistic project, which was the subject of the analysis, should be considered as investigative journalism from the perspective of the theoretical approach to the phenomenon. The goal of this project, which is fully implemented by the VSquare team, is to exercise the function of the "guardian of democracy" understood as informing the public about abuses and corruption of power and business people. The declared area of journalistic investigations is reflected in reality, which results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the publications. In this context, an equally important fact is that journalists jointly or individually address the problems identified in the countries of the Visegrad Group. Analysing the observed methods of work, we can conclude that there is a willingness to cooperate with whistle-blowers and readiness to accept various documents without metadata. Speaking about the scope of the impact of the VSquare on the public sphere of the project, it can be observed its hidden potential in was noticed by Investigative Journalism in Europe, which resulted in financial support. However, it is a project in the development phase, therefore, the size of the initiative's impact on the public sphere cannot be unambiguously assessed.

The analysis of the nature of VSquare's activities and the use of the term "cross-border journalism" by journalists were the premises for the formulation of the term "investigative cross-border journalism". Therefore, the following features have been distinguished:

- analysis, explanation and interpretation of common problems/phenomena concerning a specific territory (in the case of countries belonging to the Visegrad Group);
- the need for cross-border journalistic cooperation as well as its implementation in practice;
- working methods of investigative journalism;
- awareness of the role of investigative journalism in democracy.

Investigative cross-border journalism may in the future be one of the forms of investigative journalism on a smaller scale (regional perspective). To some extent, there is a suitable reference to successful international journalistic cooperation within the International Consortium of Investigative Journalism.

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POPULIST POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE BULGARIAN MEDIA ECOSYSTEM

Lilia Raycheva

Abstract: Populism as a political concept and rhetorical style is nowadays an object of multi- faceted social discussions. The strong critical attitude of populists towards the status quo is generally intertwined with the function of the media as a corrective factor of government authorities. The paper is focused on the developments of political populism in Bulgaria and their media reflections. As part of the study undertaken by the member-countries of the COST Action IS 1308: *Populist political communication in Europe* (2014-2018) the text also analyzes the results of interviews conducted with Bulgarian politicians and journalists regarding their perception of populism.

Keywords: media ecosystem, political populism, mediatization, politicization, Bulgaria

Introduction

The contemporary transformations processes in the technological, economic, and social spheres also impact the political environment and the media ecosystem. The challenges of the economic crisis, as well as the migration processes are strengthening the positions of Euro-skeptics and revitalize the development of populism.

Populism as a political position and rhetorical style has been the object of comprehensive research and multi-faceted social discussions. The prevailing approach to populism is as a threat to democracy. However, it is also viewed as an expression of democratic shortcomings. Positioned between the people and the elite, the nourishing elements of the performances of the populist actors are the media. Today changes in society are catalyzed not only by the functioning of traditional media, such as press, radio and television, but also by the opportunities of the blogosphere and the social networks, as well as of the mobile electronic connections.

There is no consensus in academic circles regarding the types of populism present in society. In resting upon the four types of types of populism (*ccomplete, excluding, anti-elitist, and empty populism*) outlined by Jagers & Walgrave (2007), it may be concluded that these types exist in Bulgaria, although they have not been classified in the terminology used by these two authors. The conceptual schemes of Margaret Canovan (1981) and Cas Mudde (2007) have been also used as keys to understand and explain the phenomenon, as well as to define populism in the country. Following the reasoning of Jacques Rupnik (Rupnik, 2007, p. 130), it may be concluded that Bulgarian populism is a typical example of post-communist East European populism, and is highly imitative.

As part of a study undertaken by the member-countries of the COST Action IS 1308: *Populist political communication in Europe: Comprehending the Challenge of Mediated Political Populism for Democratic Politics* (2014-2018) qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted with Bulgarian politicians and journalists to provide an insight into their perception of populism. The main objective was to discern how politicians from different types of political parties and journalists from different types of media perceive the implications of populism.

The discrepancy between economic perspectives and reality, between political expectations and concrete policies, as well as the presence of controversial evaluations of the transition to democratic society and market economy are the grounds of the varieties of political populism in Bulgaria and of the difficulty of building a relevant conceptual framework for the phenomenon. It is not accidental that the most significant manifestations of populist political actors, including in the media, have been organized after Bulgaria's accession in the Euro-Atlantic structures and as a result of people's disappointment in the effects of this accession.

Politization of Media and Mediatization of Politics

The model of democracy on the make in Bulgaria delegated the difficult tasks of transition to the political elite and eliminated the broad participation of the people in the process of transformation. Although superficially heterogeneous, the political and the media environment (especially in pre-election times) is still not fully open to pluralism and independence. Bulgarian political actors (leaders and parties), that fall under the category of populism, have mixed, oftentimes changing, features. The use of populist phraseology is evident among all political parties in the country, whether left or right-orientated.

In Bulgaria, *complete populism*, involving references and appeals to the people, anti-elitism and exclusion of outgroups (Jagers & Walgrave, 2006), is called "hard" populism. It flourished after 2005, when the former journalist and leader of the newly formed party *Ataka*, Volen Siderov, succeeded in winning twenty seats for his party in the Parliamentary elections. Thereafter, members of *Ataka* have regularly been elected in the National Assembly, and more recently, in the European Parliament as well. Contributing to its success was likewise its national daily party newspaper, also called *Ataka*. Later on, the launching of TV Alfa in 2011, contributed to the continuing support for *Ataka* and its leader over the years. The party would hardly have won enough votes to send its representatives to the Parliament if its populist slogans had not reached the audience of these nationally disseminated media. The ideology of the party tends to combine extremist right-wing with extreme left-wing ideas, and has evolved towards an anti-*EU* and anti-*NATO* stance. Its leader Siderov is a typical example of a very aggressive style combined with eclectic elements: he raises extreme left slogans referring to nationalization, but also spreads ethnic hostility and anti-elite feelings; recently he has been making anti-migrant and anti-globalist statements.

Other small parties are also part of "hard" populism in Bulgaria, including the nationalist party *Bulgarian National Union*, the *Bulgarian National Radical Party*, the *Warriors of Tangra Movement*, the party *National Resistance*, etc.

According to the indicators of populism of Jagers and Walgrave, political parties that might be classified in the range of more limited *complete populism* are the *Patriotic Front coalition*, headed by Valeri Simeonov – who is also the president of the political

party *National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria* (*NFSB*), and the *Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Bulgarian National Movement* (*IMRO*), headed by Krasimir Karakachanov; these parties are currently part of the ruling coalition. They are nationalist political parties that are more or less opposed to the minority groups, Roma, Turks, etc.

Falling under the category of *excluding populism*, with its typical anti-elitism and appeals to the common people, was Nikolay Barekov's pro-EU party *Bulgaria without Censorship*, formed in early 2014. Afterwards, however, it has completely broken apart. Its leader Barekov, formerly a popular TV anchorman and executive director of TV 7, is a salient example of a *mixed type* of political populism. He combines right-wing ideology with leftist slogans referring to protecting the interests of the poor. However, Barekov was later denounced by people from his own party in Parliament as being dependent on corporations. At present, he is a member of the *European Parliament* but has been abandoned by nearly all members of the *Bulgaria without Censorship coalition*, which now carries the name *Bulgarian Democratic Centre*.

The president of the political party *National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria* (*NFSB*) Valeri Simeonov – also emerged from media – being the owner of TV SKAT. Some other media, non-governmental organizations and marketing agencies have also contributed to the expansion of populism.

With regard to fomenting populist hate speech and constructing the "image of the enemy", some national media have evidently played a role in stimulating populist processes by serving as a platform for plainly racist and misanthropic populist vocabulary. Populism is expanding in entertainment television as well, thus establishing new populist practices in the electronic media – show populism (Kabakchieva, 2009, p. 1). Hardly any political leader fails to be present in the new media, including blogs, social networks, sites of political parties, online television.

Falling under the category of *empty populism*, with its reference and appeals to the ordinary people, was the political activity of the former Bulgarian tsar Simeon II. In 2001 he became prime minister, having won votes in the parliamentary elections through his populist phraseology. Simeon II and the party established in 2001 and named after him, the *National Movement Simeon the Second* (*NMSS*) can be regarded as representative of "pro-European" populism that may be defined as "soft" populism as well. Simeon II has a specific style of communication marked by moderation in speech, a certain show of modesty and benevolence. These traits were part of his charisma. He has used a technique never applied before him in Bulgarian politics: "the technique of non-speech" (Krasteva, 2013). His political style and conduct towards others were based on respect and compromise. Specific for him was the style of *catch-all politics*.

The present Bulgarian prime-minister Boyko Borisov of the centre-right political party *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria* (*CEDB*), who also held two previous mandates (2009-2013 and 2014-2017), falls in the category of "soft" populism as well. His is a very particular style. He displays a certain amount of eclecticism, making references to the common people, yet also tending to discredit opponents.

Eclecticism and aggressiveness are common to the verbal style of all "excluding" populists and to those with anti-elitist views.

Today, the populist space of Parliament is held mainly by Volen Siderov, though support for his party *Ataka* has decreased. This party joined The *Patriotic Front coalition*, made up of the political party *NFSB*, and *IMRO*, is also represented in Parliament and is part of the

ruling coalition. A new political party – *Will*, led by Vesselin Mareshki, with comparatively populist stance has entered the Parliament.

Comparative Study on the Insight of Perception of Populism

In order to address the concept of political populism and its potential implications through the views of politicians and journalists, a comparative study has been undertaken in 2017 by some of the member-countries of the COST Action *IS 1308*.

The aim of the in-depth interviews has been to compare the opinions of the interviewees on five key areas, such as: their understanding of the concept of populism; the perceived consequences of the populism for the country and for democracy; the reasons for the popularity of populist leaders and parties; the issues most related to the rise of populism and whether the media are supportive, critical or behave in a populist manner.

The interviews were conducted with four politicians and four journalists from each European country participating in the study. The comparative analysis of this collective work will be presented in two forthcoming publications of the Action.

The political parties included in the study were: Political Party *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria* (centre-right), *Coalition Patriotic Front* (centrist), *Will* (centrist), *Coalition Bulgarian Socialist Party – for Bulgaria* (centre-left). All the interviewees were MPs in the current Parliament.

The participating journalists were: an anchorman (centrist) from the Bulgarian National Television (BNT) – a public service broadcaster (PSB); a member (centre-left) of the Council for Electronic Media (CEM) – the national regulatory broadcasting program authority; a journalist (centre-right) from a popular weekly newspaper *Gallery* and a blogger (right) – also a former active journalist with diverse political orientation.

With regard to the first question about what they understand by populism, all of the interviewees stated that populism often has contradictory meanings. The most commonly pointed out issues were connected with: deceitful rhetoric; vain promises; law-and-order; economic failures; nationalism and immigration; exploitation of emotions as fear, anxiety and resentment, etc. For a politician from the centrist *Coalition Patriotic Front* populism is connected with the rising right-wing wave of resistance against the globalized world and multiculturalism. For the representative of the centre-left *Coalition Bulgarian Socialist Party-for Bulgaria* populism is giving easy but wrong answers to difficult questions. All of the journalists named the former Bulgarian tzar Simeon Saxe Coburg Gotha – prime minister (2001-2005) as an example of a national populist actor. Some of the interviewees added Volen Siderov (*Ataka*), Valeri Simeonov (*Coalition Patriotic Front*), and the current prime-minister Boyko Borisov (*Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria*).

In general, there is no clear pattern and dividing line between what the interviewees perceive as populism.

To the second question about what the consequences of populism are, the majority of the interviewees answered that its effects were negative. However, a positive perception of the impact of populism on democracy was also pointed out. The representative of the centrist *Will* stated that populism is part of democracy, but its growth makes democratic political systems unproductive. The interviewee from the centre-right *Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria* claimed that a much greater danger in Europe comes from neo-liberalism than from populism. For the former EMP and current MP of the *Coalition Bulgarian Socialist*

Party–for Bulgaria, populism always limits the possibility of undertaking serious reforms which require sacrifices on the part of citizens. For the blogger (right) it has positive consequences by breaking down the bipolar political model in Bulgaria. Although the centrist journalist from the PSB demonstrated a negative attitude toward populism, he stated that "it is even worse to stigmatize populism". For both the interviewee (centre-right) from the popular newspaper and from the regulatory authority (centre-left) "populism has killed the will for political and social action in Bulgaria. Politics has completely lost its meaning".

The most commonly mentioned effects in all of the answers were associated with the political system, the quality and resilience of democracy, and of its institutions.

Disillusion and disappointment with mainstream political actors, neglected voters, and unresolved real problems are some of the most important reasons the interviewees used to explain their answers to the third question about the popularity of populist leaders and parties. In addition, the disappointment of the people, according to some of them, is directed towards the European Union as well. The interviewees pointed out that the populists tend to say everything that the people want to hear, which makes them popular and engaging. The interviewee from the popular newspaper added that the populists appeal directly to the instincts of people. The centrist MP referred to the low level of political and economic culture, anomie, erosion of morals, and corruption in the society.

Asked whether the personal characteristics of particular political actors played a role in populism's popularity, all of the journalists considered that they did not, contrary to the opinions of the politicians who described populists as amiable.

Poverty, social inequalities, unemployment, low wages, injustice, as well as corruption were among the important themes raised by the interviewees, answering the fourth question about the social issues most related to the rise of populism. The immigration and the ethnic debate in some of the answers, especially in those of the cente-right and centrist interviewees are linked to a debate about the participation of the country in the European Union. The anchorman from the PSB added the catastrophic demographic problem and the unresolved integration of the Roma people.

Generally, media were widely perceived by the interviewees as supportive of populism according to the answers of the fifth question whether the media outlets support or criticize populism. Furthermore, to some degree, they were also perceived as the creators of populism and populist messages. Among the primary reasons for media support for populist policies, pointed out by all the interviewed journalists was the merge between the media ownership and political actors, as well as the deficiency of strong journalistic standards and media market. The interviewees from the regulatory authority, from the popular newspaper, and the blogger stated that "populism would not exist without the intermediary function of the media". The impression of the centre-right politician is that the most popular Bulgarian media are neoliberal rather than populist.

The process of mediatization of politics and the politicization of media has become a nourishing ground for the rise of populism (see: Raycheva & Peicheva, 2017).

Conclusion

The results of the conducted interviews have provided an important insight into politicians' and media professionals' perceptions of populism. Although all the interviewees were, in general, aware of the specifics of populism, their perception of populism differed. For that

reason, the consequences of populism to the nation and to democracy for the interviewees, both politicians and journalists, were ambivalent. Some stressed on the negative impact, others pointed out the positive features.

In terms of the reasons for the popularity of populists almost all of the interviewees pointed out that there were a number of demand and supply side factors such as immigration and economic hardship that were advantageous for the populists to capitalize on. According to the interviewees, the spread of populism in Europe and in the country is not linked to the politicians' personal characteristics, and particularly to charisma. The malfunctioning of established democratic institutions, including mainstream political parties, in addressing people's problems and in producing convincing discourses and solutions, were mentioned among the main reasons behind the rise of populism.

Reflecting on the role of both mainstream and social media, some important issues were stressed upon, such as: instrumentalization and commercialization of the media, as well as the deficiencies of professional standards. Media were not perceived as neutral bystanders.

In sum, there is no consensus in the academic circles, neither among politicians or journalists regarding the essence and the types of populism present in society – whether it can be viewed as an ideology, a distinct political movement or a rhetorical style, used by all political formations. Thus, there is not enough evidence supporting that populism has to be applied only to certain political parties and their leaders and whether their activities can be considered as a threat or as a corrective to democracy.

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YES, BUT IS IT RACISM?

Sanna Ryynänen

Abstract: The terms racism, discrimination, prejudice, othering, and xenophobia are often used in research literature without proper differentiation, or interchangeably. The aim of this article is to look at the uses and meanings of these terms, describe the main differences between them, and offer insights on how to use them in academic texts. Differentiating between the terms is essential, because the words we use guide the way we understand racism, its causes, and the actions we believe to be effective in countering it.

Keywords: racism, discrimination, prejudice, othering, xenophobia

Introduction

Racism is a touchy research subject. So touchy that some writers have chosen to use other words in their research in order to avoid the reactions the word racism arouses in the academic community (Essed, 2004, pp. 120-124). Thus, there is academic work on racism that addresses the subject with words like *prejudice*, *discrimination*, *xenophobia*, or *othering*. As a result, the meaning of these terms and the differences between them have become ambiguous. They are often used interchangeably and are seldom properly defined or explicated. Below, I suggest a model for differentiating between these terms and discuss the meanings they convoy and accentuate.

Racism

Researchers give very different definitions for racism according to which aspects they wish to emphasize. For example, sociologist Kathleen J. Fitzgerald (2016, p. 10) and political scientist Raymond Taras (2012, p. 14) define racism from the viewpoint of its manifestations, such as behaviour, attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. Sociologist Peter Braham (2003, p. 260) and anthropologist Kenneth Tafira (2011, p. 114) accentuate the idea of superiority: the "other" is seen as being inferior than "us". Philosophers Étienne Balibar (1991, pp. 17-18) and Pierre-André Taguieff (2008, p. 232), emphasize the creating and inflating of differences between groups of people.

However, when writers move on from defining racism to discussing it more in depth, they seem to share very similar views on the central points of the concept. Quite unanimously, the researchers see the word racism as meaning two things: racist behaviour and racist ideology (see: Balibar, 1991, pp. 17-18; Fitzgerald, 2016, pp. 10-11; Tafira, 2011, p. 116; Taguieff,

2008, p. 228, p. 232; Taras, 2012, p. 14). *Racist behaviour* can refer to both *individual* actions, such as exclusion, insults, or violence, and *institutional* actions, which are practices and policies that end up disadvantaging, oppressing, or exploiting some groups of people.

Racist ideology I have divided into three parts.

1. I call the first part *segregation*, and see four points to be central to it:
    a) *Grouping*. People are assigned to different cultural or ethnic groups, which are defined by things such as language, nationality, religion, phenotype, or dress (Balibar, 1991, pp. 17-18; Bulmer & Solomos, 2004, p. 8; Tafira, 2011, p. 114; Taguieff, 2008, p. 232). Sometimes the group membership is imposed on people without their agreement or consent (Gindro, 2003a, p. 94; Rex, 1986, p. 71).
    b) *Qualifying features*. The members of each group are assigned features and qualities that are not relevant for the actual boundary making of the group. These qualities are seen to be essential and shared by basically all members of the group (Banton & Miles, 1996, p. 310; Braham, 2003, pp. 259-260; Bulmer & Solomos, 2004, p. 8; Taguieff, 2008, p. 232; Wodak & Reisigl, 2015, pp. 578-579).
    c) *Stagnancy*. The presumed characteristics, abilities, and cultural practices of a group are seen as stagnant, unchanging, and fixed (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, pp. 39-40; Taguieff, 2008, p. 232; Wodak & Reisigl, 2015, pp. 578-579). The group members are a certain way, have always been that way, and will remain so forever.
    d) *Highlighting of differences*. The differences between groups are viewed as insurmountable, and the groups are seen to be incompatible (Bracalenti & Braham, 2003, p. xvii.). They will not be able to coexist without problems, because of the fundamental differences between them (Balibar, 1991, pp. 20-21; Taguieff, 2008, pp. 232-233).
2. The second part I call *superiority*. “We” are better than “them” (Banton & Miles, 1996, p. 310). “They” are lazy, dishonest, immoral, impudent, unhygienic, and so on (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, pp. 39-40; Taguieff, 2008, pp. 232-233). “We”, on the other hand, are normal — the way “they” should be as well. But, of course, they never will be, since they belong to a group whose members always stay the same.
3. The third part is the *justification of injustice* (Banton & Miles, 1996, p. 310; Taguieff, 2008, p. 232; Wodak & Reisigl, 2015, pp. 578-579). Since “they” are so unpleasant, ill-mannered, and untrustworthy, they must be kept under control, kept in their place, or shown their place. “We,” on the other hand, since we lack the flaws so commonplace among “them”, are worthy – and justly granted – all kinds of exclusive benefits and possibilities (Coates, 2011, p. 251; Fitzgerald, 2016, p. 91).

There are things listed above that do not, of course, always constitute racism. The point where innocuous grouping of people, building of identity, or boosting of group spirit turns into racism, has to be solved case-by-case. But the line must be drawn from the point of view of the possible victim(s). I will discuss this further in the section about othering.

Following the outline above, I would define racism as the unequal, dismissive, suspicious, hostile, patronizing, or condescending behaviour, beliefs, or attitudes towards certain people, based on their real or imagined belonging to a racially, ethnically, or culturally defined group that is seen as essentially different from one’s own.

Figure 1. *Racism*



Prejudice and discrimination

As Simon Goodman and Lottie Rowe (2014, p. 34) have pointed out, the terms racism and prejudice are often used as synonyms. Most researchers (see: Braham, 2003, pp. 259-260; Goldberg, 1993, p. 104; Zick et al., 2011, p. 28), nevertheless, follow the literal meaning of the word, "prejudging", judging in beforehand, and define prejudice as negative attitudes, beliefs, or feelings towards certain groups of people. I share their view, and further point out that when defined this way, prejudice is not thought to include behaviour or actions. It is solely about emotions, attitudes, and beliefs. This, I think, is the main difference between prejudice and racism.

Contrary to prejudice, discrimination is expressly about actions and behaviour. It is about treating someone differently than others because they belong to a certain group (Braham, 2003, p. 260; Brune, 2004, p. 49, p. 342; Cashmore, 1996, pp. 305-306; Fitzgerald, 2016, p. 11; Taguieff, 2008, pp. 216-217). Sometimes, however, discrimination can also be a consequence of non-differential treatment – for example, if everyone is offered a similar opportunity of using stairs to reach a restaurant, people with physical disabilities may be unable to enter (Scheinin, 1996, p. 11). Today's racism is often about this kind of non-differential discrimination: everyone is given the same opportunity without recognizing their different starting points or obstacles (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Omi & Winant, 1994).

I would define the term discrimination as "disadvantaging treatment."

The line between racism and discrimination is not clear-cut. If a person is mugged because they belong to a certain group, the act could hardly be described as "disadvantaging treatment." Again, I don't think "disadvantaging treatment" would be an apt way of describing slavery, but it would be an apt way to describe an instance of someone being paid less than someone else for doing the same work. Thus, I would not use the term discrimination for the gravest instances of racist behaviour or actions. For them I would choose other expressions, for example, racist violence, oppression, or exploitation.

Othering

Othering is about pointing out differences. Differentiating between "us" and "them" is, of course, a natural part of identity building, but only to a certain extent. Kristina Boréus (2006, p. 420) describes othering to be a matter of degree. When the "others" are seen as being rather like "us", the degree of othering is low. When they are seen as differing from "us" in important ways, the degree of othering is high.

In my opinion, when the term othering is used, the idea of harmful difference making is already present. I see the line between innocuous building of identity and harmful othering to be in the truth-value that is granted to the image of the other. Most of us know how those people are who live in the town next to ours. Not very smart, bad drivers, lousy hockey players, cheap, and so on. But when we meet people from the neighbouring town, we don't truly expect them to be different from us. We know that our image of them is made of stereotypes and exaggerations, even though we almost believe it to be true. Instead, when othering becomes harmful, the stereotypes and exaggerations are seen as truthful facts.

Othering is often well-meaning and non-intentional, for example, when a person of colour is asked "Where are you from?" (and, after the answer "From Helsinki," is asked a follow-up question: "Yes, but *originally*?"). If racism is thought to be malevolent or intentional, this kind of behaviour would not be seen to be racism. Yet, there are numerous non-malevolent and non-intentional ways of letting a person know they are not truly a part of "our" culture, "our" nation, "our" country (Adam, 2015, pp. 453-454; Hirsch, 2018b), and this sort of non-intentional othering is extremely central to the modern-day forms of racism (Trepagnier, 2011). As long as certain forms of behaviour are seen to be "only othering," in the sense of "not racism," they are easy to deprecate. For example, when writer Afua Hirsch tried to share her daily experiences of micro-aggressions and othering in a TV show, a white co-panelist told her: "If it's well-intentioned, it's not racism" (Hirsch, 2018a). In my opinion, othering is already a form of racism, and the topmost authority for defining the limits of what constitutes racism and what doesn't, should always be the victim. If the dominant group claims it as its right to state: "This is not racism," it exonerates the many constant, subtle forms of oppression and exclusion minorities face all the time.

Xenophobia

The term xenophobia comes from Greek words *xénos* (ξένος), meaning stranger, and *phóbos* (φόβος), meaning fear, forming the concept "fear of strangers". In psychology, the term *phobia* is used to denote a fear out of proportion, often towards an imagined danger. But xenophobia is not a clinical psychological term, and it is hardly ever used in the sense of an actual fear. Instead, it is used to describe a combination of aversion, dislike, fear, or hatred towards foreigners (Bleich, 2011, p. 1586; Gindro, 2003b, p. 331; Tafira, 2011, p. 115; Taguieff, 2008, p. 223; Wallerstein, 1991, p. 32).

I would be very cautious in using the word xenophobia – or any other phobia-suffixed words, like Islamophobia or Muslimophobia – for three reasons: First, because xenophobia is usually used as a synonym for racism, which makes it a euphemism (Banton, 1996, p. 382; Tafira, 2011, p. 114). Racism is a phenomenon that transforms itself all the time, making it hard to notice and fight (Fitzgerald, 2016, p. 11; Sundstrom & Kim, 2014, p. 33). Many are eager to claim that racism is a marginal problem, even a thing of the past, at least in

their own society (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, p. 2; Coates, 2011a, p. 7). A phenomenon like this should not be further blurred by using euphemisms. Second, since the term xenophobia holds the idea of fear, anyone can defend themselves against the accounts of racism by explaining their "xenophobic" behaviour as a natural and understandable reaction to a stranger (Gindro, 2003b, p. 331; Bernasconi, 2014, p. 6). As a result, the responsibility for racism is taken away from the racist and laid on the victim: "It's not that I'm a racist, it's that you're frightening." Third, the term xenophobia implies that a fearful reaction to a group is at least partly grounded in reality, the best example being the current "Islamophobia." It involves a nuance that there is, indeed, some aspects in Islam that give credence for the fearful – and often hostile – attitudes towards Muslims (Taras, 2012, p. 113).

I would define xenophobia to be the common but irrational fear towards the "other" that forms a part of racist attitudes and feelings (prejudice) and that gives momentum and justification for the ideology of racism.

Much of the fear we feel towards the "other" is due to the racist representations that circulated in Europe at the era of the crusades and later, during the colonization of Africa, America, and Asia. Justifying the domination, massacre, and enslavement of the conquered people required that those people be depicted as savage, bestial, licentious, and deceitful (Isaksson & Jokisalo, 2005, pp. 40-41, pp. 56-81; Miles 1989, pp. 17-30). The image became tragically persistent.

Irrational fear is something that unfortunately bedevils us all (Gindro, 2003b, p. 331). But our responsibility is to confront the fear and its absurdity, not the other person or group.

I would confine the use of the term xenophobia to instances where the emphasis is solely on the aspect of fear. A good example would be a text by Carolina S. Boe and Karina Horsti (2019, p. 199). They described a situation in a Norwegian border-town Kirkenes where asylum seekers entered the country from Russian side of the border. The inhabitants of the town used solidarity and political action "against xenophobia, which [was] … perceived to be generated by politicians from the political centers who care[d] little about the experiences of locals …"

How are the terms related?

Below (Figure 2), I have placed the four terms, prejudice, othering, xenophobia, and discrimination, in the earlier chart of racism (see Figure 1). As demonstrated in the graph, I understand the four terms to be parts and forms of racism.

I see both prejudice and othering to coincide with the first two parts of the ideology-side of racism: segregation (1) and superiority (2).

In *prejudice*, people are seen as belonging to separate groups (part 1a) with presupposed qualities and characteristics (part 1b) that make the groups essentially different from each other (part 1d). Those qualities have to be fixed and unchanging (part 1c), otherwise it would not be possible to make presumptions of the members according to their group membership. The "others'" defining qualities and characteristics are considered to be negative (2 Superiority), rendering the "others" inferior to us, because prejudice is expressly about negative beliefs, feelings, and attitudes.

Othering, on the other hand, emphasizes difference (1 Segregation). The superiority-position (2) may also be present, but is not necessary. The pointing out differences suffices to make a person feel like they don't belong, or they aren't a truly a part of "us". Othering

can be done with good intentions, and those who are doing the othering, are often unable to see their own attitudes or beliefs, which, nevertheless, may be very lucid to the subject. But othering can also be intentional and malevolent. Unlike prejudice, it can involve deeds, such as exclusion, slurs, or institutional practices and policies.

Xenophobia is present in all three parts of the ideology side of racism. First, it is generated by the idea of fundamental difference between groups of people (1 Segregation). Second, the "others" must be seen as being somehow inferior to "us" (for example, morally or behaviourally) — otherwise there would be nothing to be afraid of (2 Superiority). And third, very often the injustice that minority members encounter every day is consciously or unconsciously rationalized with their fearful qualities (3 Justification of injustice).

The fourth term, *discrimination*, deals with the behaviour-side of racism. It covers (at least in part) such individual actions as racist slurs or exclusion, and such institutional actions as oppression and disadvantaging practices and policies.

Figure 2. *Racism, discrimination, othering, prejudice and xenophobia*



Conclusion

In this article I have offered insights into differentiating between five related terms: racism, discrimination, prejudice, othering, and xenophobia. I suggest that racism is an umbrella term covering the four other terms. Discrimination would denote racist actions that can be defined as "disadvantaging treatment," prejudice would cover racist feelings, attitudes, and beliefs. Othering would be the pointing out that someone does not belong to "us." Xenophobia is the aspect of fear that forms an essential part of racist feelings and attitudes. However, very often xenophobia is only used as a euphemism for racism, a use which I find highly objectionable.

Philomena Essed (2004, pp. 120-124) and Teun A. van Dijk (1999, p. 147) have described the difficulties scholars face in academia if they use the word racism in their research. As van Dijk wrote: "At most, we may be allowed to examine prejudice or forms of discrimination." One of Essed's colleagues chose to substitute racism with terms like "prejudice" and "stereotypes" in order to avoid the strong opposition caused by the r-word. Essed suspected that researchers here in Scandinavia might face similar responses, since racism is a relatively new subject in our public discourse – and, according to my experience, she seems to have been right. But the terms used in research should, of course, not be chosen according to the feelings they may cause in fellow academics. The least a racism researcher can do is call the enemy by its name.

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SPATIAL GOVERNANCE ACROSS BORDERS

Edit Soós

Abstract: The study analyses the spatial logics of EU border externalisation practices. What is meant by cross-border space? The purpose of the study is to apply the concept of space to cross-border relations and to acquire novel interpretations.

Since cross-border cooperation has been growing, it has been mainly developed at an institutional level. Little has been said about the possible influence of informal relations and communication technologies which has brought forward new spatial experiences. In this context the study examines the nature of border networks and how they are interconnected with the institutional cross-border cooperation.

Keywords: spatial integration, cross-border space, public authority, info-communication technology, EGTC network

Introduction

European territorial development objectives date back to the European Spatial Development Perspective and were further detailed in the Territorial Agenda 2020 (TA, 2020). TA 2020 highlights that integrating territories is crucial for fostering competitiveness. Barriers can inhibit the full use of resources in border regions, which increases their peripheral position. The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) was introduced in 2006 to overcome barriers and assist public authorities in different Member States looking to implement actions across national boundaries. The EGTC instrument is a European cooperation structure with a legal personality, defined by European law and designed to facilitate and promote territorial cooperation in the European Union. EGTCs fulfil many different purposes, all of which aim to add value through long-term territorial cooperation, contribute to implementing European territorial cooperation programmes and Cohesion policy projects as well as other European, national and regional projects, enhancing economic, social and territorial cohesion.

The cross-border cooperation itself presupposes that there exists a certain 'obstacle' that is the border, that has to be overcome. Borders are specific elements of space, which cut historically, geographically, socially, politically homogenous space, preventing interactions between the two sides of the border.

The borders are in a process of functional differentation, which implies that there is less overlap between economic, social, legal, political and identity spaces. (Schobben & Boschma, 2000, p. 126) Internal borders no longer function as functional obstacles in the EU. The European integration has been an economic integration for a long period, but since

the 1990s it has moved along functional lines, where the market has played an important role. EU regional policy became an important functional area of EU governance. Through European policies the internal political process and administraive structure of the nation states are changing. The EU accomodates more and more functional policy areas, each with its own charateristics and institutional regulations.

EGTCs as a networking platform support policy and activity coordination, can also contribute to the reduction of the separating role of borders, the elimination of the periphery character, the re-establishment of the previous economic-spatial structural and settlement relations, and the strengthening of the cohesion of border regions.

The study analyses the spatial logics of EU border externalisation practices. What is meant by cross-border space? The purpose of the study is to apply the concept of space to cross-border relations and to acquire novel interpretations.

The 1st section examines how EGTCs can promote spatial integration and cross-sectoral policy integration. The 2nd section evaluates the role of the EGTC as a public authority in the development of cross-border space. May EGTCs facilitate shaping the border areas? The 3rd section addresses the possible influence of informal relations and communication technologies which have brought forward new spatial experiences.

The study is based on the examples of the Comittee of the Regions' EGTC monitoring reports and additional close communication with the EGTCs, extracting and linking key findings from existing research and practice.

Spatial Integration of the Cross-Border Areas

'Spatial development across national borders is one of the central aims of European political integration.'(Chilla, Sielker & Othengrafen, 2017, p. 7) An EGTC as an acknowledged legal entity can promote the cross-border institutionalisation, thus re-bordering the cross-border space. (Klatt, 2018, p. 3)

The transposition and the implementation of EGTC legislation requires harmonisation of legislation with a view to overcoming cross-border obstacles and facilitating the EGTCs in creating a new, shared space across the borders. (Svensson & Ocskay, 2016, p. 120)

The basic problem with different forms of collaboration in the past was that the cooperating organizations had to establish their proper contacts in a particularly heterogeneous administrative environment. As a result of the differing status of local and regional bodies in Member States, competences that are regional on one side of a border can be national on the other. The different legal and administrative systems of the connected countries comprised the root causes of many difficulties. It was essential for the development of institutions' operative relations that all participants had the same jurisdiction and legitimacy.

The EGTC is a new alternative to increase the efficiency, legitimacy and transparency of the activities on the cross-border area. In accordance with Article 5(1) of the Regulation 1082/2006, '*the EGTC shall acquire legal personality on the day of registration or publication*' at national level.

An EGTC is a formalised structure of cooperation partnership along the border. Each EGTC has a specific structure with an assembly, which is made up of the representatives of its members, headed by a director, who represents the EGTC and acts on its behalf. The Convention may provide for additional organs with clearly defined powers, e.g. senate,

permanent secretariat and administratve staff, commissions and thematic working groups or experts. The succes of an operative structure is measured through the availability of funding: the operation of these institutions can be financed by membership fees, common tender incomes and direct subventions of the state. The major funding source is the ERFA of the EGTC-projects. The 2014-20 legislative framework has consolidated the role of EGTCs, with €10 billion available for European territorial cooperation.

In the past all policies with cross-border dimension have traditionally been directed by the central authorities on bilateral and multilateral basis. In accordance with Article 3(1) of Regulation 1082/2006 members of the EGTC must be Member States, regional or local authorities or other bodies, governed by public law. The EGTC regulation is the first example among EU regulations in the course of which a legal instrument grants special rights to local, regional and national public law institutions of different Member States in order to develop unified structures with legal personality in the border areas.

Which actions on the ground can make an EGTC an appropriate legal and institutional tool in the cross-border space?

In accordance with Article 3(2) of Regulation 1082/2006 an EGTC shall be made of members located on the territory of at least two Member States. An EGTC as an acknowledged legal identity can obtain better visibility and improved acceptance by other public authorities. It is a major tool to achieve territorial cohesion not only in the form of coordinating plannig, but also by coordinating development in various public policy sectors. EGTCs play an important planning role in functional areas such as public health, research and technology, transport, people-to-people actions, culture, education, and investments in territorial and social cohesion (human resource development, business-related infrastructure).

Development of the Cross-border Space

Drawing up and implementing EU public policies presuppose the building-up of a European Political Space. The major development towards a European Political Space was the ’horizontal’ opening of the Member States’ legal and political systems. Spatial integration means the complete removal of the obstacles, (Bufon, 2011, p. 41) since internal borders no longer function as functional obstacles in the EU.

The European Political Space is emerging along the dimensions of the European Public Space and the European Administrative Space.

European Public Space

The development of the European Public Space is a mere top-down process. The impacts that EU level institutions, policies and policy-making have on institutions, policies, policy-making and politics at the national level of governance is an overly narrow usage of the term. The bottom-up approach to Europeanization describes how member states ’upload’ or ’shape’ policies, politics and institutions of the European Union. (Nguyen, 2011, p. 141)

The development of European public policies is not a question of translating European or national objectives into local or regional actions, but it must also be understood as a ‘bottom-up’ process for integrating the objectives of local and regional authorities in the strategies of the European Union. Local and regional authorities throughout the European

Union have the responsibility for providing a wide range of services to the public. Currently, nearly 95,000 local and regional authorities have significant powers in key sectors. (CoR White Paper, 2009, p. 3)

The integrated place-based form of cross-border cooperation is based on territorial governance. Territorial governance is rather formalised and quite stable with respect to time and space. The most important feature is the territorial nature of its functioning both in the international dimension and the intersectoral dimension. In an ideal type of territorial governance, the lines of interaction are predominantly vertical, the information flows primarily through central authorities to the national borders.

In contrast, the functional governance is characterized by the opposite features. In an ideal-type of functional governance both boundaries, the territorial and the sectoral, are blurred. Emerging policy-networks are major structural characteristics of the EGTCs. (EGTC EUCOR – The European Campus; Cerdanya Cross-Border Hospital EGTC)

With respect to tensions between 'territorial space' and 'functional space', there is no single optimal space. Interdependent, interorganisational networks along functional lines reflect the changing relations within government and between governmental bodies and non-governmetal actors.

Table 1. *Different types of cross-border governance*
Source: based on Blatter, 2004. p. 534.

Type of governance	Territorial governance	Functional governance
Structural pattern of interaction	hierarchy	network
Centricity	monocentricity	polycentricity
Functional scope	separation of public sector	integration of public and private sectors
Institutional stability	stable with respect to space and time	flexible with respect to space and time

Those authors who use network analysis as a research tool focus on the structural pattern of interactions between actors in order to distinguish hierarchies and networks. (Blatter, 2004, p. 533; Svensson, 2014, p. 85) Other authors (Kenis & Schneider, 1991, p. 25) define networks in contrast to the definition of hierarchies provided by H. Simon. (Simon, 1962, p. 477)

European Administrative Space

Public administration is a key institution of the EGTC' government. The management of public programmes is an integral part of public administration. Public administration is responsible for the management of information, money and personnel to achieve goals developed in the democratic process through which public policies are made and enforced. The public administration structures and regulations vary among the EU Member States.

The Member States are marked by a high degree of close administrative cooperation between all levels of Member States' administrations with the European institutions and bodies in various policy phases. National administrations developed as state-specific structures reflecting different identities, historic traditions of organisation, and certain underlying values such as regionalisation or centralised unification within a state. The

Member States are autonomous in administrative issues, since their administrative systems have developed indigenously and autonomously, and are based on national traditions, administrative culture and the development of democratic systems within individual states.

Despite Member States with diferent legal traditions and various systems of administration, the implementation of EU law and the Europeanization of national administrative law, the exchange of information have bought forward certain approximation in the organisation of administrative structures. (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Art. 176D)

The term 'European Administrative Space' (EAS) has been used to describe an increasing convergence of administrations and Europeanisation of the Member States' administrative structures.

The development of the European Administrative Space, as an informal entity, based on different national legal and administrative frameworks, refers to a set of common principles that guide the activity within national public administration in all Member States. Rule of law, as legal certainty and predictability of administrative actions and decisions, which refers to the principle of legality as opposed to arbitrariness in public decision-making and to the need for the respect to the legitimate expectations of individuals. Openness and transparency aim at ensuring the sound scrutiny of administrative processes and outcomes and its consistency with pre-established rules. Accountability of public administration to other administrative, legislative, or judicial authorities is aimed at ensuring compliance with the rule of law. Efficiency in the use of public resources and effectiveness is accomplishing the policy goals established in legislation. (Kovač, 2017, p. 10)

The above principles represent the foundation for the European Administrative Space and the convergence and coherence of public administration are reflected through the implementation of these standards in legislation and especially in practice. In most Member States, these principles are enforced by their national constitution and included in administrative legislation (civil servant act, local administration act, administrative procedures) and also in financial control systems, internal and external audit and public procurement. (Cioclea, 2012, p. 290)

The extent to which EU Member States share the public administration principles and values serve as preconditions for a closer integration among them and determine the degree of compatibility amongst their administrative systems.

Cross-border Space

The development of the European Administrative Space refers to the distinct, but interconnected dimension of cross-border space. Through the creation of legal frameworks, partners from different countries and at different administrative levels can collaborate at local, regional and national levels and make joint decisions and take actions.

The evolving EGTC network constitutes the complementing added value. EGTCs are new actors exercising public authority in the administrative space. The added value of EGTCs is that they facilitate structuring the European Administrative Space in the border areas, by building the pillars of the EAS.

This process in itself posed no threat to the operating system of central state administration since the aim was not to create a new, independent level of administration, but to connect already existing levels of administration for cooperation (AEBR, 2000, B1, 9)

The EGTC regulation is completed by national provisons adopted by each Member State. EGTCs shall be made up of members within the limits of their competences under national law, although the European integration and domestic decentralisation/regionalisation in the borderlands are challenging the dominance of national administrations in cross-border areas. For example, the development of EGTC membership is not only affected by new EGTCs, as well as joining and leaving members, but also by administrative reforms. Mergers between administrative territories and administrations have reduced the number of EGTC members in some cases. That is why the number of EGTC members is lower in 2017 although no public authority has left the EGTCs. This refers in particular to regional and local authorities. Without these administrative reforms, the number of EGTC members would be slightly higher in 2017.

EGTCs have legal basis and few internal regulations (Convention, Statute) and procedures. Therefore, they can be created and adjusted in flexible ways and are fluid institutions with respect to time and space. But there is no 'one size fits all' model. Complementing the national administrative levels the evolving EGTC network have a significant mobilizing capacity, possibility to network with other EGTCs and a tremendous transformational power.

Communication, proximity, close to the ground

What does civil society and local governments expect on the ground where the EGTC is close to where cross-border problems occur?

In accordance with the Register of European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation, from the entry into force of the EGTC Regulation 1082/2006 in July 2006 until the end of 2017 in he Member States 68 EGTCs were established, involving more than 561 local and 81 regional authorities, and 6 national authorities. (EGTC monitoring report, 2017, p. 136) As regards the citizens these EGTCs have a direct impact on the lives of more than 40 milion European citizens.

Many EGTCs are still little known both among policy actors and the citizens, the first decade of the regulation and its usage in the borderlands made these bodies known and with the support of policy actors have a better claim to their legitimacy.

Respondents living in the border regions were asked whether they were aware of any EU-funded cross-border cooperation activities in their area. Although almost one-third (31%) have heard about these activities most respondents have not heard of these activities in their region (68%). Awareness is the highest in the Czech Republic (50%), Hungary (48%), and Ireland and Bulgaria (both 43%), and the lowest in Cyprus (13%) and the UK (14%). (European Commission, 2015, p. 6)

EGTCs, which were founded in the interest of the citizens and to serve the people in the border areas, are still facing real challenges, and there remains a lot to be done to disseminate information to citizens about their activity.

Efforts made on European, national and subnational levels:

1. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) runs a European Register of EGTCs and puts in place measures to ensure greater visibilty for newly created EGTCs. The activities of EGTCs in Europe called up the creation of the EGTC Platform in the CoR. Since its launch on 28 January 2011 it has integrated the political and technical representatives of all the existing EGTCs, as well as associations and other

experts and stakeholders. It aims to allow all the stakeholders to exchange their experiences and good practices, to improve communication on EGTC opportunities and challenges.

2. Member States use various means to promote the EGTC instrument as a tool for territorial cooperation and to foster communication and coordination among authorities. Many approval authorities provide information online: it ranges from basic information about what an EGTC is and contact details, to guidance documents.
3. An EGTC being an institution with legal personality provides better access to EU information that can be communicated to members who are often local or regional authorities. The top-down information flow helps members with their daily work. The cross-border or transnational character of EGTCs also helps communicate the European added-value.

EGTCs often act as a reliable and sustainable communication channel.

- EGTC Eurocity of Chaves-Verín (2007) implemented a cross-border IP telecommunications network. Efficient, well designed and balanced intellectual property (IP) systems are a key lever to promote investment in innovation and growth in the crss-border region.
- Groupement Européen de Coopération Territoriale West Vlaanderen/Flandre-Dunkerque-Côte d'Opale (2009) facilitates new networks between its stakeholders. Topics dealt with in 2018 were economic development, water and flood management, spatial planning, public services and citizen participation.
- The development of the info-communication network is a special activity of the Banat Triplex Confinium EGTC (2011). The InfoBanat project aims to apply innovative info-communication technologies, to develop and implement a Web application that will serve as a virtual card with additional services, a Web portal and physical infrastructure. Promoting cross-border cooperation between institutions and citizens the portal will provide information about the system and offer general content management functions, tailored to the preferences of each user.

Aware of the challenges that the European Union faces and of the need to develop solutions that meet the needs of citizens (Athens Charter, 2018, p. 1) EGTCs still seem to be far away from their citizens, despite the various attempts to remap common and cross-border space in the EU. (Houtum & Strüver, 2002, p. 144)

In addition, more can be done to modernise public administration, achieve cross-border interoperability and facilitate easy interaction with citizens. Ensuring communication with the public in a consistent and coordinated manner, using the most effective and efficient media channels, communicating with politicians and civil servants has already been solved partly since 2006, but more needs to be done. And this is the responsibility of those local- and regional-level practitioners and authorities who will ultimately bear the task of adjusting to the future shape of the border area, the accuracy of information depicting the situation on the ground.

Conclusions

1. EGTCs are often bringing together public authorities, administrative levels and policy sectors from different countries. The overarching objective of an EGTC is to facilitate cooperation between partners along the borders and to strengthen integrated spatial development. Stimulating endogenous development potentials and catering policy to local circumstances by fostering bottom-up processes could represent opportunities and may become building pillars of the cross-border space.
2. Spaces of place like territorial states are no longer the only imaginable basis for creating and defining primary political communities and institutions. Paradigm shift in the cross-border space is determined by functional considerations. We can observe a transition from territorial integration to functional differentiation on the scale of cross-border regions.
   The process of functional differentiation is now becoming even more prominent since national societies are being superseded by a functional logic of integration and differentiation. The emergence of an EGTC as new functional cooperation is aimed at better structuring the cross-border territories.
3. The European integration is becoming differentiated not only by multilevel decision-making and implementation of public policies but also by various groups of Member States. The European administrative convergence of the Member States is a key factor in achieving 'good governance'. The administrative cooperation and improved administrative capacity through business-friendly administration could lead to the reform of the provision of public services and fulfil the expectations of citizens in the field of management of public policies.
4. Communication is key and multilingual communication often creates new opportunities for cross-border integration. EGTCs are increasingly acknowledged as strategic players and suitable actors for promoting the interests of local and regional authorities at EU level, mostly through their networks. Partners that are geographically closely located and that have cooperation experience with each other often develop a common cooperation culture. This holds at times of increasing use of digital communication technologies for bridging large distances, especially if a lot of partners are involved and regular meetings are necessary.

Finally, EGTCs can combine multiple tasks and functions mirroring the versatility of the instrument. Public stakeholders can develop their EGTC in line with their joint needs, at local or national level, focusing on small projects or networking, managing infrastructure or facilitating policy processes.

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ONLINE VOTER COORDINATION AND STRATEGIC SPLIT-TICKET VOTING ON THE 2018 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN HUNGARY

Peter Bence Stumpf

Abstract: Since the democratic transition of 1990, the Hungarian electoral system allows for casting two ballots simultaneously, one for a party list and one for a candidate in a single-member constituency. This feature provides an opportunity for voters to split their tickets supporting a different party and candidate on the same election. While a significant portion of the electorate did use this opportunity before, it was in 2018 that it truly gained political importance. This paper aims to examine how this voting decision was influenced by certain online actors by simple quantitative methods. The comparison of the final results with the recommendations published on four websites clearly indicates that a wide range of voters did follow their advice. However, a causal relationship cannot be determined with full confidence as it is possible that these online sources simply guessed integrative candidates correctly.

Keywords: split-ticket voting, electoral systems, Hungary, online campaigning, voting behavior

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to better understand the 2018 Hungarian general election campaign by examining one of its most politically divisive aspects: the tactical voting. The focus of the study is at the intersection of several distinct but not unrelated topics: tactical or strategic voting, split-ticket voting and voter coordination. The influential interplay of these three factors was made possible by the Hungarian electoral system, the political environment and the increasingly online nature of public discourse on politics.

The political landscape of Hungary before the 2018 elections consisted of a dominant governing coalition by the right-wing Fidesz and KDNP parties, and their fragmented opposition of medium and small left- and right-wing political groups. Due to the mixed nature of the Hungarian electoral system, where the 106 single-member constituencies represent more than half of the 199 seats in the parliament, the heavily divided opposition was seriously disadvantaged. In the first-past-the-post system of the constituencies, forming a single political alliance as a counterpart to the extensively wide and united voting bloc of the ruling parties would have been a viable electoral strategy for the opposition. However, such a move was prevented by the long ideological distance between the main opposition powers (the right-wing Jobbik and the social-democrat MSZP), and the inner conflicts

of the political left. In this situation, a number of public figures and civil organizations decided to advertise the idea of tactical voting. They called for a form of split-ticket voting where citizens dissatisfied with the government would support the strongest challenger of the Fidesz – KDNP candidates regardless of political preference. In practice, this meant that left-wing voters in certain constituencies were encouraged to vote for more popular right-wing Jobbik candidates and vice-versa. The campaign and the final results produced by this political situation present us an intriguing example of how a wide range of voters were willing to vote across ideological lines for a common political goal: removing the reigning government. This article focuses on one specific element of this situation, the effects of online websites created with the sole purpose of facilitating strategic ticket-splitting.

Theoretical framework

The terms tactical and strategic voting are used interchangeably in this article, both referring to the same phenomenon: when due to the expectation that their first choice of party or candidate does not have a chance to win the election, voters cast their ballot for another, less-preferred alternative (Blais & Nadeau, 1996). The theoretical assumption that voters act in such manner was formulated by Duverger (1967) and Downs (1957). The notion that plurality systems in single-member constituencies lead to two-party competition, also known as "Duverger's law" colloquially, is predicated on the Duvergerian equilibrium. According to this theory, in an electoral constituency with the magnitude M, the strongest M + 1 candidates receive all rational votes (Cox, 1997; Crisp et al., 2012). Since in a single member constituency M = 1, we expect a two-party competition, hence Duverger's law. One explanation for this is that voters strive to influence the election outcome, act rationally and select a candidate based on not just personal and political preferences but also according to expected performance at the polls. This, of course, is only one of many competing explanations for voter behavior, one that assumes the electorate acts strategically and not expressively. Empirical research suggests that these different explanations actually overlap in real life (Spenkuch, 2018).

Another central concept of this topic is split-ticket voting. A ticket is split if the voter votes for party A in one contest and party B in another contest (Buren & Helmke, 2009). It can happen vertically, when the two votes are cast for positions in different levels of government. Horizontal ticket-splitting can happen when the voter casts votes for equivalent positions (Campbell & Miller, 1957). An example of possible vertical splitting would be any occasion when different level elections, like legislative and presidential, are held simultaneously. Horizontal splitting is possible in two-vote systems used in Germany, Hungary or Lithuania for parliamentary elections. Splitting can also happen concurrently or non-concurrently (Burden & Helmke, 2009). However, distinguishing non-concurrent ticket-splitting and electoral volatility is not necessarily obvious.

Voter coordination is an expression borrowed from game theory and *nomen est omen* it refers to the interpretation of voter choice as a coordination game. A demonstrative example of voter coordination relevant for this study would be the so-called "Nader trader" vote swapping websites (Southwell, 2004; Hartvigsen, 2006; Crisp et al., 2012) observed during the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections. The optimal outcome for the Democratic Gore and the third-party Nader voters was that Gore wins the presidency and Nader gains 5% of the national vote. Obtaining this outcome required voters to cast their votes tactically,

supporting Gore in competitive states but Nader in non-competitive ones (for a detailed description of these websites see Hartvigsen, 2006). The Hungarian websites in question did not feature vote trading explicitly and instead operated under the assumption that there was a common denominator for all opposition voters, the desire to dismiss the current government. Still, the general idea of coordinating voter choice to influence the nation results is identical.

Measuring tactical split-ticket voting

Even though the electoral system was reformed extensively after 2010, strategic vote splitting remains a somewhat common phenomenon among Hungarian voters ever since 1990. The opportunity for voters to split their electoral support between a more-preferred but weaker and a less-preferred but stronger political alternative arises from the two-ballot system used in the Hungarian parliamentary elections. Voters can choose a candidate in the single-member constituency according to their domicile and also a national party list. Since the 93 seats on the national level are distributed proportionally according to the D'Hondt method, even small parties have a chance of succeeding, given that they reach the 5% electoral threshold. On the other hand, in the plurality system of the 106 single-member constituencies, the winner takes it all, meaning that candidates of smaller political groups rarely stand a chance. In such circumstances it may not come as a surprise that some citizens decide that to reach a favorable election outcome, they have to give their vote to a less preferable but overall more popular candidate. Their willingness to do so may be further increased by the opportunity of still expressing their primary political preference through their other ballot cast for the national lists.

Figure 1. *FTPT and Proportional list shares on the 2018 Hungarian general elections. Based on data published by the National Election Office*



Nonetheless, analyzing this phenomenon is not simple and measuring it precisely is probably impossible. Deviations between the vote totals of candidates and that of their respective party lists indicate tactical vote splitting to a smaller extent, as seen in figure 1.

Since the two Hungarian ballots are physically separate and voting is secret, it is impossible to ascertain which way the votes were split. Even if there is little to no difference between the vote counts of candidates and their lists, it would always be theoretically possible that voters shared their ballots but did so in equal number, thus making it impossible to see in the aggregated results. This problem can be at least partially mitigated by examining the differences at the lowest possible level, that is in polling district results. Another aspect of tactical voting that remains mostly hidden is the direction of these vote transfers. Determining that the supporters of which party decided to split their ballots and who they supported may be obvious in some cases and totally impossible to identify in others.

I recommend a measure that can be used to examine how common tactical vote splitting was. Even though the exact number of split ballots cannot be determined due to the reasons above, it is possible to get an approximate figure that can be used for comparisons and time series analysis. This measure is mathematically identical to Pedersen's index of volatility (Pedersen, 1979) and the Loosemore-Hanby index (Loosemore & Hanby, 1971) used for examining disproportionality. It is calculated as the absolute difference between the vote count of a candidate and its respective national party list in each polling station. The sum of these differences is then divided by two, since extra votes of one candidate are missing ballots of another one in this hypothetically zero-sum game and since absolute differences are used, every split ballot is counted twice. The result is the approximate number of ballots that were split, calculated by this formula:

$$\frac{\frac{\sum\sum(|ev_{i,j} - pv_{i,j}|)}{2}}{\sum LV}$$

where *i* is the polling district, *j* is the candidate, *ev* is the vote count of the candidate, *pv* is the vote count of the respective list of the candidate, and *LV* is the national vote count of all the party lists. To get an index useful for comparison across several elections, the number of split ballots is divided by the total number of votes cast, resulting in a ratio independent of variance in election turnout. There are of course a number of requirements for calculating this measure. First of all, the majority of candidates must be assigned to a national party list. Technically, votes cast for independent candidates (or any candidate without a national party list for that matter) is considered to be a split ballot when calculating the measure. This is not a problem until the vote share of such candidates remains marginal. However, if they receive a considerable number of votes, the value of the index may not make sense anymore. This is not a deficiency of the proposed method but a situation where tactical split-ticket voting is not obviously interpretable. Second, the number of candidate and party list ballots must be close to equal. Missing ballots would probably indicate dissatisfaction with the available options instead of attempts at tactical voting.

Figure 2. *Rate of split-tickets and number of votes cast for candidates without party lists in Hungary. Based on data published by the National Election Office*



By plotting the values of the proposed measure over the Hungarian elections in figure 2, a decreasing and then increasing trend can be identified. To "debug" the measure, the number of votes cast for candidates without party lists is also featured as bars under the ratios represented with the line. For the first few elections, the large vote share of independent candidates explains the high level of split votes and both decrease over time together. However, the dramatic increase in 2018 cannot be explained in the same manner since the two figures dramatically diverge. This indicates that the explanation for ticket splitting must be different for 2018.

Voter coordination in 2018

One fairly challenging aspect of tactical voting is that the results of the elections are uncertain so selecting a winner beforehand is risky. This why voter expectations of the outcome become highly important. Consequently, candidates may seek to influence voters to be perceived by them as the most likely winners. This is a staple of electoral campaigns in general, however the novelty of the 2018 elections was the wide range of political outsiders striving to influence these perceptions. Four different websites were set up for the purpose of coordinating opposition voters and informing them regarding the chances of candidates in the single-member constituencies. These websites were the following: V18, an organization of several public figures and former politicians of various background; Taktikaiszavazás.hu, set up by civilians and Kireszavazzunk.hu. The latter had some indirect ties to the Jobbik party. Finally, rendszerváltás2018.hu was established by Péter Márki-Zay, a politician who won the mayoral seat of a rural city with the support of all opposition political groups. These websites and organizations provided visitors with a list of candidates who had the highest chances of winning relative majority in the constituencies. These sites were featured in national online media outlets and received public attention in the weeks leading up to the election.

The election results

The voter coordination websites were moderately consistent with their recommendations, although only two of them provided a full list of 106 names. All four sites agreed on who the strongest opposition candidate was in 38 out of 106 constituencies. At least three out of four agreed on 54 constituencies. There were only 18 constituencies where there were conflicting recommendations. For the purposes of evaluating the voter coordination effects of the websites, constituencies were categorized as unity, partial or conflicted. In unity constituencies (n = 38), the four websites supported the same candidate. In the partial category (n = 50), there were no conflicting recommendations, however some websites did not support any of the contestants. In the conflicted category (n = 18) the websites provided conflicting recommendations.

Out of the 106 single-member constituencies, opposition candidates won in only 15. However, these 15 candidates were, without one exception, the top scoring, recommended candidates of the websites examined in this study. While 14 belonged to the unity category, in the Budapest 17th constituency the eventual winner was the candidate of the Együtt party who won after several other opposition contestants withdrew. Apparently, the sites themselves would have been poor prediction tools for seat shares. This does not come as a surprise as the original intention behind them was to coordinate opposition voters, recommended candidates were presented as the most likely winners in case of large-scale tactical voting. Although landslide opposition wins by the right candidates in the single-member constituencies would have probably been a great success for the four coordination pages, their effectiveness should not be measured by the number of seats gained.

Table 1. *Recommendations vs. constituency outcomes on the 2018 elections*

		Strongest opposition candidate						
		DK	**Együtt**	**Independent**	**Jobbik**	**LMP**	**MSZP-P**	**Total**
Recommended candidate	**DK**	11			1			**12**
	Együtt		2					**2**
	Independent			2				**2**
	Jobbik				62			**62**
	LMP				1	4		**5**
	MSZP-P				4		19	**23**
	Total	**11**	**2**	**2**	**68**	**4**	**19**	**106**

A better method to assess the effect of the coordination on opposition voting patterns is to look at which candidates came out first among the opposition alternatives. Table 1 indicates that candidates recommended by the websites did beat their opposition rivals in 100 out of 106 races. Apparently, Jobbik was underestimated in 6 constituencies where their candidate came out as the strongest, even though other alternatives were recommended to tactical voters. Otherwise, we can see that the website recommendations were aligned with the election outcome. All candidates in the unity and partial categories came out first. Since the V18 group only provided 53 recommendations, the final results only aligned with their website in 48,11% of the constituencies. However, out of their 53 recommended contestants, 51 came out first, that is 96,23%. The site taktikaiszavazas.hu was right in 93,40% of the constituencies, rendszervaltas.hu in 89,62% and kireszavazzunk.hu in 83,96%.

Notably, two independent candidates both managed to beat all their opposition contestants. According to the measure described and used in this paper, 100% of their votes were tactically split tickets since there is no corresponding party list that could be used for the calculations. This method may be debatable as in both cases the MSZP and the DK supported them by not running any candidates in their respective constituencies. However, these candidates had a right-wing background that set them apart from their allies. Likely that leftist voters supported them for tactical reasons.

Based on this data it is safe to say that coordination recommendations were very close to the final election results. If we resolve the conflicting advice of the websites by considering the most-recommended candidate in each constituency, they align with the final results in 94,34%. This remarkably high proportion can mean two things: that the websites were a highly effective tool of voter coordination, or that they correctly gauged voter preferences to pinpoint the strongest opposition candidates. My hypothesis would be that both were true at the same time. The creators of these pages attempted to follow public opinion and selected candidates who seemed to have wide public support. By publishing their names, they created a positive feedback loop, more or less a self-fulfilling prophecy where more and more people expected the recommended contestants to come out first in the race.

To accept this hypothesis, it is not enough to examine how the final results aligned with the recommendations, as we do not have any information on the tactical nature of the vote. This is important because if the final results only show the sincere political preferences of voters then there was no need for any type of coordination at all. To assess whether there were any strategic or tactical voting patterns present, the relationship between candidate and party list vote shares must be examined. This is where the empirical measures of tactical voting truly become useful. As Figure 2 indicated, tactical split voting was significant on the 2018 elections on the national level. However, split voting is focused on the seats and votes of the single-member constituencies and consequently results aggregated on the national level may hide important details. One such detail would be the extent to which candidates under- or overperformed their corresponding party lists.

Figure 3. *Rate if split tickets (%) and vote share of the strongest opposition candidate (log2)*



There is a very visible trend identifiable on Figure 3 showing the direct proportionality between the total split-ticket ratio and the ratio of the leading opposition candidate's votes to their party lists' votes. The two figures are actually closely related, since no candidate can overperform their respective party list without ticket-splitting. However, the direction of split-ticket voting was obviously tactical as it always increased the strongest opposition candidate's vote share. Several data points exhibit extreme values, these are constituencies where withdrawals strengthened small party contestants who in turn vastly overperformed their respective party lists.

Another interesting information is that the unity / partial / conflict categories do not seem to matter, the different data points are all mixed together without any separation. There are a number of available explanations for this, although we have no means to test them at this time. It is possible that most of the electorate actually preferred one of the websites and the others did not matter – meaning there was always unity from the perspective of the voters. They may have dismissed conflicts and partial recommendations because it seemed obvious which candidate was actually the strongest.

Conclusion

In this paper I attempted to assess how instrumental the four guides were to tactical voting in 2018. Besides descriptive statistics, I applied my own measure derived from Pedersen's volatility index to examine the proportion of split-tickets nationally and by constituency. The results of the analysis clearly show that tactical voting on election day aligned with the recommendations of the coordination guides, however the strength of this relationship is questionable. Other factors not included in the research were probably more influential. Such factors would be the strategic withdrawal of opposition candidates and other means of voter coordination, like expectations presented in local and national media outlets, or direct communication between candidates and constituents. This study was also an experiment of the new measure, and it shed light to some of its methodological deficiencies. Namely, independents and candidates supported by strategic withdrawals can seriously distort the values of the index, even though there is meaningful difference between such situations and pure tactical voting.

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RECONSIDERING THE HUNGARIAN ROMA FRESCO VILLAGE AS PHYSICAL POLITICAL SPACE AND COMMUNICATIVE SPACE

Maria Subert

Abstract: The Hungarian Fresco Village is a unique place, where contemporary painters of Roma/Gypsy origin have created large murals on the back walls of the houses to form a permanent outdoor exhibition. Based on a three months long ethnographic research, I examine visual storytelling, and analyze how the place – the village transformed for a Roma gallery – affects the artistic narratives. I utilize Riessman's (1993, 2008) Narrative Analysis and Dialogic/Performance Analysis. I conclude that the "Roma gallery" represents visual colonization that not merely shares or simplifies Roma visual signifiers with different meaning but exploits them as Roma self-representation.

Keywords: Roma fresco village, Gypsy visuality, Roma art, visual colonization

Introduction

The Hungarian Fresco Village is a unique place where contemporary painters of Roma/Gypsy origin have created large murals on the back walls of houses to form a permanent outdoor gallery. The visual storytelling of these murals about Roma experiences uniquely works together with the physical site and reveal power-dynamics that affect the artists' identity narratives.

The Fresco Village Project (FVP) was begun by a Hungarian woman (I name her Project Leader) who started pondering how Roma/Gypsies (the most disadvantaged ethnic minorities who wandered to Europe in the 14th century) could gain more positive attention. She remembered an Egyptian Nubian village where the poor villagers decorated their houses with wall-paintings that made their village a tourist attraction, and she started organizing a permanent open-air gallery for large murals of contemporary Roma artists in hope this would bring similar development to a Hungarian Roma village (Laborczi, 2012).

After the Project Leader succeeded in lobbying and finding sponsors, she persuaded the mayor and the inhabitants to lend their back walls to the murals, hiring painters of Roma origin to create a "Roma outdoor gallery" of "Roma frescoes." Since then, the village has become known as the Roma "Fresco Village Project."

What do visual narratives in the Fresco Village communicate about the experiences of Roma? How does the gallery, as physical space, affect the artists' narratives? In exploring these questions my purpose is to understand whether the gallery brought the envisioned development to the village.

First, I study a representative mural, then I examine the "Roma gallery." I conclude that the Roma gallery represents a (neo)colonial site that limits the artists instead of "appreciating" them as stated in the FVP's agenda (Gábor, 2011, p. 1).

Since the EU, private, and non-governmental organizations have invested much to increase Roma cultural representation to empower them, it is critical to highlight the role of visual colonization in the Roma's struggle. Further, since the gallery and its effects on cultural identifications has not yet been a subject of communication research, this study has unique value.

Although the politically correct umbrella term for this group of people is "Roma," I also use the terms "Gypsy" and "Roma/Gypsy," because many of my informants self-identify as Gypsy. In quotations, I retain the speaker's word choice.

To protect my informants' confidentiality, this essay uses no real names. fFor the artists' real names I use upper-case letters in alphabetical order; the first painter appears as Painter A (PA), the second as Painter B (PB), etc.

The Context of the Gallery

Based on their cultural differences, Roma faced discrimination in Europe from earliest times. Although from 1958 to 1988 the Hungarian Socialist government handled the Roma as a strictly socio-political issue that made this period a comparatively good time for the Roma people, with the fall of Communism, people lost their jobs and remained unemployed or employed in a community service program (Bősz, 2013). So the village faces chronic poverty and joblessness.

The Project Leader addressed these problems in her initial program and set two goals: "This project [the FVP] has two goals, one global and one local. The global: to create something that our Roma peers could be proud of, and that would give them the majorities' unconditional appreciation. The local aim is to better the living conditions of this people and to create jobs" (Gábor, 2011, p. 1). Yet, every attempt to create jobs in the Fresco Village had failed (Doros, 2015). This is the immediate context of the FVP.

Previous Literature

Contemporary scholars differentiate between vision and visuality (Foster, 1999; Metz, 1975; Riessman, 2008). The social and cultural significance of this difference is that while the human eye is capable of seeing, "how we see, how we are able, allowed, or made to see, and how we see this seeing and the therein" are culturally and socially constructed (Foster, 1999, p. ix).

Moss (2010) asserts that visual representations are sites of identity negotiation for cultural minorities. Baker (2011) identifies "Gypsy visuality" including community/family, home, traditional skills, wildlife, countryside etc. as identity markers for the Roma community. Yet, Poueyto (2008) points out that Roma and non-Roma share visual signifiers of "Romaness" such as "fire, caldron, river, in which a woman washes linen, horse, dog, caravan" etc. that count self-empowerment for Roma but stereotyping for non-Roma (p. 401). Thus, Acton (2006) and Junghaus (2006) propose, Roma visual artists must extend and reject dominant cultural representations and fight for direct access to mainstream audience. However, there is

a gap in previous research: dominant cultural representations do not share or simplify Roma visual signifiers with different meaning but they exploit them as Roma self-representation.

I add to previous research the concept of visual colonization in which, while they pretend to be a Roma self-representation, signifiers of Romaness are strategically misused by non-Roma and capitalized upon from the outside of the cultural community. Accordingly, I define visual colonization as the power of (mis)representation where non-Roma exercise power to propagate "essentialized Roma visuality" and "essentialized Roma identity" for a non-Roma audience. This includes inviting (neo)colonialist gaze that sees and shows Roma as either "savages" or the "Oriental Other" ("demonized Gypsy"), reducing people for a backdrop to an Orientalized scene (space/place), and limiting the artists' rights to stand up and to speak for themselves.

"Essentialized Roma visuality" refers to the non-Roma dissemination of markers of Romaness (horse, caravan, family, traditional occupations etc.) in a supposedly Roma style. "Essentialized Roma identity" means that a people are limited to their Romaness, but denied every other facet of human identity. It also denotes that various stereotypes of the majority society are melded into one imaginary character that considers Romaness the most important part of one's identity. The "essentialist Roma" creates social reality when applied to real persons. For example, with FVP's promotion of the artists and villagers as the exotic "Other," they become fixed in their Romaness, which denies their Hungarian-ness, their European-ness, and ultimately, because it is an artificial identity, denies their human-ness.

Contrary to this, when artists with Roma roots use "markers of Romaness" their aim is to reach into the Roma past to emphasize common roots, to remember a *Gemeinschaft*-like community that they miss in their present majority society. They take the teacher-storyteller's role, recalling this past as images of freedom, at a time when they experience unfreedom (PD and PJ). Yet, as PD criticizes, some painters accepted their assigned subordinate position.

Methods

This study is based on three months of ethnographic research in the Fresco Village and other Hungarian sites. I conducted semi-structured interviews with 35 villagers out of 220, and 10 artists out of 17.

I examined the narratives based on Riessman's (1993) Narrative Analysis, which defines three types of narratives (hypothetical, and habitual narratives, and narratives of past events). During my analysis a new genre emerged; I named it "counter/emancipatory narrative" because it rejects existing dominant narratives while also seeking to liberate Roma from their subordinate position. To analyze my data, I adopted Riessman's (2008) dialogic/performance analysis that requires thematic and structural analyses with special attention to the dialogue between the narrative, the narrator, and the audience and their social, historical and cultural contexts.

Findings and Discussion

First, I discuss PD's mural, which is representative because it was built on the villager's stories. He worked closely with PG, who was artistic director until the Project Leader

separated herself and decided to lead the project alone. PD talks about his arrival in the village:

> I was burning with curiosity, with the desire to paint something monumental. And I thought, this community, and this desire I felt, it was obvious that the two should come together. In other words, what I was going to put on that wall could not be independent of the people who lived there.

This is the important role of location. What the villagers told him, he knows personally, he says.

The emerging first major theme, the Roma's supposed inferiority in the non-Roma world, signifies the artist's and villagers' common experience. "But what do we want?" I hear him asking. "In Ferguson, Missouri, black people are rioting over the killing of a black boy who was shot by a white police officer, so 'What do we want?' Everyone has good and bad sides, but blacks and the Roma are viewed as if they had only a bad side."

Next, PD outlines a colonial setting: "How can a Roma person trust a Hungarian when we are always talked down to, always told what to do and how to do it?" This "always" reveals habitual narrative, the Hungarian habit of discriminating against Roma.

> MS: You say that this village could mean some kind of standing up for the Roma. Why is it framed in the conditional tense?
> PD: To be honest, there were some among us, who painted in a way the white man gave the paintbrushes and the paint color. They fulfilled the oppressor's expectations. I wasn't one of them.

PD begins openly to use a post-colonialist vocabulary stressing the words "white" and "oppressor," and laments that a few artists "sold themselves" to them. PD argues that questions like "Who can help?" and "How can one help?" and "Why is it necessary to help?" are difficult questions. If helpers build only upon the need for assistance, it is not helpful. Indeed, "It is humiliating. It only reinforces their weakness," PD says. So, the FVP project seems to have a double life. Internationally, it provides publicity and more funding. At the local level, as PD notes, "it does not help."

PD's mural is nearby the village's end. There stands one main figure in the foreground, with many faces and figures in the mural's background, which consists of villagers' habitual narratives broken into mosaic-like fragments.

In the left upper corner, we see the painter's self-portrait, paintbrush in hand; behind him a baby is born. From left to right we can see a silver face. Around her cluster usurious lenders. Big and smaller faces line up in the background–each resembling someone the villagers know. Around the main figure's arm, three people appear, imitating the gestures of the three wise monkeys: speak no evil, see no evil, hear no evil. So, the artist "reports" things that he cannot see, hear and tell even if he saw, heard and said. This tension echoes the fragmented structure. Yet, we can identify fragmentation also as repetition, a signifier that these events happen repeatedly, for generations. There are identifiable characters, but no stories are "told" about them. The villagers know "This is Gyöngyi, who was arrested for prostitution, which she entered in order to feed her children," and so on. Though the viewers see only the "first frame," they know the rest.

But at the mural's center, the dark-skinned main figure stands before the people. He is thin but strong: his body is muscular. He wears a linen cloth wrapped around his body, similar to the Indian dhoti. He looks straight into the viewers' eyes with determined face

and glowing eyes. PG says, the main figure neither asks nor orders, he merely presents himself and the villagers:

> I get up every morning and spread my arms wide and rid myself of all my preconceptions and prejudices even if I got a couple of slaps in the face the day before, because I am a Gypsy by birth. Yes, you do get slaps in the face, and of course you feel them, but I can't live like that, closing myself off, being suspicious. So I have to strive to remain open, to face the world with my arms spread wide. That's what it stands for, that figure with his arms spread wide.

PD's encounter shows an individual and a collective struggle. We must distinguish between two messages here. First, "I/we welcome everyone," and second, "Although non-Roma regularly slap me, I force myself to welcome everyone." The former is free of struggle, the second is full of struggle. To welcome someone who slaps me is a Jesus- or Gandhi-like gesture. Thus, PD rejects stigmatization and shows Roma/Gypsies strong to stand up for themselves. The artist here emancipates the Gypsies.

The Project Leader interpreted PD's picture very differently:

> The message of this painting is that "here we are with our misery, problems, jealousy, and pain." And, in my opinion, this painting, though it is not very similar but, for me, it is the Gypsy *Guernica*.

She understands the picture as a symbol of misery like Picasso's *Guernica*. With this, she not only overlooks PD's critique of the "Roma's supposed inferiority" and the "colonial setting" but enforces it. She also overlooks the counter/emancipatory narrative of the mural, that "Roma need to stand up for themselves" instead of having the FVP stand up for them. As the artist has no other way to contradict this interpretation, ignoring his messages is a political act.

Second, I examine how PD's mural "fits" into the Roma gallery. In the concepts of the "Roma gallery," "Roma art," and "Roma artist," the word "Roma" is not used as the umbrella term or a kinship identifier, for these terms allow (even demand) self-identification. As the FVP uses the term, there is no room for self-identification. If one was born Roma and is a painter, he/she is a Roma painter even if he/she identifies differently; accepting this was a precondition to apply for this project. This reveals the essentialism that considers race and ethnicity the essential part of individual identity.

The FVP expects the paintings to "fit" into the gallery where artists (and villagers) are expected to demonstrate a distinct "Gypsy culture" to satisfy visitors and comply with the VFP's generalized Roma image. However, out of ten interviewed artists, eight openly criticized the Roma label in "Roma artist," and "Roma fine arts." The label was assigned by a non-Roma in the interest of exoticizing and commodifying Roma experiences. PI considers this assigned identity both politically and morally inappropriate:

> No one has the right to categorize artists on an ethnic basis. Like segregation in schools. The moment we create a Gypsy class, we start teaching on a lower level. So why is segregation allowed on an ethnic basis in fine arts? It is not us saying, we have such and such a style, it is other people saying it. This is an ethno business [that excludes the artists]

PI and his peers (PG, PJ) call this "compulsory Romanization/folklorization," a "ghettoization" of art and the community, where artists (and villagers) are limited to an

essentialized [false] Roma-ness and confined within the walls of the hegemonic image of their culture. Thus, six of the ten painters I interviewed said they resisted painting romanticized Roma topics in some specific Roma style that would immediately connect the viewer to their Romaness.

Finally, the spatial situation (the actual site, including the visitors' tour) is significant. Gypsy homes are not considered a "home." When individual spaces/places become public spaces/places, Roma properties are controlled by the FVP as non-Roma territories (Tonn et al., 1993). "Roma Ownership" is totally erased: the painters waived their rights and left; in the village, no one knows who owns the murals.

Hence, the Project Leader's well-intentioned idea to exchange the dominant Hungarian stereotype, "criminal gypsy," for another stereotype she thought positive, "romanticized Gypsy," turned out to be a bad idea. Both concepts revert to the same Romantic 18th and 19th century tradition. While the "criminal gypsy" stemmed from the uncivilized, antisocial "savage" image, the romanticized version visualized Gypsies as "loyal" to their nomadic freedom. The romanticizing perspective invented the "demonized Gypsy," who exhibits extraordinary talent "by nature" in music and dance (Brown, 1985). Amplified by the gallery's location in a Roma village, the same characteristic is assigned to the painters by the FVP. These identities are two ends of the same continuum, different names that signify the same artificial identities that "immobilize, mold, and reduce" real, individual human beings (Frye, 1983). Thus, the Roma outdoor gallery may be seen as a visual colonization where the FVP exercises the power to promote both an "essentialized Roma visuality" and "essentialized Roma."

Conclusion

Transforming the village into the "Roma Fresco Village," the FVP affects the artistic narratives in two ways. First, the concept of a "Roma Gallery" (as the Project Leader enforces it) presupposes a "Roma art" – that Roma people always illustrate their "Roma life experiences" in a "Roma style." This stereotype silences the artists. Second, there is a problem with "Roma artist" because it is not only essentialist but, covertly, emphasizes that "Romaness" is biologically defined. One remains Roma even if he or she identifies differently. Therefore, in her gallery, the Project Leader is unwilling to give up the central importance of the artists' "Romaness" even after many artists have rejected this label. This leads me to conclude that, although many artists talked about "Roma experiences" in the village, they cannot be limited exclusively to this Roma identity and these experiences (PA, PB, and PJ). They are more than this. The artists always communicate about general human experiences.

Next, connected to the gallery, the FVP attempts to establish a "Roma brand" that capitalizes upon and, in a way, commodifies Roma poverty. This is implied by the location: a dead-end settlement where people in poverty are a necessary background to the murals. In this way, the FVP transforms poverty into a deceitful signifier of Romaness, a salable commodity to the tourist market. Similarly, the gallery commodifies the artists as "extraordinary Other" (or the "demonized" Gypsy), so the Project Leader could not give up the importance of the artists' Roma origin, since this was fundamental in Orientalizing the artists and making them part of a tourist attraction.

Accordingly, the Hungarian Roma Fresco Village is a physical political and communicative space where the Project Leader has the exclusive power to propagate an "essentialized Roma visuality" – that is, the non-Roma dissemination of stereotypical markers of Romaness from the outside of the cultural community. The FVP invites the (neo) colonizing gaze of a non-Roma audience. Consequently, the "Roma gallery" represents visual colonization that not merely simplifies Roma visual signifiers with different meanings but exploits them as Roma self-representation. With this, it limits the artists' rights and their power to stand up and speak for themselves to reject dominant cultural representations and fight for direct access to mainstream audience.

Thus, the FVP's visual colonization is the fundamental difference between the Hungarian Fresco Village and the Egyptian Nubian village, which, according to the Project Leader, originally inspired the FVP. In Egypt, the villagers themselves decorated their own houses as they chose, according to their heritage, individual tastes, and freedom. Their everyday spaces were not reorganized by an outsider. Unlike in the FVP, no outsider moved into their village to manage the wall-paintings, the community or the people's lives from a "higher" position. The two projects, the Nubian and the Roma Fresco Village, led to opposite results. One enables the villagers and artists to flourish, the other compels them to resist individual, cultural, and political stereotyping or accept the assigned subordinate position.

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DIASPORA DIPLOMACY: THE CASE OF THE VIETNAMESE DIASPORA LIVING IN HUNGARY IN THE DIASPORA DIPLOMACY

Réka Brigitta Szaniszló

Abstract: To sum up in one sentence: diaspora diplomacy is an opportunity for individuals to participate in foreign policy. However, the simplification of this phenomenon is a mistake scientifically. Nowadays diasporas are increasingly active in politics, furthermore in diplomacy. Three explanation for this phenomenon can be drawn up: (1) the states' recognition of diasporas' potential, (2) the transformation of the states' role in international relations and (3) the transformation of diplomacy's interpretation: With the spread of mass communication, public diplomacy became crucial as a form of communication in inter-state relations. The paper aims to demonstrate the definition, types and importance of diaspora diplomacy and present an example for diaspora diplomacy: the case of Vietnamese diaspora living in Hungary in the Hungarian diplomacy.

Keywords: diaspora, diplomacy, international relations, Hungary, Vietnam.

Introduction

The actors of the inter-state network shape the system of international relations through the institutions of the system. The individual, as a category of actors in international relations, and foreign policy, as an institution of inter-state relations, is the most distant actor-institution pair; on the surface. The practice of foreign policy is traditionally part of the competences of a state. However, the combination of mass culture and the accelerating globalisation in the last decades of the 20th century has modified the classic interpretation of the relationship between individuals and foreign policy (Mingst, 2011). Diaspora diplomacy can be a new opportunity of participation for individuals in foreign policy, in the shaping of international relations.

The purpose of this study is to present and substantiate the meaning, types and significance of diaspora diplomacy and examine the participation of the Vietnamese diaspora living Hungary in the Hungarian diplomacy. The practical example of this study is the role of Vietnamese diaspora in the Hungarian and Vietnamese diplomacy. To get to know this, I have examined the characteristics of the chosen diaspora, the current foreign policy goals of Hungary and the diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Hungary. I interviewed Dr László Botz, the president of the Hungarian-Vietnamese Friendship Society and Dr László Vasa, the Chief Advisor of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade and the coordinator

of the Eastern Opening Program. I asked the same seven questions from both professionals within the frameworks of a semi-structured interview.

The Actors and Institutions of the International Relations System

According to Samuel P. Huntington (2015), the system of international or otherwise inter-state relations is equal to the world order. The world order is nothing but the complexity of world economy, world politics, ecological system, social structures, ideas and cultures. Consequently, we can identify what the actors of international relations are and what institutions shape our world order.

The three main actor categories of international relations' system are the states, the international organisations and the individuals (Mingst, 2011). With the rise of modern states (1648), then with the emergence of nation-states (second half of the 1800s), we can speak of international relations. Consequently, inter-state relations cannot exist without states, so we can declare that states are the most important actors in international relations. States can be classified into additional categories based on economic, political, social, cultural and natural conditions (Bihari, 2013, pp. 378-395). The next major actor group consists of organisations. Organisations can be divided into five categories: international organisations, which may be intergovernmental or non-governmental, transnational corporations, companies and NGOs (Mingst, 2011.). The third group of actors is the group of individuals, which includes the foreign policy's elite, private persons and small groups, as well as the masses (Mingst, 2011).

Diasporas can be both small groups and masses which depends on their percentage in the surveyed country's population. For example, in Hungary, the Vietnamese diaspora can be considered as a small group. Based on the latest census data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (*Népszámlálás*, 2011) 3 500 people declare themselves Vietnamese. This means 0,03% of the total Hungarian population. However, it is difficult to determine over what size can a diaspora be considered a mass.

Diaspora is a Greek word (meaning scattering) which was initially used for Jews, Jewish-Christians scattered throughout the world (The Oxford English Dictionary). Sociologists (Sík, 2012, p. 108) have formulated five features of modern diasporas: (1) a migrant population which is (2) ethnically different from the host country's population, (3) a minority which is characterized by (4) a strong emotional attraction and/or active relationship to the country of origin, (5) where it always wants to return to but never can.

According to today's state of the art, we divide the individual category only into three groups (Mingst, 2011). However, the significance of diasporas in the political, economic and cultural circles of the 21st century has grown so much that, in my opinion, it would be possible to introduce a new subcategory, the group of diasporas. Diasporas in international relations mean an exceptional case; they have their specified features which entitle them to have their subcategory.

To be able to influence the international relations the actors need specific tools. These are the institutions of international relations. Egedy (2011) divides six institutions: foreign policy, open violence, intervention, propaganda, terrorism and international law. We can distinguish two instruments of foreign policy: foreign trade and diplomacy.

Diplomacy refers to the communication between states; it is a game where international actors compete to their goals (Egedy, 2011). In this communication, diasporas are also

able to engage and establish a policy-forming role. In this case, as a method of securing national interests, we should primarily consider indirect, background or public diplomacy.

Private persons, such as small groups, masses, and diasporas, in contrast to the foreign affairs elite, are generally not bound by state-defined formal frameworks, so they can participate more freely in shaping international relations. The question is how and why a non-governmental natural person or group appears in the relationships between states.

The answer to the question of why is hidden in their advantage compared to the political elite: the actions of private persons are not defined by strict rules. Engagement of private persons in inter-state relations is three-dimensional: the linking role, the effects of the virtuousness of individuals' actions on the masses and/or the states, and background diplomacy (Mingst, 2011).

The real influencing power of diasporas can be identified in their 'knowledge'. They are those individuals who are deeply familiar with the cultures of the two nations and are thus able to exert pressure on both countries' governments to promote relations between the two states. It is in their utmost interest to have friendly relations between their host country and motherland.

The Role of Diasporas in Diplomacy, Diaspora Diplomacy

The impact assessment of diasporas in inter-state relations is a less-researched area. However, this does not mean that the phenomenon is negligible, but rather that the importance of diasporas has increased in global politics parallel to the accelerating globalisation, so the phenomenon has only begun to be researched in the past few years.

Globalisation, the weakening of nation-states, and the parallel emerging international organisations have begun to resolve the internal contradiction of diasporas: host society still does not accept them, and the motherland's society no longer accepts them as its own. To relieve this internal tension, diasporas become more and more transnational communities. It is important to emphasise that this wrangle still exists, and it is very slowly able to decrease in ethnic, national communities. New technologies of communication and simplification of locomotion also contribute to the transformation of transnational communities from diasporas (Sík, 2012).

Not only the diaspora's but also the diplomacy's meaning has changed in recent years which contributes to the emergence of diaspora diplomacy. How can diplomacy be interpreted in today's context? Elaine Ho and Fiona McConnell (2017) in their joint study, which summarises the most comprehensive and detailed research on diaspora diplomacy (see also: Jovenir, 2013), state that diplomacy is relationship management between groups. Moving from the traditional interpretation to the modern one lies in the change of the relationship between communication and representation. Since the info-communication revolution, communication channels have been expanded, and new opportunities have enabled much faster information flow. In the course of this change, private persons are also able to represent themselves; there is no need for a foreign elite in order to articulate a message. Now it is not even difficult for a country of origin to contact its diasporas and to contact the host countries through them.

The next question is with which tools and incentives of diasporas can appear in the diplomacy. Ho and McConnell (2017) distinguish four diplomatic methods and six options of tools.

One of the motivations of diasporas to engage in diplomacy is to conduct high-level diplomatic negotiations in the name of the country of origin. It is clear that in this case, diasporas do not consist of private persons only but also foreign affairs professionals. Thus, the diasporas cannot be classified in any classic categories of actors of inter-state relations. The second method is the representation of the country of origin in everyday life. In this situation, they have a role similar to an honorary consul. The third entry option is to influence the foreign and domestic policy of the country of origin through public diplomacy. The fourth and last incentive of diasporas in diplomacy is to establish a nation-state.

Regarding the instruments, diasporas can use lobbying, advocacy, voting in the country of origin, representation, communication and mediation. Among them, we must highlight advocacy, representation and mediation, which play key roles in diaspora diplomacy. Therefore, we can distinguish two types of diaspora diplomacy. The first is diplomacy by diaspora and the second is diplomacy through diaspora (Ho & McConnell, 2017).

Diplomacy through diaspora is not directly in the interests of the diasporas, but rather reflects the aims of the sending and receiving states. The country of origin or even the host state can encourage the diaspora to lobby for bilateral co-operation with the means of cultural and public diplomacy. This can be beneficial to both the country of origin and the host state. Positive effects on the country of origin include the possibility of economic development through financial and social remittances (Jovenir, 2013). In this case, the host state also has economic advantages. Thanks to the cultural knowledge and social network of diasporas, they can be able to promote or even hinder economic relations between two countries (Ho & McConnell, 2017).

The other form of diaspora diplomacy, diplomacy by diasporas, could have developed through the diaspora's political identity: in some cases, they can act as an independent political actor. In order to express their interests, three methods can be convenient: advocacy, mediation or representation (Ho & McConnell, 2017).

The Vietnamese Diaspora living in Hungary and the Diaspora Diplomacy

The Vietnamese Diaspora living in Hungary

Hungary and Vietnam entered into diplomatic relations in February 1950. Vietnam was Hungary's first partner in the Southeast Asian region (Hungary's Embassy in Hanoi). The diplomatic relationship building of the two countries was not enough for the Vietnamese to migrate to Hungary; there was a need for additional push and attractive factors.

The main push factor was that Vietnam was constantly a war-zone from the First World War (or rather since the appearance of French in the region) to 1979. These decades of fighting have exhausted Vietnam's economy, and a part of the Vietnamese population has seen the way out in emigration. (Balogh, 2015). They chose a country of destination with whom Vietnam had friendly relationships and had much more advanced economic indicators. Under the conditions of the Cold War, if a Vietnamese wanted to emigrate legally, he could choose from another communist/socialist counties. This is how the first Vietnamese arrived in Central Europe, including Hungary (Földes, 2015).

János Kádár's foreign policy had crucial importance in making Hungary attractive for migrants. After Hungary's unsuccessful revolution and war of independence in 1956, not only the Western bloc, but the Soviet Union also isolated the country. Kádár saw a possible breakthrough from this isolation to contact third-world countries or to strengthen the existing

relations. In this context, international students were granted higher education scholarships so that Hungary could become an educational destination for immigrants (Földes, 2015).

The interview with László Botz reveals that Hungary has always paid particular attention to Vietnam within the Southeastern Asian region. During the Second Indochina War, Hungary expressed its solidarity with Vietnam and provided the opportunity for 6,000 Vietnamese students to obtain a diploma in Hungary. According to László Botz, this was a vital issue for Vietnam, since those Vietnamese who graduated in engineering contributed significantly to Vietnam's post-war reconstruction. László Botz said that the Hungarian aid provided for the Vietnamese people during the wars resulted in a very significant emotional connection that is still felt today.

Vietnam's Appreciation for Hungary in Recent Years, the Southern Opening Program

After the regime change, Hungary took on a distinctly Western, Euro-Atlantic foreign policy. For this reason, the former socialist countries and the third world states were de-emphasised. The political paradigm shift took place after the accession to the European Union in 2004, in the early 2010s, when Hungary announced its eastern and southern opening programs (Becsey, 2014).

Based on the interview with László Vasa, Hungary aims to diversify foreign economic partners. To reduce dependence on transatlantic relations, the eastern opening was announced in 2014 and the southern opening in 2015. The eastern opening program is targeted at Russia, the countries of the post-soviet region and China. The southern opening program targets Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. According to László Vasa, the essence of the doctrines is not the redistribution of the slots of Hungary's economic cake but the increase of the cake itself.

Vietnam is one of the most important partners of Hungary in the southern opening. László Botz explains the remarkable attention to the nearly seven decades of Hungarian-Vietnamese relations, emotional attachment and Vietnam's size. Eszter Torda, Ambassador of Hungary to Vietnam, has a similar view. She mainly emphasises the emotional connection and the fact that Vietnam's size is more in line with the Hungarian economy than China (Torda, 2016). Also, it should be emphasised that the Vietnamese economy is developing dynamically. Based on World Bank data, Vietnam had an annual average GDP growth of 6% over the past six years.

László Vasa also mentioned that those Vietnamese who studied in Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s but returned, usually occupy high political, economic positions in Vietnam and because of their emotional attachment to Hungary, it is easier to get in touch and establish economic, political cooperation between the two countries.

László Botz also pointed out that education in the southern opening program has crucial importance. In 2017, the Hungarian government raised the number of scholarships for Vietnamese students to 200. In the same year, 483 Vietnamese students studied in Hungarian educational institutions, mainly in healthcare, engineering, information technology and economics. László Vasa also added that the opening of higher education institutions by Hungary to foreigners, including the Vietnamese, is a long-term program, its success can be expected in the future. They expect a similar result as in the socialist era: Vietnamese

students who are studying in Hungary and will return will occupy high positions and will shape and simplify relations between the two countries.

The Vietnamese living in Hungary and the Diaspora Diplomacy

Both László Botz and László Vasa argued that in the case of the Vietnamese diaspora living in Hungary, it was not possible to talk about the traditional sense of hard diplomacy. The Vietnamese diaspora is not strong enough, is not large enough or does not fulfil any public roles that might contribute to their emergence in diplomacy. László Vasa brought the Chinese diaspora in Hungary as a counter-example, which is being used by China for intelligence; an example of diplomacy through diaspora.

In the case of the Vietnamese diaspora living in Hungary, we can talk about soft diplomacy, public diplomacy. László Botz said that the Vietnamese contributed significantly to the development of Hungary in social and cultural terms. He had the example of the humanitarian programs where the Vietnamese actively support the vulnerable groups of the Hungarian population, people with disabilities, the elderly and the children – expressing their gratitude to Hungarian society.

László Vasa also mentioned that the inter-state relations between Hungary and Vietnam were initiated from above, there was no need for this diaspora that had not even existed at the time. László Botz added that in his opinion, the Vietnamese living in Hungary play an essential role in the strengthening economic cooperation today.

According to László Vasa, the Vietnamese diaspora in Hungary today provides a foundation for negotiations between the two states, which can be used to build economic cooperation, that brings political, cultural and social cooperation.

According to László Botz, both the Hungarian and the Vietnamese governments use the opportunities, personal and economic relations of the Vietnamese living in Hungary to develop political, economic and cultural relations between the two states. He also highlighted that the first generation actively involved the second and third generation Vietnamese to 'diplomatic' affairs, who could support the strengthening of relations between the two states as Hungarians.

Conclusion

The relationship between the individual and the foreign policy is gradually changing and getting closer together. One of the best examples of this is the diaspora diplomacy. Individuals, including diasporas, are increasingly becoming politically conscious and are willing to actively engage in the formation of their own political, economic, social and cultural life.

The migration theory has already exceeded the static approach of migration. In a globalised world, complex and dynamic attitudes are needed, so the theory of transmigration mobility has formed, and analyses the relationship between modernisation and power relations.

In my opinion, the significance of diaspora diplomacy will increase in the future. The volume and the intensity of migration are progressively increasing, so the host countries have to expect bigger and bigger diasporas.

The research revealed that in the case of the Vietnamese living in Hungary, we could not speak of great, world-changing aspirations. Their goals are the following: a high-level diplomatic representation that takes place at the state level and a kind of honorary consular role by representing the Vietnamese culture in everyday life and trying to convey it to the Hungarian society.

So, we cannot talk about classic diaspora diplomacy in their case, but by examining the other instrument of foreign policy, foreign trade, the Vietnamese diaspora could play a more significant role in this aspect of the interstate relations.

In my opinion, regarding diaspora diplomacy and the Vietnamese diaspora in Hungary, the focus should be on the future. Both the new institution of inter-state relations and the Vietnamese diaspora are still in formation.

Diaspora diplomacy is an existing and ever-expanding phenomenon that has not received enough attention in the past, despite its significance, and the opportunities that it can provide to each country.

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INTERNET, ANARCHY AND THE AUTOCRACY OF PLATFORMS. TOWARD A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE INTERNET

Mihály Szilágyi-Gál

Abstract: Although the principle of freedom of expression has traditionally targeted the limitation of the intervention of the state into communication, the arbitrariness of online platforms to infringe upon the communication among their users should also be subject of social control. The question is whether it is possible to anchor any set of rules or norms that unite all online users despite the fundamental differences of interests and values that otherwise exist between them. The present paper traces matters of ethical and political theory, which highlight the ultimate interest of platforms to overcome particular interests in content regulation and follow the naturally free character of online communication.

Keywords: platform, community, interest, value, online, anarchy

Introduction

We use media globalized in content and in technology, but some of the rules of using them are still floating between the global and the state level – a diagnosis, from the nineties (Price, 1998, pp. 22-41). More than a decade later online media was described as having three main domains in which regulations fall short of becoming globally consensual: property, filtering and censorship (Heinrich & Weber, 2014, p. 283). In the following I address these vulnerable aspects of the online environment within the context of the ambiguity of freedom and dominance both present in online content management. I argue that although the platforms cannot be taken as value neutral in their role of moderators and suppliers, all online users may have fundamental interests to share common normative rules for the sake of their own online survival, and that their incentive for fairness is a matter of interest rather than a matter of value. I'll use the concept of online environment as the global network of communication networks.

The Internet as Political Environment

The legal and political framework of free speech has emerged in nation states. But there has never been any media in history before the internet to make its users as free and as endangered in the meantime. Although the user can exercise individual freedom of speech more naturally than ever before, the various forms of online „terrorism" ranging from

harassment against individuals, attacks against communities, hate speech, robbery and abuse have turned the same free users to be more vulnerable than in the case of any other media (MacKinnon, 2012, pp. 82-97, 195).

In addition to these risk factors already visible in the late nineties, by the 2010s we could also list the arbitrary content management of platforms as a new major risk. The barriers these risk factors generate resume basically the infringements of individual rights, security and moral safety (Heinrich & Weber, 2014, p. 284).

In order to understand online communication from the perspective of political theory, one has to distinguish between three problems. Firstly, online networks also involve "real world" politics which takes place outside the strictly online interactions. It involves such real life processes both as a platform of the information that reports of the real world (Burján, 2010) and also as object itself of political decisions (Bartóki-Gönczy, 2014). Thus secondly, numerous political controversies target the online platforms themselves, while in the meantime those (or other) online platforms serve as screens of various other political controversies, events etc. Finally, although the online world is politically salient on its own right, online communication as network of networks (as the final frame of online platforms) can also act as a self-relying political actor. It contains platforms which have their private policies, even with preferences of hard-core political content. Therefore, online platforms may partly generate, involve and accompany political events, and they also act politically by offering room for politically relevant discussions.

There are groups which engage in the protection of the rights and interests of the internet users. They can be considered as representives and advocates of the various needs of online users. But they can obviously not represent the internet as a whole, which cannot be represented as a separate entity by anyone and which is not a self-relying actor itself. The online networks constitute a stateless environment. This environment is however disturbed by autocratic non-state power centers, as well as by autocratic private power spots, which are also online users themselves.

Internet as Anarchy

I consider that despite the content managing power of platforms to undermine the inherent freedom of online communication, the fundamental nature of the online environment is anarchy: it resists to any centralizing and censoring effort. Although such control mechanisms exist both on state and private levels, they are fundamentally alien to the true nature of the online environment as a de-centralized global network of networks.

Although, the internet as the global environment of the virtually boundless freedom of communication seems to synchronize best with liberalism as its possibly closest political culture, its essential de-centralized global structure drives it closer to anarchism as the ideology of de-centralized and voluntary structures.

In 1970 the anarchist thinker Robert Paul Wolf imagined the utopia of direct voting as a means to reduce or even eliminate representative democracy, so much despised by the anarchist tradition. Wolf speculated on the impact of technology on the will-formation o citizens. Wolf's citizen would vote from home by his television (Wolf, 2009, pp. 78-80). In the age of the internet Wolf's utopia seems more realistic than in his age. The fear is however that the technological realization of this utopia might not coincide with its

normative chances: the internet does not in itself supply democracy, but it can be used for democratic will formation in a new and creative way.

Earliest descriptions of the possible grass-root character of online self-organization came in the dawn of the age of web 2. (Debatin, 2002, p. 236). Wolf's utopia re-emerges in the age of web 2, in the thoughts of Heinrich and Weber on the self-governing potential of online users. Observing online communication as the particularly fertile ground for democratic values of transparency and consultation to prevail, the two authors actually recall the possibility of online deliberation (Heinrich, Weber 2014, pp. 286-288). Coleman and Blumler also consider online platforms as a possible way of a more direct and less hierarchical means of social cooperation with the political institutions compared to standard voting methods (Coleman-Blumler, 2009, pp. 179-180).

As the unregulated global network of networks of communication the internet seems to exemplify anarchy in the classical sense. It is a virtually infinite sequence of interactions between individuals and groups, of which rules of functioning are often beyond the rules established by any particular state power. This means that the users engage in their role as users in a high number of interactions which are not ruled by any state. The advantage of this situation seems to be the potential of online users to govern them (Nádori, 2014).

This historical chance of unconstrained global communication however does not eliminate the danger of the infringements upon free expression altogether, because whereas the platform suppliers are often not less powerful than many states, they are in the meantime legally also less responsible to their private practices of infringement.

We are looking for the possibility for all online users – including the platform suppliers – to be motivated to overcome their particular interests and values and subject themselves to norms that they share with all online users. Such overarching rules would unite all online agents, regardless of their natural oppositions of interests and values as for instance moderators, advertisers, buyers, influencers etc.

N(ethics)

By searching for normative conduct shareable among all online users, one has to distinguish between the community of values and the community of interests. The community of values emerges by the acceptance of identical aesthetic and moral values. The community of interests means the formal cooperation among users, regardless of their possibly shared or unshared values. In this sense the website of a religious group, of a scientific research institute, of a single's page can all be seen as enterprises of equal rights in online communication.

In other words the webshops, their buyers, the advertisers and the users disturbed by them, the public (or private) lists of personal data and the hackers which steal them, as well as many other users on the net all have strongly opposing interests and values in terms of their goals and motivations on the one hand, but they all share the fundamental interest to be seen on the online platforms as reliable users on the other hand. Obviously no webshop hacker would advertise himself openly as a hacker. And no platform would advertise itself as infringing free expression. The shared interest to show oneself as a fair online user indicates the normative framing of online users and as such, a means to define what counts for abuse.

Therefore, there may be motivations for common interests among the users merely for each to, maintain its own position as user. The mass of users online can obviously not be

taken as a community of values. But they can be taken as a potential community of interests based upon the above considerations. By looking for any possible normative behavior shareable among possibly all users, we end up with a foundation based upon common interests first, rather than upon common values. Thus, the normativity that might link the online users is primarily of instrumental nature. It is supposed to prescribe modes of rule following which makes it possible for users to remain users, but it doesn't prescribe goals for which one wants to be a user.

If we take a closer look at the instrumental rule-following of the online users, we come to the possibility of a normativity which is beyond particular interests. This perspective reveals the exchangeable nature of the relationship between all users, including platform suppliers. For instance, if somebody creates a work and uploads it, because he wants his work to be seen by as many online users as possible, he is clearly interested in establishing the credibility of him sharing it. He would proceed for this purpose by linking his work to the website of some prestigious institution – providing that he has access to it. Or else, he will collect positive book reviews by recognized experts on his work and upload them as links. Similarly, if he wants to find a reliable work on the net about some particular topic, he will proceed from the perspective of the reader rather than from his previous perspective as an author. The exchange of perspectives of the sometimes uploading, sometimes downloading user reveals those aspects of interest, which guarantee the credibility of the source.

The platform also recognizes the constraint of establishing its own credibility as a supplier, by trying to eliminate suspicion against itself in its moderating role. The realization of the interest is only possible by the establishment of one's own credibility in that particular user role. By failing to establish this credibility one becomes questionable in one's own role as a user. This fundamental normative constraint to make one's user role credible is present in the uploader, downloader and platform supplier roles alike, and it emerges from the recognition of interests rather than of values.

Credibility however cannot be considered as a mere aspect of interest. By the practice of uploading, downloading and platform supplying, one experiences the possibility of the exchange of the authoring, reading and moderating perspectives alike. This awareness and practice of the possible exchange of roles may serve as the ground for a normative stance which is beyond the particular set of interests and/or values of the various agents acting online.

It is important to stress that this particular normativity only addresses the user as user and in no other normative aspect of his life. A monk will have to establish credibility for his specific online activities in the same way as a singles page moderator. They only appear in the online context as users which equally need to establish their credibility in the specific experience of exchange of roles that occurs online as described above. The establishment of one's credibility is an element of shared value, which is beyond the mere element of interest between users.

Toward a Political Philosophy of the Internet

A further normative phase of the relationship between online users is their political self-deliberation. As mentioned before, the extreme variety of online communities imply an extreme variety of online values and this is true for the platform suppliers as well. A group

of religious fundamentalists can have the same rights to access the internet as a secondary school workshop.

A group of activists for the protection of online rights named Access Now published a document in 2011, which lists up widely accepted rights and principles to be applied in online communication. These are the following: 1. universality and equality, 2. rights and social justice 3. accessibility, 4. expression and assembly, 5. privacy and data protection, 6. life, freedom and security, 7. diversity, 8. network equality, 9. standards and regulations, 10. governance. This list indicates both the pursuit and the possibility of a set of norms which link potentially all online users, despite the huge value differences that separate them (MacKinnon, 2012, pp. 239-243). However, none of these values is foundational for the rest. My statement is that credibility is the overarching value, which establishes the fundamental sense of reciprocity in acting online.

It seems obvious that along credibility (that also includes virtues like sincerity, discretion, fairness and mutuality) the normative path of the user behavior may develop from the instrumental, merely value-neutral rule-following to the more self-constraining ethical and finally politically normative behavior. Political behavior may also emerge from the basic user experience of the already mentioned experience of exchange of roles. It derives from the fact that to be user means the constant possibility of playing either the role of the uploader or the role of the downloader respectively, the role of the moderating platform. I am potentially a user who uploads, downloads and moderates or supplies platform for others.

By acknowledging the possibility of switching these roles, one also becomes aware of the possibility to be potentially related to many other users in these different roles. This awareness develops a communal sense of sharing the online space without any obligation to share their various broader normative commitments in matters of ethics, politics, taste and any particular interest.

However, the normative model of the ethical and political community of the online users as sketched above does not elucidate a problem. The internet is neither the institutional system of a society in which we live, nor a community which co-exists with other communities within one particular society and state. The internet doesn't supply the individual a citizenship. It cannot either be seen as an association which functions within a larger political community. It is both more and less than anything like these. It is "everywhere and nowhere". On the online "street" we can be passerby both without entering any "house" and without being forced to leave any of our "real-life" addresses. Thus, online using resembles a repeated moving from address to address (the on-offline move is precisely of this kind), while our different real-life memberships and citizenships may remain intact. By logging in, we do not emigrate and we do not request and obtain any new citizenship. Moreover, we can equally be members of the google-group of some particular institution like a school, party or club, but also of a google-group which lacks any relation to some real-life institution.

Thus, our roles of online users can coincide, intersect and overlap with any real-life membership and it can also avoid any. Thus, one could claim that the virtual character of the online relationships (anonymity, fake profile etc.) are not parallel with the non-virtual social relationships, but are intermingled with them.

If we consider the possible description of the political structure of the internet as network of human networks, the political philosophy of John Rawls conception of well-ordered society seems to offer a feasible model. But Rawls' distinction between the right behavior towards our fellow citizens and our private conceptions of ethically and aesthetically

good life does not seem to be applicable. Rawls refers to the institutional system of a community of citizens which integrates them into a community in virtue of their publically right behavior, while it doesn't interfere with our private life style and conviction (Rawls, 1993, p. 272, p. 278). As we have seen however, the situations the online users are engaged in are mixtures of virtual and real-life contexts rather than full integration into either the virtual or the real-life environment. This specific intermingling of the virtual and the real-life engagements in which the online user finds himself, cannot be adequately described with Ralws's model of a well-ordered society of parallel networks.

Robert Nozick's anarchist state also falls short as a model of description. Nozick claims that the state is necessarily a violence imposing entity, because it infringes individual rights even when it limits the individual's natural right of self-defense (Nozick, 1974, p. xi). Yet the nakedness of online users before the formal and informal intervention of the state does not emerge from any particular state. Any state can interfere with the freedom of online users on its own territory, and by threatening statements of official power holders of the state, it can even interfere with such liberties globally (MacKinnon, 2012, pp. 82-94). Moreover, the online communication may not only be protected against state involvement but also against private platform suppliers. The dominance of private agents is not a typical problem in the classical anarchist register, which targets the state as the main oppressor of the individual and the community.

Due to their extra-territorial nature online users have to deal potentially with any or all states, as well as with platforms as private companies. We take into consideration the highly flexible relation establishing modes of online communication: one-to-many, many-to-many, one-to-one as well as the depths of its interactivity never seen in any preceding media, – especially of its active versions as the homepage and the blog – (Deuze, 2003), then the anarchic mode of organization of online communication appears as its essential feature. These relation establishing modes and the interactivity have destroyed the former author – readership hierarchy which has been characteristic for the written press, television and radio: the impossibility of "speaking back". Writing about the radio in the thirties, Bertolt Brecht had noticed that although this new medium reached out many people, it fell short to be as democratic as wished, its mode of communication was unidirectional, because it didn't allow any feedback from the audience (Brecht, 2002, p. 152). Jean Baudrillard argued in a similar fashion forty years later about the television (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 277).

Conclusion

The question raised in this paper was whether it would be possible to anchor any set of rules or norms that unite all online users despite the fundamental differences of interests and values that otherwise exist between them. The question is especially provoking because, although the internet partly imports the power relations of the real-life society (McChesney, 2013, p. 181) and creates new hierarchies of its own, any kind of organization from above and centralized governance proves to be essentially alien to it. The present paper traces matters of ethical and political theory, which highlight the ultimate interest of platforms as well as of all users to overcome particular interests in content regulation and follow the naturally free character of online communication.

The paper presents the argument that the opposed interests and lack of generally shared values online communication has the normative potential which may render an overlapping

user ethics between the platform suppliers and their users. Such a shareable normative attitude might not only establish rule following acceptable and respectable between the highly diverse user community but also between the users and the platform suppliers. Such shareable modes of user attitude do not collide with the otherwise highly different and even opposed interests of both users and platform suppliers, because all of these agents are primarily motivated to establish their own credibility in the online environment. The establishing of one's own credibility implies a constant learning of the inter-changeability of the various user perspectives (up-loader, down-loader and platform supplier).

It is important to highlight that the possibility of the overlapping attitudes which unite the users and the platform suppliers are not centrally imposed, but emerge as inherent interests of being a user; by not observing the essential elements of establishing one's own credibility, both the user side and the platform-supplying side fails to remain a reliable online agent.

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"DON'T BLAME THE MEDIA". THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN CREATING THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE OPINION OF GERMAN PRESS JOURNALISTS

Agnieszka Szymańska

Abstract: The European public sphere appears only incidentally and temporarily and even then, European issues are presented through the prism of national benefits or loss. All of this is not conducive to the creation of a European identity, nor the legitimization of EU. Should the media and the journalists be blamed for this state of affairs? How do they perceive their role in the process of European integration? Where, in their opinion, are the causes, which render the creation of a European public sphere impossible? This article will present the results of individual depth interviews (IDI) conducted with German press journalists (16).

Key words: media and European integration, European public sphere, research on journalism

The media should keep a healthy distance from any type of „preaching"
because "preaching" is only a step away from propaganda (...)
The media's task is to neither save Europe, nor bury it.
[An excerpt from the comments of one of the respondents]

The Role of the Media in the European Debate – Theoretical Approach

European and national politics influence each other and the members of European societies in the area of communication, which is expressed by the term the *European public sphere*, or the *European public space*. In accordance with definition of Hans-Jürgen Trenz, which in its concept, harkens back to the terms proposed by Jürgen Habermas and Bernhard Peters, one understands the public sphere to be the intersubjectively divided, communicationally structured area of mutual observation (Trenz, 2000, p. 333). The public sphere is, nevertheless, merely a certain theoretical-normative construction, and in the empirical sense, does not exists as a uniform and homogeneous area, for the exchange of political views, "neither on a national level, nor on a European one (Habermas, 1993, p. 20). In reality, the public sphere is quite differentiated when considering its structure, and is composed of many smaller areas, in which the debate is held. That is why this definition is often operationalized as an intensification (e.g. amount and density) of communication activities, undertaken in a given area, by various types of actors.

In the context of the process of European integration, many authors call attention to the significantly lower intensity of communication in the trans-national public sphere (European), that occurs on the national level, which is not conducive to creation of a European identity, nor to legitimization of the policies of European institutions (Latzer, Saurwein, 2006, p. 11). The range and quality of the European public sphere are often thereby linked with an evaluation of the quality of the value of the democracy of the European Union itself, hence the narrow extent of the European public sphere considered to be an essential detriment to the democratic value of EU institutions. This deficit in the European public sphere is thereby identified as a deficit of democracy in EU structures. (p. 10). In the introduction to a publication on the media public sphere in the EU, Lutz M. Hagen calls attention to the enormous expectations, which thereby are universally linked in the EU, with the media coverage as an antidote to any and all deficits of democracy in EU institutions (Hagen, 2004, p. 7). But are the media in a position to meet these expectations?

The results of many varied types of research have shown, unfortunately, that the media are not able to completely fulfill this task. The media coverage continues to be meager in comparison to the significance and influence of the policies/decisions of the EU, concerning the day-to-day life of the citizens of the member states. The very process of integration is often reduced by media to its economic dimension, and in specific member countries, the European course of events is presented almost exclusively from a perspective of national interests and profits thereby obtained by an individual state (Lichtenstein & Eilders 2015, p. 281). The occasions to increase the European public sphere are furthermore usually linked to the very controversial issues, like Brexit, refuges, immigrantion, financial crisis and so one. Thus, as Hartmut Wessler observed, *conflict keeps European public sphere alive* (Wessler, 2004, p. 24). But, are news values alone responsible for this deficiency of the European public sphere?

Amongst the five prerequisites, which Jürgen Gerhards recognized as being absolutely essential for the creation of a European public sphere, he mentioned: 1.) the existence of such legal solutions in all member countries, that would guarantee freedom of speech and freedom of the media 2.) accessibility to effective and efficient technology for the dissemination of information 3.) the presence in Europe of a concerned public, which actively takes advantage of the media's message and is competent/capable of undertaking a discussion 4.) professionalization of the media's trades, especially those of journalism and of the managers directing the media 5.) the emergence of a category of collective political actors, who take the floor at the European public forum and promote their electoral programs, would destroy, or at least weaken the barrier of existing national boundaries of the public sphere (Gerhards, 2000, pp. 277-305). What's noteworthy, is that at this time (2000) Gerhards perceived obstacles, blocking the road to the creation of a European public sphere, only in the third and the fifth, of the aforementioned prerequisites (Gerhards, 2000, pp. 289-292). Meanwhile, from today's perspective, the establishment of a European public sphere, appears to be even more difficult, and the range of existing impedimenta, significantly exceeds the boundaries of those two, mentioned, prerequisites. The changes which have occurred over the course of time in the sphere of legal regulations dealing with the manner in which the media function in many member-countries, especially those in East-Central Europe (amongst others, in Poland and Hungary) or also in matters concerning the ownership of the media, amongst others in Czechia and Slovakia, but also in many countries of the so-called *old* Europe (see: Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 'Monitoring Risk for Media Pluralism in EU Member States') also put a question mark to the first of

the prerequisites mentioned by Gerhards. In addition to these considerations, there have arisen (and constantly are arising) on the media market, fears as to whether it is really possible to realize today, the fourth prerequisite as well. The level of professionalism of the journalist, and the quality of the media's functioning and its content is invariably linked with financial sphere of the media's activities, which for many years has been tormented by a deep crisis (Szymańska, 2017). The characteristics of media markets and journalistic traditions differ in the member countries as well (Tunstall, 2002, p. 231). And these are only some of the elements of the exceptionally richly varied European media markets. The general climate of discouragement and chaos reigning in the EU, which also results in a lack of readiness of certain specific national audiences, to become interested in, and to be positively engaged in the affairs of the EU is also rather doubtful (see Brexit as an example) should not be underestimated as well.

When introducing these types of considerations, it should also be remembered that the quality of the message regarding Europe also depends not only on the will of the journalists and publishers/owners of the media, but is derived above all, from the events which are taking place on the continent. The commitment and position of the politicians, not just those who are holding office in the European government, but also those – and perhaps above all those – politicians on a national level, who being closer to their electorate and society as a whole, exert influence on the framing and the climate in which the European dilemma is presented in the media. One may not omit, that the burden of forming a chronicle, that is a description and transmission of information, rests first of all on the backs of the journalists and the media. How then, does the media itself perceive its role in the process of European integration? The response to this question will be especially interesting with reference to the authors of the European media discourse in Germany, since today it is virtually universally accepted, that in the current situation, its is exactly Germany which occupies a key role in the European Union. In what manner does Germany, and especially German journalists as leaders of German public opinion, imagine the future of Europe and its shape, may have an essential significance for the future of the European Union, of which Germany at one time was a precursor, and for many today remains its unquestioned leader.

The Role of the Media in the European Debate in the Opinion of German Print Journalists

The considerations presented here are based on the results of research, conducted in 2015, in the milieu of German print journalists, as part of the project entitled: "*A German Europe or a European Germany? Media diplomacy and a (post)national Europe on the Example of the European political discourse in Germany*". Altogether, 16 interviews were conducted in the project, with representatives of the German national, regional, and local press responsible for shaping the European coverage of the German print media. Research was narrowed to include only print journalists, due to the extraordinary significance of the traditional print media in the German media landscape and political discourse. Due to the specific character of the journalists as a professional group, as a research method the individual depth interview (IDI) was chosen, which is a classic qualitative method. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured interview format. The interview guideline was composed of 17 questions in total (Szymańska, 2016:87-100). This article will present the answers to 3 questions: 1. What influence does the national media have (could have)

on the process of European integration? 2. To what degree can the media (or should) contribute to our identification with the EU? and finally 3. How do you see the role of the media then [in Europe in ten years]?.

 # The Process of European Integration and the Media Today and in the Future #

The responses regarding the question of the media's current influence on the process of European integration were quite varied. Amongst the respondents, there were those who affirmed, that the media have an essential influence on the process of European integration today, but also those, who were of the opinion that the media currently have only a marginal influence on the state of the EU as a political project and are only used for exerting influence by politicians.

Equally different (and partially, even mutually exclusive) were the opinions of respondents in the context of the significance of the media in European politics in the future. Just what the influence of the media on the process of European integration in the future will be dependent on, in the opinion of the respondents, the future condition of the media itself, (because a conscientious fulfilling of the social function of the media is quite expensive) and of the future condition of the EU itself and the future manner of understanding the essence and goal of the integration of our continent.

The German journalists therefore affirmed that the media exert an essential influence on the process of European integration by influencing the manner of perception of its recipients. The media accomplish this through the manner of presenting and framing European subject matter. In light of these opinions, the influence of the media results from the realization of their classic social functions. The national media (which is partially a consequence of the lack of a transnational media), being mostly the only source of 'European' information for their domestic public, creates a manner of perception of their recipients in relation to the level of European political communication. All of this causes in the opinion of German journalists that the coverage of the European issues in the national media has substantially greater significance for domestic reciepients than the media coverage of domestic politics. At the same time, the media which are organised in Europe on a national level are responsible for shaping the European discourse, which has negative consequences for the manner of influencing integration by the media, since the national media tend to present and use a nationally oriented argumentation in questions concerning Europe. Hence – in the opinion of some of the respondents – the national media should concentrate on a presentation of European issues through a transnational perspective.

On the contrary, those respondents who expressed doubts about the influence of the national media's European coverage, believed various financial and political aspects to be more important than media coverage.

There were also respondents, in whose opinion the media and their content are used by other actors to exert their influence. In the opinion of these respondents, the media therefore don't serve solely as a source of information, but rather as a loudspeaker for transmitting the positions of the various European governments. Hence, if the media do exert any influence at all, the direction of this influence depends upon those who supply the media with their own political *input*. The media are used by politicians also as a scene/setting for their self-creation. European politicians use the media as a forum where they can appear before a national and foreign audience in a manner appropriately planned and directed by themselves.

 # European Identity and the Media #

The question of the influence of the media on the creation and consolidation of a European identity, or in a broader sense, the hierarchy of values designated by European society, evoked exceptionally lively comments from the respondents. Regardless of what type of media they worked for, a sizeable majority of the German journalists answered, in a surprisingly uniform and exceedingly emphatic manner, that the media's task is not, nor should it be, the promotion of any type of idea. In their opinion the media should not promote any type of attitude, and a journalist can not be a missionary of any type of ideal, no matter how lofty it may be. According to them, the media are only to inform, and not to promote any type of specific values, or construct a common post-national European identity. Overall, responses of this type appeared in almost all of the interviews.

Many of the respondents were also of the opinion, that the creation of a European identity is a concept of the politicians, and not of the media. Moreover, any type of attempt to launch the idea of European integration would signify the necessity of employing improper standards of journalism, because they would weaken the possibility of realizing the control function of the media (would it be possible to criticize the activities of European bureaucrats and politicians, if the main premise of the media would be the promotion of the European project?). The journalists' task therefore is not to promote the idea of European integration, but to critically accompany this process. If, however, it is possible for the media to, in any manner, impact the process of European integration, it is only through the explanation of the processes, an interpretation of issues, etc. This is because without this interpretation, the inhabitants of the EU will be unable to understand what the European project is all about. Besides an explanation and indication of mutual dependencies, the national media may also constitute a forum for the exchange of arguments (the content and range of which, will not be limited only to politics), and in this manner, co-create a European transnational discourse. In this sense, representatives of the German media have appreciated – in addition to the duty to inform their recipients – the fact that they also possess the privilege of commenting on current events.

However, apart from the fact, that the media must not promote any type of attitude and/or ideology, the German journalists seem to understand that, the European debate/discourse has a special significance. Without the support of the media, dependent upon an accurate reporting about what happens in other countries, the existence of an integrated Europe is impossible.

 # Barriers on the Media Market #

The expressed postulates and comments (see above) about the required perspective for the presentation of European issues in the media become significant in context of the barriers of the media market. In light of the answers, the journalists meet a multitude of internal obstacles in their work on the contemporary media market. In the opinion of the respondents these structural barriers effectively render it impossible for the media to realize the full spectrum of their social functions with regards to the process of international political communications.

Amongst the structural barriers which in the opinion of the journalists most effectively block them from realizing their social mission, economic questions were mentioned most often. The financial crisis, which has been plaguing the media for years, has become evident

in the many varied aspects of the media's functioning. One of these manifestations is the ever-increasing process of tabloidization and also the incredibly rapid tempo with which the media work today, which negatively influences the quality of media content and thereby certainly doesn't serve transnational political communication. The financial crisis, which effects the media, also results in the number of editorial staffs working in Brussels. The number of European correspondents is decidedly insufficient for their journalistic tasks, which they should meet on a day-to-day basis. This situation is unfavorable not only from the viewpoint of transnational political communication, but also domestic political communication carried out on a national level. This trend is adverse because of the scope of decisions undertaken in European institutions, which directly effect the lives of the citizens in EU member states.

At the same time the German journalists, in their comments, gave voice to the fears they have, that the cost cutting trend on the media market, which forces certain media organisations to reduce expenses, will continue for the foreseeable future. In the opinion of the journalists the negative consequences of the structural transformations of the media market, will not simply disappear. These problems affect, above all, the traditional print media, which are obliged to seek solutions, which are not favorable for the improvement of the quality of media content, nor do they assist the 'European'socialization of the editorial staff members. In this context the journalists hoped that an internal flux of personnel within an editorial staff might be helpfull. It could provide the opportunity to share the "European" knowledge and experience of the former correspondents with other journalists of the editorial staff. This would be a way to reverse the process of lowering the quality of the media's content resulting from the necessity of cutting costs.

Conclusions

The results of the research conducted with German print journalists thereby allow the formulation of several initial conclusions about the mutual relations between the media and politics regarding the European integration discourse. First of all, those journalists who are concerned with the subject of the EU, are aware of the significance of their own work in the process of European integration. Second, in their opinion, their role and efficacy in this process is nevertheless, rather limited. Among the factors which limited their effectiveness, economic aspects make up the greatest barrier, however – due to the presence of the new (and new new) media – ever greater communication challenges are constituted by a new type of media recipient, who is not interested in European issues. Thirdly, the journalists themselves perceive their influence on the process of European integration as a derivative. In their opinion the role of prime creator of the discourse on integration, should be played by the politicians. The media's work is secondary and a derivative. That is why without the politicians becoming engaged in the integration process, the prism to present and view Europe will be dominated by national interests. Those national 'eyeglasses' do not allow Europeans to see Europe in any other way than some type of abstract being, from which everyone may (or even should in the opinion of a few politicians nowadays) take as much as possible without looking at the consequences for others. In the opinion of the journalists, without the assistance of politicians it will be impossible to dismantle both the legal and economic barriers, nor obtain this new type of media recipient for European issues. Therefore, the change of 'national eyeglasses' responsible for this national prism in

the presentation of the European issues for 'European contact lenses' which would widen the field of vision to include the point of view of other European partners, is not possible without the politicians becoming involved and engaged. Let us not, therefore, blame the media. Let us blame those politicians who are not able (or who just don't want) to win the media for Europe.

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THE DIGITAL AMBASSADORS: A VIEW ON HOW CULTURAL EXCHANGES ON REDDIT OUTLINE THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Flavia Țăran

Abstract: This study aims to identify how the national identities of Eastern-European countries are constructed through Reddit cultural exchanges. We analyzed a corpus of 8017 comments collected from 95 threaded conversations from 10 national subreddits (Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine). Using co-occurrence and natural language processing tools we created a structured web of national identity codes based on frequent terms and markers, as outlined by the literature on the subject (Smith, 1991; Edensor, 2006; Anderson, 2006). We also considered an overview of the redditors engaging in this voluntary knowledge sharing, through which we spotted a thought-provoking dynamic of community participation: the overly-active moderator, silencing and voicing ideas.

Keywords: Reddit, national identity, national subreddits, co-occurrence analysis, NLP

Reddit and its relevancy

Reddit, as part of the social media universe, serves almost 330 million users per month (2018), a blip on the radar if compared to a mastodon like Facebook, with 2.1 billion users per month. However, since it went live, in 2005, roughly the same time as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, Reddit amassed a stable following, asserting itself as the 'the front page of the Internet'.

In the academic lexicon, Reddit has been fitted with an array of definitions, to best suit a variety of research directions: 'news aggregate Web site' (Bergstrom, 2011), 'social voting site' (Gilbert, 2013), 'web-based discussion boards' (Potts & Harrison, 2013) or 'forum' (Wang, et al., 2015). We do not dismiss these definitions, given the multifaceted nature of Reddit, but we prefer the definition proposed by Singer et al., "a community-driven platform for submitting, commenting and rating links and text posts" (Singer, Flöck, Meinhart, Zeitfogel, & Strohmaier, 2014, p. 517), crediting the agents and the processes which shaped Reddit into the platform for deliberation it is today.

Reddit can be queried (searched) or it can be interrogated (questions can be posted), rendering it a repository of human and non-human knowledge, circumscribed to subreddits (distinct communities governed by own rules, readership and content), curated and organized in-house through upvotes and downvotes.

What makes Reddit relevant is the community-driven angle of the definition quoted earlier. Given its structure, we cannot talk about a single virtual community, but a net of intertwined subject-driven content communities where knowledge sharing is highly appraised

Literature review

This research paper builds on the theories formulated by Benedict Anderson (*Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, first published in 1983) and Anthony Smith (*National Identity*, 1991), due to the timelessness and flexibility of their definitions and approaches.

Anderson defines the nation as an "imagined political community" (2006, p. 6), highlighting its geographical limitations (even in the smallest nation people will use their imagination to perceive the community they are part of) and upholding the idea of comradeship, in the face of inequality and exploitation, as a community-building tool. In this framework, the nation becomes a social construct governed by a cultural matrix called national identity. Subsequently, we will observe how Anderson's imagined community and the nation-state were digitally transposed on Reddit through the creation of national subreddits, each with its own vernacular, structure and narratives.

Smith also tackles the multi-dimensional concept of national identity, which he imbues with language, sentiment and symbols, while subtracting any affiliation between national identity and the ideological movement called nationalism (1991, p. vii).

In an effort to systemize and synthetize this complex phenomenon, Smith formulates five fundamental features for national identity (1991, p. 14), which we rearranged for the purpose of this paper: (1) a common, mass public culture; (2) common myths and historical memories; (3) an historic territory, or homeland; (4) a common economy with territorial mobility for members; (4) common legal rights and duties for all members.

This alternative prioritization emphasizes the role of culture, in tone with Edensor's assertion on the inexpedient dominance of historical origins as the pinnacle of national identity, as observed in three decades of literature on the subject (Edensor, 2002, p. 1). Smith argues that the national identity is built around "common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions" (1991, p. 11), which become the cohesive devices for cultural communities, while the "historic memories and associations, the place where 'our' sages, saints and heroes lived, worked, prayed and fought" (Smith, 1991, p. 9) are encapsulated in this repository called *homeland*.

National identity permeates every aspect of human life, from "historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties" (Smith, 1991, p. 43) to "national landscapes, particular symbolic sites (monuments, historic centers and institutions), points of assembly, and the everyday landscapes of domestic and routine life" (Edensor, 2002, p. 69), making these markers important for the study of national identity in conversations.

The dynamics of cultural exchanges

Cultural exchanges, as standardized by Reddit, are programmed conversations/Q&As between subreddits, bridging the divide separating very focused content communities. They tend to follow a pattern and abide to special rules.

Every Reddit community is moderated by a group of active users with special privileges (deleting comments, banning other users), granted by a custom set of rules. However, during cultural exchanges, extra precautions are put into place, "moderation outside of the rules may take place as to not spoil this friendly exchange" (Welcome /r/Polska! Today we are hosting /r/Polska for a question and culture exchange session!, 2017). This entails that cultural exchanges are more closely scrutinized, in order to identify hate-speech, harassment and other offensive behaviors.

Cultural exchanges sometimes feature preliminary phases, like requests and reminders. Most often, the requests are not public, but set between moderators. The reminders let the community know the date and the starting time, as exchanges are treated like events. The bulk of the conversation happens in a short time-span, rendering it a mostly synchronous type of computer mediated communication.

An analysis of Reddit cultural exchanges

The purpose of this research is to identify the way Reddit users construct national identities and narratives through the practice of organizing cultural exchange between subreddits, given then intrinsic dynamics of the user-sustained and seemingly selfless virtual communities inhabiting the national subreddits.

Research design

This research attempts to answer the following research question, focused more on the conversation and less on individuals and motives. We use 'digital ambassador' more as an umbrella term for the action of spontaneously representing a country, voiding it of the signification of an official envoy anointed with this task. The four research questions are:

(RQ1) What are the main topics that redditors tackle in cultural exchanges?

(RQ2) How are these topics related and what narratives do they create?

(RQ3) Is the conversation inclusive? Does it give voice to diverse users from different cultures?

Methodology

We employed as primary research method the content analysis, using automated and semi-automated tools, doubled by manual analysis where the tools fell short and gave room for errors. The ten Eastern-European countries were selected based on the United Nations geo-scheme for Europe. As such, the national subreddits for Belarus (BY), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Moldova (MD), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Russia

(RU), Slovakia (SK) and Ukraine (UA) were interrogated for the search term 'cultural exchange', in order to single out the relevant threads.

The size and nature of the data set justify a quantitative approach, for both the natural language analysis and for determining the idiosyncrasies of the redditors engaged in the conversation.

Data collection

The original dataset was comprised of 8518 comments collected from 98 threaded conversations. However, 501 comments and 3 threads were eliminated due to errors, leaving the dataset with **N=8017** (see *Table 1*). The data, collected through interrogating the Reddit public API in January 2018, includes the following information:

- comment text
- author handle
- author flair (a label chosen by users to appear next to their name; a user can have different flairs for different subreddits)
- date of publishing (spanning from 2014 to 2017)

Table 1. *Number of subscribers (S); number of comments and treads analyzed*

	BY	**BG**	**CZ**	**HU**	**MD**	**PL**	**RO**	**RU**	**SK**	**UA**	**total**
S	1219	19718	5123	26256	869	78014	64173	28676	12049	7997	
comm.	2	49	181	964	6	3108	814	2603	4	286	8017
threads	2	3	4	17	1	27	7	26	2	6	95

Using a Java Script module, we extracted the URLs from the comment body corpus (L=2817) and replaced them with the domain of the website, to aid the co-occurrence analysis.

Analysis

We subtracted from the original dataset (N=8017) the comments deleted due to non-compliance with the Reddit rules of conduct during cultural exchanges (**Nd=7843**). The content of those comments is no longer available, but they remained marked as [deleted] or [removed].

73 comments were posted by bots, scripts integrated in user accounts, crawling certain subreddits and automatically posting responses based on key words or links. Given the nature of the subsequent analysis on user profiles, we delineate a new dataset with no bot comments and untraceable deleted accounts (413): **Nu=7357**.

A. The redditors and flairs

The 7357 comments were posted by **U=2015** Reddit users. An extrapolation of the Pareto principle for internet culture (80% of the comments come from 20% of the users) fails with our dataset: 20% of the users make up for 64.6% of the comments, 80% of the comments

come from 39.4% of the users. At one end of the spectrum are 965 users (almost half) who only commented once, and at the other, one user with 557 comments. A closer look at the accounts of the most prolific commentators reveals that they are moderators for national subreddits: *u/pothkan* for Poland (557 comments), *u/WeAreBRICS* (246) for Russia and *u/multubunu* (55) for Romania.

Based on *Table 2*, we can determine that the 32 active moderators are responsible for 15% of the conversation. Subsequently, we measured that only 6% of the comments posted by the moderators were posted to subreddits other than the ones they were moderating.

Table 2. *Distribution of moderators' activity on the sampled subreddits*

	BY	**BG**	**CZ**	**HU**	**MD**	**PL**	**RO**	**RU**	**SK**	**UA**	**total**
no. of comm. from mods	0	8	9	67	3	618	137	254	0	11	1107
no. of mods	4	3	5	11	6	14	10	4	3	6	66
no. of active mods	0	2	2	5	2	8	8	3	0	2	32

A total of **Nf=4606** comments (62.6%) have flairs. Semi-automated and manual filtering were used to circumscribe the city, region or county flairs to countries. 59.4% of comments are from the ten sampled counties, 28% are spread across the world map, mostly Europe (*see Table 3*), while 12.6% fall into the 'other' category (e.g.: *I am pirate, dog*).

Table 3. *Distribution of comments based on flair*

sampled countries	**no. of comments**	**no. of users**	**continent**	**no. of comments**	**no. of countries**
Poland	1159	138	Europe*	716	21
Russia	748	82	Asia	194	7
Hungary	387	58	South America	152	3
Romania	286	79	Middle East	150	8
Czech Republic	66	27	North America	69	3
Ukraine	60	23	Africa	6	2
Bulgaria	16	8	Central America	2	1
Belarus	9	4	Australia	2	1
Moldova	5	3			
Slovakia	2	2			
total	2738	424	total	1291	46

**we excluded the 10 sampled countries from this number*

From the 95 threads collected, 60 were actual cultural exchanges and 35 were requests, reminders and trans-national dating advice. The following network graph (*Figure 1*), created with NodeXL, indicates the relationship between subreddits based on the sampled threads. Poland has the largest vertices, with 29 conversations with other subreddits, 22 for Russia, Hungary with 19 and Romania with 10. This visualization maps out the relationships between the sampled subreddits (with purple) and all the subreddits they had contact with regarding cultural exchanges.

What becomes apparent is that the most prolific subreddits clustered and participated in Easter-European cultural exchanges. Poland, Russia, Hungary and Romania, plus the

Czech Republic and Ukraine take middle stage, while Belarus, Bulgaria and Slovakia appear on the visualization only due to the campaigns of *r/Iranian* and *r/Francophonie* to organize virtual meetings, which never materialized.

Figure 1. *Network graph featuring all the subreddits engaged in cultural exchanges and related conversations*



B. Co-occurrence analysis

For a more comprehensive view on the topics and patterns hidden in the text corpus (approximately 2 million characters), we operated with KH Coder, an open source software used for quantitative content analysis and text mining. Based on the part-of-speech tagger results and frequency charts we coded the recurrent terms into concepts of interest for the study of national identity markers.

Figure 2. *Concept co-occurrence networks for Reddit cultural exchanges*



Edges were filtered based on the Jaccard similarity coefficient. *Figure 2* showcases codes with a frequency over 250. Even though the frequencies for positive and negative quantifiers and qualifiers were considerable, we refrained from introducing them into the analysis. These terms are too volatile and could sidetrack the whole study in a flawed sentiment analysis. Furthermore, we excluded from the visualization codes with high frequencies, but with little to say about the conversation.

The software identified 19 communities (subgraphs) delineating conversational clusters. We selected just a few from the visualization and extracted some of the subjects approached in conversation. We detailed the code where it was necessary (some codes are comprised of a single term).

- *Community 01 – 11*: Russia, Poland and the media (TV news, press, music, literature, movies, books); popular media and popular gastronomy; justice, freedom and minorities; conflicts in the world, in Europe, in the USA; religion, language and culture; swear words and politics; problems in justice, economy and politics;
- *Community 03*: Romania, Moldova and Transylvania, the ladder in relation to politics, UDMR (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania); also the Roma communities and a 0.1 coefficient tie to France;
- *Communities 04 – 14*: tourism and natural landmarks (mountains and lakes), Russian and Hungarian cities and towns; also, Hungarian and Turkish politics, mainly Viktor Orban, FIDESZ, Jobbik and Recep Erdoğan;

- *Community 06 – 16*: the Reddit corner, meta and self-referential, using the Reddit lingo and abbreviations common to computer mediated communication;
- *Community 07 – 17*: proper etiquette and a visible Q&A dynamic; questions about the Hungarian-Polish friendship;
- *Community 09*: Israel and the Jewish people, the Nazi party, Adolf Hitler and the Holocaust;
- *Community 19*: the Polish Law and Justice Party, Jarosław Kaczyński and other politicians in relation to nationalism.

Findings

Even though we set up to uncover how the national identities of Eastern European countries are portrayed through the Reddit cultural exchanges, our research is visibly skewed due to the incongruence of the communities sampled. As seen in *Table 1*, the 10 Reddit communities selected have various numbers of subscribers. Furthermore, a massive role is played by the moderators, which behave like hosts, 'people of the house', entertaining the conversation: our analysis shows that 32 mods wrote 15% of the comments. The most active communities were those of Poland, Russia, Romania and Hungary, making them the most visible throughout the whole research.

Even though the sampled subreddits had cultural exchanges with other world countries and non-national subreddits, the conversation revolves around Easter-European topics. This can be explained by the fact that Poland, in its constant activity, engaged in exchanges with Russia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine and the Czech Republic, consolidating an Eastern European front which overpowered any other subjects, on a macro level. If we compare the flairs and the co-occurrence network, we see other countries, like Iran, India, Estonia, Latvia, Spain, Croatia and Albania, at the outskirt of the visualization, with low frequencies. This does not entail that the exchanges were not fruitful, just that our sample was constructed favoring the Eastern European conversation.

Reddit can turn self-referential and meta very easily, engulfing decades of internet culture, creating its own lingo and mannerisms, all occupying a distinct and visible cluster in *Figure 2*. Politics play an important part in the conversation, with both current affairs and historical milestones. The present state of Europe is being scrutinizes – the rise of nationalism, the refugee crisis, Crimea and the minorities are recurrent topics in these transnational conversations.

We identified the markers for national identity, as described by the literature: the homeland and historical figures and events; gastronomy, most notably the pierogi and alcoholic beverages; languages and dialects; landmarks, brag-worthy landscapes and places to visit; culture and media, all spun around the core everyday life – politics, the economy, education, religion.

Conclusion

Given Reddit's architecture and dynamics, the conversations in cultural exchanges are as inclusive as the rules and the moderators permit them to be. The most popular opinions will always rise to the top of the thread, the least agreeable will be heavily downvoted and

sink to the end of the thread, while the truly offensive and out of place will be eliminated by the moderators.

As it so often happens on discussion platforms, there is constant usership, able to steer the conversation in any direction. We searched for quantitative data that would talk about the distribution of activity in this type of online setting. The Pareto principle extrapolated for virtual communities fell short in this particular case, but we identified a new type of dynamic, that of the overly active moderators. This raises new and troubling questions about the role of the discussion moderator as both the entity capable to silence and voice ideas.

However, these 'digital ambassadors' have proven, as a group, not as individuals, that they possess the knowledge and insight to talk about matters of national identity, politics and current affairs, in a fairly civilized manner (*Figure 2* shows a frequent amount of swear words in correlation with political matters), all in a seemingly selfless manner, but as part of a community (we are aware of the Reddit appraisal system of karma points and gold).

We cannot isolate national narratives from this analysis, but we clearly see in the co-occurrence network the topical narratives – USSR and communism; the Jewish people, the Nazis and the Holocaust; politics and the rise of nationalism in present-day Poland; the power and the problems of the European Union. We find these more thought-provoking than a national narrative or a historical account of what makes each country unique. This research peeped into how internet users perceive this real, vast place called Eastern Europe.

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MEDIALIZED POLITICS AND POLITICIZED MEDIA. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BULGARIAN MEDIA MODEL

Bissera Zankova

Abstract: The article explores some characteristics of the Bulgarian media system through the prism of the impact media has on politics and politics has on media. The analysis also dwells on the recent penetration of showbusiness in this complicated process. The article provides observations and conclusions explaining the precarious situation of Bulgarian media.

Keywords: media, politicization of media, mediatization of politics, showbusiness in media.

Mediatization of contemporary reality

The intermingling of media and politics is not a new phenomenon. However, today we witness mediatization everywhere – a process as strong as globalization. Due to the advent of technology the intensity of mediated experiences has increased to stretch beyond the pure mediation and interaction with political actors who strive to influence the news or public agenda. As Strömback (2008, p. 234) points out "the mediation of politics should be perceived of as one, although necessary, part of the mediatization of politics" Nowadays society is permeated with the media to such degree that "the mediated realities replace the notion of a belief in objective realities" (p. 240). The fusion of technology, media and politics has led to the fact that "political communication cannot operate without technological tools." (Ostrowska & Garlicki, 2013, p. 19). The Internet and the social platforms can either facilitate wider public participation and involvement or they can stimulate deformed relationships between the media outlets and politicians and put at stake the fourth power role of the media in the digital age.

On May 3rd 2018 (the World Free Press Day) the European Parliament adopted a resolution on media pluralism and media freedom in the European Union announcing a set of principles in support of media independence. Exposing the subversive methods taken on board by politicians to capture the media outlets the document particularly "condemns attempts by governments to silence critical media and demolish media freedom and pluralism, including by more sophisticated ways (...), such as by government members and their cronies buying up commercial media outlets and hijacking the public service media to serve partisan interests." The passing of the resolution in and by itself serves as an admonition of the real risks that have currently loomed on the European media.

The BG media environment – between politicization and mediatization: a general overview

The developments in the Bulgarian media system either to the direction of politicization or to the direction of mediatization are illustrative how perilous for the media environment the close ties between the political and economic actors, on the one hand, and the media, on the other, can be. Against the backdrop of corruption and collusion between media, politicians, and oligarchs the dubious position of the media vis a vis the government, political figures and business circles raises serious concerns about the media independence.

The media in Bulgaria are in a precarious situation and according to the Reporters without Borders (RwB) ranking for 2018 the country occupies 111 place because "although the current holder of the European Council's rotating presidency (until the end of June 2018), Bulgaria is now lower in the Index than all the countries in the western Balkans, some of which are candidates for EU membership. The RwB assessment led to polarized reactions in the public space – while the media generally supported the inferences (Mediapool, 2018a), the politicians called the ranking manipulative (Mediapool, 2018b). However, the evaluation of RwB coincided with the conclusions of other independent international organizations. The US Department of State makes the same observations in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 concerning Bulgaria stating that "corporate and political pressure combined with the growing and nontransparent concentration of media ownership and distribution networks, as well as government regulation of resources and support for the media, gravely damaged media pluralism". The International Research and Exchanges Board's (IREX) 2017 *Media Sustainability Index* report expressing similar thoughts dwells on the specific methods used by political parties and economic groups which "exert influence, ruin the reputations of political and business opponents, and manipulate public opinion" thus undermining public's trust in the media. Further the publication noted that the reports of intimidation, violence and economic measures against journalists persist. The cases are not investigated properly or publicly exposed. Due to these negative tendencies the Bulgarian media system is classified as "unsustainable mixed system with unsustainable anti-free press".

Politicization of the media in Bulgaria

In the years after the democratic changes the politicization of public service media and the commercialization of private media were given as examples of the rising risks for the Bulgarian democratic society. Such conclusions are made still in 2008 in the OSI follow-up monitoring reports ("Television across Europe" (OSI, 2008) and later in the Mediadem reports (Mediadem, 2010). Experts emphasize that the rapid and extensive liberalization of the media sector in Bulgaria without applying the necessary legal framework for a long time after the beginning of social transformations has led to institutional controversies in different periods (resulting in law suits and scandals in the awarding of broadcasting licenses or in the preparation for digitization) and eventually to heavy concentrations of the media market (Smilov, Ganev & Smilova, 2012). Effective regulation of media concentrations and transparency of media ownership has been and is still missing. In 2010 a special provision was envisaged in the Act for the compulsory depositing of printing and other works (title amended – SG 42/09, in force from 06.07.2009, am. 2010) regarding transparency of

print media ownership providing for the announcement of the owners and headquarters of newspapers at the beginning of each year. The regime has not produced tangible results so far. Despite this obvious legal failure in 2018 deputies from the opposition "Rights and Liberties Movement" party (with the active involvement of the media oligarch and deputy Delian Peevsky) introduced a draft law to expand the same provision to encompass audiovisual and online media neglecting the apparent systematic and legal contradictions of such approach. It also comprised an attempt to politically harness the media especially to put pressure on the media rivals of Peevsky and his New Media Group, the largest one in BG. Though problematic the parties in office lent their support to the controversial instrument and it was adopted.

With the blending of political and economic interests, banking, media distribution, etc. the overall politicization of the media stands out as being completed. This is also the general conclusion of a report prepared by the Media Monitoring Laboratory with the KAS Media programme for South East Europe (2014). Experts express their worry that "through the year the process of politicization of the media has been exclusively confirmed. Political themes occupied the considerable part of the information materials online. The dominant tone in the coverage was dedicated to conflicts: defamation, discrediting materials and lie have normally come to the centre of the arsenal of the political toolbox."

Political parties use also the weapon of fake news to smear each other and manipulate public discourse. (Dimitrova, 2017). This behaviour deals a blow on free and independent debate. A recent survey by Gallup International discerns a considerable problem with respect to public trust in any official information circulated. (Jordanova, 2018). The question is whether it is now possible at all for the institutions to convince citizens of the need for unpopular measures, even if these measures are necessary, "Gallup" points out. These are the hallmarks of a serious crisis between the media, political parties and the public.

The politicization of the Bulgarian media can be explained by various reasons. The media system represents a hybrid of media models with features of the polarized and pluralist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), the tradition of the establishment of close ties between journalists and political parties and vice versa is still alive (Daskalova, 2013) and there is a lack of or a low respect for individual freedom in the Bulgarian society which historically has developed like collective society (Zankova & Glowacki, 2018). Weak journalistic associations at the expense of strong media owners' unions and generally passive civil society comprise other conditions for the deplorable situation. The tabloidization of media culture which in Bulgaria means the media stay close to powerholders and radically change their attitude depending on the twists in power is a conspicuous feature of local journalism. The non-transparency of media property gets us back to the period of the beginning of the democratic changes when the persons working for the former DC (State Security) could easily put money in various lucrative businesses including the media and their shares have not been brought to light so far as explained by the German journalist Frank Stier. The hidden public funding of some media outlets through the European communications financing strategies according to vague and discriminatory criteria is another reason for their standing close to ruling parties and therefore politicization (Antonova, 2017).

Mediatization of politics

The politicization of the media created a flourishing ground for the mediatization of politics accomplished through institutional, operational and personal relationships.

It will not be an exaggeration to state that the media play the role of PR agents of politicians and they feel very comfortable embracing this role (Stefanova, 2014). The media station TV 7 financed by Corporative and Commercial Bank was established to serve the political ambitions of its managing director Tzvetan Vassilev but it was closed down after the bank went bust in 2008 causing damage of 4 bln BG leva. Several parties also began their start from the media sector (some of them are non-existent by now but their members are Euro deputies or advisers with the government), others are allies to the party in office. Social media particularly provide ample opportunities for campaigning which are thoroughly exploited by start-up politicians. Scientists draw attention to the peculiar fact that even the zone of journalistic inquiries was occupied by politicians and political parties (Spassov, 2011, p. 232). Though no longer operative the Bulgarian political party RZS (Order, legality and justice) (2005-2011) investigated other politicians and through scandals and slander nurtured media news and currency affairs programmes.

Showmen in politics

The case of Slavi Trifonov who presents his night talk show is an example of the relationships between the media, showbiz and politics. Some years ago Slavi and politicians were on friendly terms. Many of them were guests at the show to gain publicity. On the one hand, this format operated as their PR forum, but on the other, through the instruments of entertainment and satire their behaviour had been exposed to the people. After acting to the one or another direction Trifonov decided to announce his own political project to organize a referendum to introduce a majority vote system in parliament and to trigger political changes. This was considered the first step only towards the total refurbishing of the national political system. Under the Act on the Direct Participation of Citizens in State Authority and Local Self-Governance (SG, N 44/2009, am. until 2015) such referendum was initiated by an Initiative Committee headed by Trifonov and was carried out on Nov 6 2016 as a part and parcel of the presidential elections. Under the law the referendum decisions become mandatory if two conditions are met: to have at least as many real voters as in the last parliamentary elections before the referendum and to support one of the answers of over 50% of the voters. In the case of Slavi's referendum, the second condition is completely fulfilled – for all three issues raised the support was over 60%. More than 70% of the voters wanted a majority system in two rounds with an absolute majority and the political party subsidies to be reduced.

After winning the early parliamentary elections in 2017 the GERB party declared they would support the changes voiced in the referendum and introduced a draft law providing for majority voting system in two rounds and a reduction of the party subsidy but their coalition partners announced they would pursue other options and no concrete legislative steps have been taken afterwards.

In the meanwhile, Slavi Trifonov persisted with his alternative methods to the direction of radical political reforms organizing a "casting" for his future political project. The competition for future oriented politicians took place on 2, 3 and 4 February 2018 and 3777

people participated in the live streamed discussion. Slavi also declared that the political class and the way it is elected in the country are "archaic, incapable, dysfunctional, corrupted and need a ruthless change." In addition, he announced that castings would continue.

No doubt being a popular show figure and using skillfully the opportunities provided by the broadcasting and online media his ideas are embraced by large segments of society. On Facebook Trifonov has 150 000 followers compared to 100 000 of the BG president. The populist stance of his project is well vivid in any of his performances. Whether his "virtual superiority" will assure him also political superiority is hard to predict.

Though Trifonov's own political party establishment has been a long-expected goal both by supporters and opponents this has not happened yet. Some commentators are of the opinion he has the charisma to become a successful political leader while others pragmatically stress the fact that he lacks the financial resources to create a solid political subject. For some sociologists he symbolizes the end of professional politicians and the return to normality in political life while others discern in his political ambition a protest against all powerholders. Still Trifonov's plans remain unclear and that is why there are specialists addressing his project as a "ghostly" one.

Slavi Trifonov project is an example how by various means the media colonizes politics in Bulgaria and how impotent civil society and public opinion to debunk such attempts are. Though accused of populism, Slavi Trifonov and his followers claim to be the voice of people expressing the general public indignation and disappointment with the rulers. No doubt Trifonov takes benefit of any opportunity provided by the media and the law. Though the success of the referendum was a surprise and a slam on the political caste, crucial changes out of these steps cannot be expected.

Conclusion: media, politics, showbizz and democracy

What is striking about Bulgaria nowadays is that the public relies on popular showmen like Slavi Trifonov and on the so severely criticized fusion between politics and media to bring forth the necessary reforms. To pursue the changes through the democratic procedures is considered outdated and ineffective. The Bulgarian society somehow willingly takes part in the grand political and media show that unfolds in the country. Let us simply recall the Slavi Trifonov's concert concluding his referendum campaign turned into a magnificent event which attracted 100 000 attendants with its patriotic slogans and songs. Political commentators think that the new political projects mushrooming in Bulgaria pursue populism without reforms. (Jelev, 2018) Analyzing Trifonov's campaign the Bulgarian journalist and blogger Ivan Bedrov comments for DW: "The real casting is the elections. What we see at the moment is just a show." (Bedrov, 2016)

The question here is how to accomplish changes in society. Transformations in the media field particularly are not popular to be massively supported as they are considered by and large an issue of the media sector itself – of journalists and media owners. If triggered the normal democratic procedures can result in certain modifications of the regulation of the media – hopefully positive. Why democratic instruments like petitions, public consultations and campaigns have not been taken on board by the civil society? Apparently, there is disillusionment and fatigue among social groups and communities. More reasons can be possibly stated in addition to the conclusion that the overall atmosphere is not nourishing reforms.

To start from the general prerequisites, democracy and rule of law are perceived as shallow words without real value for society. This is vivid in the responses to a survey done in 2017 by the "Trend" agency. According to the results human rights, freedom and rule of law stay in respectively 5th, 6th and 7th place. The data illustrates the feeling of the people at large that social changes and democracy have not brought them much good (Mediapool, 2018c).

Law in particular is understood not as an effective mechanism of social impact but as a restrictive instrument that should be evaded whenever possible. Legal instruments are thought to be generally unfair and supporting the economically powerful. (Vassileva, 2018) May be this attitude is due to the fact that laws are not of very high quality, are in constant flux, and their implementation is not always in line with the letter and spirit of norms, besides people in Bulgaria generally do not trust the judicial system.

An interesting point that could be taken into account is that the Bulgarian society is more inclined to trust and make use of the irrational than of the rational. Such perception of reality can impede practical action. A recent survey done by "Trend" has shown that 40% of the Bulgarians believe in the existence of a secret society that governs the world and more than half of the people with high education interviewed share this view. (NewsBG, 2018)

Specifically about the media the dual media model was imported in the country during the democratic transition and possibly never sufficiently adopted as one owned and trusted by the society. Especially public service media are still considered state media and this is not far from reality considering their financing and programming.

The media development has been driven by the owners and journalists and journalistic organizations have not had a major say in the structuring of the broadcasting law. During the first stage of the democratic transition genuine expertise in media regulation was also missing and this fact coupled by the delayed adoption of an appropriate regulatory framework allowed powerful political and economic groups to entrench their interests in the media as well.

The most alarming signal about the media and journalism in Bulgaria is that the profession is still dispersed and disorganized, more than twenty years after the democratic changes have started. Recently the debate about regulating and strengthening journalistic profession has been invigorated in the public space, too late, may be.

Still weak and easy to be politically manipulated is civil society, there is civil inertia, fatigue, and the famous Bulgarian caricaturist Hristo Komarnitzki calls it "the great civil failure".

Under these conditions the media and the society are on the side of the losers in the political game and apparently left to the mercy of showmen. Though politicians always repeat that the problem of Bulgarian media is that they enjoy super even overbearing freedom in fact the media remain hostages of petty political and economic interests. Initiatives for amending the laws related to the media or passing new ones come rarely to the fore and predominantly from the political parties following their parochial preferences and the demands of the concrete political situation. It is rather paradoxical but also pessimistic about the future of the Bulgarian media.

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